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PREFACE 
This study is both a "spinoff" and an up-date of a larger work, 
Human Rights in the People's Republic of China. The larger study is a 
comprehensive treatment of the subject, complete with historical back-
ground and topical analysis. In this study, we endeavor to pick up 
where the larger work left off, focusing on the years 1986-1987. We 
also plan to write future annual "watches." 
In this "annual review" of the human rights condition in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, we have used the massive student demonstra-
tions at the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987 as a take-off point 
from which to look back through the year 1986 and assess events of 
the first half of 1987. We shy away from the popular method of 
"itemization"-that is, listing reported cases of human rights viola-
tions in narrowly and arbitrarily defined categories. Instead, we have 
taken a "macro-systemic" approach, remembering that China is a 
communist country where there is an official guiding ideology and that 
the society is controlled from the top. Insofar as communism and cen-
tralized control are antithetical to the practice of human rights in the 
Western sense we assume this helps explain, though it does not excuse, 
human rights abuses in China. 
Seen in this light, the year-end student demonstrations as well as 
their subsequent suppression can be viewed as symptoms of long-sim-
mering problems. We believe that they also reflect "contradictions" 
between the political controls used in a communist political system 
and efforts to modernize China based upon free market principles. 
During the period under review, clearly there have been both confus-
ing signals and bold, if at times naive initiatives on the part of the 
political leaders in power, to reform the polity and the economic 
system. 
The demonstrations then can be regarded as a sudden outpouring 
of demands for human freedoms long suppressed in a society which 
had only recently attempted a measured relaxation of control. The 
goal was to revive a stagnant economy. The subsequent reimposition 
of political controls similar to those used over the past three and one-
half decades provides proof that Chinese Communist Party leaders 
were fearful of any challenge to their power. More important, they 
can be expected to prevent democracy and individual freedom from 
becoming a reality, and, where necessary, to sacrifice economic 
freedoms. 
(1) 
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The authors also see an inherent incompatibility between respect 
for human rights and China's brand of totalitarianism, though the lat-
ter may be in the process of evolving toward another political style or 
system. However, even if totalitarianism is giving way to a more tradi-
tional form of authoritarianism, as some scholars contend, human 
rights abuses remain very serious. They are just different. 
The reader is also reminded that during the period under review 
reforms were promoted by the faction of the Chinese Communist 
Party in control. When problems associated with the reform oc-
curred, as happened in late 1986, China's leaders cast blame on the 
reform. Outspoken critics of the system who were at first encouraged 
were then suppressed. Party Secretary-General Hu Yaobang was 
forced to resign. He favored reform. Deng Xiaoping changed his po-
sition on democratic reform-as he had done several times before. 1 
The result was "reform in reverse" which favored leftist, orthodox 
communism and was designed to strengthen Party control and "so-
cialism with Chinese characteristics." 
By mid-1987, with the student demonstrations suppressed and 
the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign officially still on the 
agenda, reform had clearly suffered a setback, and the cause of human 
rights suffered. We have tried to underscore this theme in our review 
of the developments in the topic areas that relate most closely to the 
human rights condition in China. We have also examined the abuses 
themselves. 
In the course of our research, the authors were struck by the dif-
ferent standards adopted by the U.S. government and the American 
press towards the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union 
respectively on the human rights issue. United States responses in the 
Daniloff case and the John Burns case (reporters expelled by the 
USSR and the PRC respectively), for example, provide a study in con-
trasts. Likewise, we cannot help but observe that, although there are 
serious human rights abuses in China, Beijing is only infrequently 
criticized. 
One final note: The chapter on economy and human rights was 
I. By mid-1987, there were speculations that Deng Xiaoping was shifting his position 
again after a period of "ideological chill" brought on by orthodox ideologues opposed to 
reform. See, for example, Julian Baum, "Policy Shift in China?" Christian Science Moni-
tor, June 26, 1987, p. I; Howard G. Chua-Eoan, "The Old Man and the Mountains," Time, 
July 13, 1987, p. 41. 
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I. INTRODUCI'ION 
Toward the end of 1986, Deng Xiaoping's reformist policy of lim-
ited relaxation was put to a test as a result of a series of student dem-
onstrations that raged through dozens of the nation's universities and 
colleges in 17 major cities. The students, the nation's privileged elite, 
demanded freedom and democracy. Despite official warnings, demon-
strations continued into the new year, sending shock waves that 
reached the top echelon of the Chinese Communist Party leadership. 
The demonstrations not only foreshadowed drastic changes in the in-
ner circles of power in Beijing; they also ushered in a new wave of 
purges and the suppression of what little intellectual freedom had been 
briefly permitted. The human rights implications are obvious. 
In cracking down on the student unrest and in subsequently lead-
ing a charge against "bourgeois liberalization," Deng Xiaoping sig-
naled not so much an abrupt turnaround in his attitude, but rather a 
tightening of the official policy which rejected the basic principles of 
human rights as bourgeois in nature. Deng showed that he is not a 
"pragmatic" liberal leader with little regard for ideology, as he is often 
pictured in the West; rather, he is a Marxist ruler who tolerates 
neither challenge to his power nor dissent in ideology. 
In freedom of thought, before the latest crackdown, much of 1986 
saw the continuation of measured relaxation without departure from 
the proclaimed Marxist line. The trend, as in the past few years, was a 
zigzagged one, however, punctuated by advances and setbacks, as the 
"reformists" and hardliners continued to engage in a high-stake strug-
gle. As year-end approached, there were clear signals coming from 
the highest policy-making echelon as reflected in speeches and state-
ments by top leaders as well as actions by the government. Taken 
together, these signals suggest that the orthodox communists, (whom 
the Deng faction referred to as "radical leftists,") often confusingly 
labelled as "conservatives" in the West, were gaining an upper hand 
and the trends toward further liberalization had suffered a setback. 
One of the most significant developments was the appearance of 
the phrase "opposing bourgeois liberalization" in a long resolution 
passed by the sixth plenum of the Party Central Committee in late 
September 1986. Bourgeois liberalization, according to that important 
document, is contrary to socialism, and, therefore, must be firmly op-
posed. Coming from this top Party meeting, this had to be taken seri-
ously. With the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign of late 1983 still 
(5) 
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fresh in mind, many people in China saw this as a sign that the Party 
planned to tighten its grip again after a period of limited relaxation. 
The chilling effect would be inevitable. 
The year 1986 was marked by several significant events that had 
an impact on freedom of thought in general. These include statements 
on ideological freedom made by several top Party leaders, the appoint-
ment of a new Minister of Cultural Affairs, and, of course, the Party 
Central Committee meeting held in September at which a document 
on building "socialist civilization" was adopted. 
The resolution reaffirmed China's commitment to economic mod-
ernization while warning against corruption and other evils. It cham-
pioned "socialist morality" and warned that it was wrong to "blindly 
worship bourgeois philosophies and social doctrines." Deng Xiaoping 
called for political reforms, but what he meant was a renewed effort to 
reduce inefficiency and corruption. Important policy decisions of a 
specific nature had been expected from the Party meeting in Septem-
ber. However, Deng later conceded that it was too early to make con-
crete decisions on political reform, a sensitive issue that could affect 
the power of millions of middle-level cadres throughout the country. 1 
Instead, the Party resolution stressed only ideological work. 
In promoting socialist values, the resolution emphatically rejected 
"bourgeois liberalization" and capitalism. "Bourgeois liberalization, 
which means negating the socialist system in favor of capitalism, is in 
total contradiction to people's interests," it declared. 
Referring to the growth of official corruption and crime that was 
attributed to economic reform, the resolution read: "Socialist moral-
ity rejects both the idea and the practice of pursuing personal interests 
at the expense of others, putting money above all else, abusing power 
for personal gain, cheating and extortion." Stopping short of reviving 
the 1983 Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign to fight "Western deca-
dence," the resolution instead reaffirmed the newly promulgated 
"Double Hundred" policy-Deng Xiaoping's latest borrowing of Mao 
Zedong's 1956 slogan to "let one hundred flowers bloom and one hun-
dred schools of thought contend"-to allow greater freedom of expres-
sion by intellectuals in order to help the troubled reform. However, 
the resolution was quick to set guidelines for the intellectuals in their 
new task of extolling the new official line with a clear and unequivocal 
definition of socialist ethics: "It means essentially love of the mother-
I. See Chapter VI, The Economy and Human Rights. 
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land, the people, labor, science and socialism. " 2 
On September 8, just before the Party Central Committee meet-
ing, Hu Qili, ranking member of the Party Secretariat, made the most 
explicit statement to date on political reform. Receiving Ch'en Ku-
ying, a native Taiwan scholar residing in the United States who was 
critical of the government in Taiwan, Hu answered Ch'en's query 
about political reforms as follows: 
Our political reform mainly refers to reform of the leader-
ship pattern, not reform of our socialist system. Our social-
ist system, won by our people through bloodshed and 
sacrifice, simply will never be changed. Our reform aims at 
improving and strengthening the leadership of the Party, not 
its abolishment. We are now carefully studying such struc-
tural reform. " 3 
Earlier, Wan Li, first vice premier and Deng Xiaoping's right-
hand man, had urged reform of the policy-making organ and 
processes. In a widely publicized speech, Wan pointed out the ur-
gency of political reform to coincide with the progress of economic 
reform, citing the over-concentration of power at the top and the lack 
of modern knowledge among top leaders as among the most serious 
problems hampering further efforts toward modernization. He urged 
bold reform to make the policy-making processes truly "scientific and 
democratic," replacing the "old, backward policy-making concepts 
and methods" with "new, scientific policy-making concepts and meth-
ods."4 It is well to remember that both Hu and Wan urged only struc-
tural and administrative reform, not reform of the system. 
2. "Peking Parley Backs Economic Policies," New York Times, September 29, 1986, 
p. A3. 
3. "Hu Qili Receives Ch'en Ku-ying and Discusses Political Reform," Chung Pao 
(Centre Daily News), eastern U.S. edition, September 10, 1986, p. 2. 
4. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), overseas edition, August 15, 1985, p. I. 

II. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND THEIR 
SUPPRESSION: A CHRONOLOGY 
Student activism has been an integral part of the history of 20th 
century China. Despite the complex manifestations and varying mo-
tives, two types of student activism can be broadly discerned: the 
spontaneous and the manipulated, and they are by no means mutually 
exclusive. The former tends to take place during periods of decline 
and weakness, the latter in times of strong central authority. Student 
agitation around the turn of the century, before the birth of the Chi-
nese Republic and the anti-Japanese student demonstrations during 
the 1930s, are prominent examples in the first category. The rampag-
ing Red Guards unleashed by Mao Zedong to attack his opponents 
during the Cultural Revolution and the student activism during the 
period of the Democracy Wall of 1979 which was skillfully manipu-
lated by Deng Xiaoping to topple Hua Guofeng from power, fall un-
mistakably under the second category. The most recent student 
demonstrations, first inspired by calls for political reform within the 
Party and later suppressed by the same powerful Party authorities, 
would seem to fit the second category, although there were elements of 
both spontaneity and manipulation. However, one should not lose 
sight of the fact that by suppressing the student movements, the ruling 
power structure, even in periods of seeming strength, was in effect 
demonstrating an inherent institutional weakness and lack of self-
confidence. 
Student demonstrations first broke out in early December 1986 at 
the elitist University of Science and Technology in Hefei, Anhui prov-
ince, seemingly over local issues, including students' right to partici-
pate in local elections and poor living conditions on campus. The 
demonstrations grew more strident and quickly spread to other cities, 
where university students took to the streets and plastered campus 
buildings with posters demanding freedom and democracy. 
By December 17, the demonstrations had spread to the South-
west, with over 2,000 students of Yunnan University in Kunming pa-
rading through the streets and calling for democracy and freedom. 
The students waved banners proclaiming "Long Live Democracy!" 
and put up wall posters with similar messages, according to foreign 
faculty members at the university and other institutions. 1 
I. "Democracy Movement Takes Mainland China Like Wild Fire," Chung Pao (Cen-
tre Daily News), eastern U.S. edition, December 20, 1986, p. I. 
(9) 
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Because of Deng Xiaoping's "open" policy and lacking clear pol-
icy guidelines on student demonstrations, local authorities at first were 
at a loss as to how to cope with the situation. Over the course of the 
day on December 20,. when tens of thousands of university students 
marched in the streets of Shanghai, Wang Minguang, an official with 
the foreign affairs office of the city government, for example, was 
quoted as saying repeatedly that the demonstrations were "completely 
legal. " 2 
Small, printed manifestoes were handed out by the student 
protesters, explaining the reasons for the demonstrations. "To our 
countrymen," began one manifesto, on a 3 by 5 inch mimeographed 
slip of paper. "Our guiding principle is to oppose bureaucracy and 
authoritarianism and strive for democracy and freedom. The time has 
come to awaken the democratic ideas that have long been 
suppressed. " 3 
By the end of 1986, student demonstrations for freedom and de-
mocracy had swept 150 campuses in at least 17 major cities. Even 
before that, the authorities had decided to clamp down. Party intellec-
tuals who encouraged "bourgeois liberalization"-advocating capital-
ism and overthrow of the socialist system-were blamed. 4 
Demonstrators were accused of trying to "disrupt stability and unity" 
and "derange production and social order."5 The official New China 
News Agency (Xinhua) compared the activities of student protesters 
to the rampages of Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution in a 
thinly veiled attempt to intimidate advocates of civil and political free-
doms. "We have just gained some peace after the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Is the suffering brought about by the Cultural Revolution not 
enough?"6 By evoking the nightmarish memories of the years of anar-
chy and institutional violence, the press agency thus began a powerful 
campaign to justify the coming repression in the name of order and 
stability. 
The charges were all very familiar: violating laws, disturbing so-
cial order, anarchism and counterrevolutionary activities. To the par-
2. Edward A. Gargan, "Thousands Stage Rally in Shanghai Demanding Rights," 
New York Times, December 21, 1986, p. 1. 
3. Edward A. Gargan, "China Denounces Student Protests as 'Illegal Acts,' " New 
York Times, December 22, 1986, p. AI. 
4. Lawrence MacDonald, "Teacher Faces Beijing's Wrath," South China Morning 
Post, (Hong Kong) January 12, 1987, p. 17. 
5. Gargan, "China Denounces Student Protests as 'Illegal Acts,' " supra note 3, p. 
AI. 
6. Ibid. 
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ticipants, and keen observers of China, there was nothing new in this. 
The immediate precedent was the short-lived Beijing Spring and its 
subsequent suppression in 1979-1980. Both followed closely the pat-
tern of the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956-57. In all three cases, 
students and intellectuals were encouraged to speak out, only to fall 
victim to the ensuing suppression when the criticism inevitably went 
beyond the permissible limits, Constitutional guarantees of "free 
speech" notwithstanding (Article 35, 1982 Constitution). 
"Freedom and Democracy" 
The students demanded "freedom of the press and democracy, not au-
thoritarianism." Legally this was a legitimate complaint. Freedom of 
the press and other basic freedoms are guaranteed in China's Constitu-
tion. In fact, they have been included in the four different Constitu-
tions since 1954 and before that in the Common Program promulgated 
just before the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. 
Since they are in the Constitution, why then did the students still de-
mand these rights? The answer is that these rights to a large extent 
have existed on paper only. Constitutional provisions have been rou-
tinely ignored in practice. History has repeatedly shown that during 
such mass campaigns as the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries in 
1950-1952, the Hundred Flowers and the subsequent Anti-Rightist 
Campaign in 1957, the Great Leap Forward in 1958, the Cultural 
Revolution of 1966-1976, the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign of 
1983 and the most recent Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign, 
laws have not been a bulwark for the protection of people's rights; 
rather, they have been an instrument for totalitarian control. 
In Shanghai, the ban on student demonstration was issued on the 
night of December 21 and posted and broadcast the next day through-
out the city. But thousands continued to demonstrate. In the largest 
city in China, known for its recent history for radicalism, workers 
soon joined the students. About 2,000 of them were reported to have 
gathered in front of the City Hall and in the People's Park waiting for 
the students to arrive both on December 21 and 22. Factories banned 
the workers from participating. But, according to an Agence-France 
Presse (AFP) report from Shanghai, the ban was ignored.7 The in-
volvement of workers was apparently a deciding factor in the authori-
ties' decision to contain the spreading demonstrations in China's large 
cities. The demonstrators appeared to be organized. In Shanghai, for 
7. "Chinese Communists, in Policy Shift, Suppress Student Demonstrations," Chung 
Pao, December 23, 1986, p. I. 
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example, the demonstration was led by trucks equipped with loud-
speakers broadcasting speeches calling for democracy and freedom. 8 
One poster at Tongji University mentioned the unfair imprisonment of 
Wei Jingsheng, China's most famous dissident who was serving a 15-
year term.9 
Shanghai police posters detailed a list of forbidden activities. 
People were warned about disrupting order and breaking into any gov-
ernment offices, radio and television stations, news offices and foreign 
institutions. They were also warned against insulting government cad-
res, policemen and other state functionaries. Finally, they were for-
bidden from "encroaching on people's rights, from spreading rumors 
and misleading the people." By the evening of December 22, loud-
speakers atop the People's Congress Building on the People's Square 
began broadcasting the following police notice: 
Fellow citizens, at present People's Square is packed with 
many people and it is very disorderly. It has been reported 
that some bad elements have been creating trouble and mo-
lesting women. If and when such bad elements are uncov-
ered, bring them to the public security authorities 
immediately. 10 
On December 25, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) published a 
strongly-worded editorial, proclaiming "political reform only under 
Party leadership." It reaffirmed the four cardinal principles of the 
Deng regime, featuring close adherence to socialism and the 
supremacy of Party leadership. The four principles had always been 
mentioned on appropriate occasions, in fact almost ritualistically, and 
in ways often thought to be little more than lip service. With the stu-
dent demonstrations as a backdrop, preparing the nation for a new 
wave of suppression entailing, the reiteration by the Party organ of the 
four principles took on immediate significance. 
"Shed Some Blood" 
As the student demonstrations spread, emergency meetings were 
called in Beijing at which Deng was reported to favor suppression by 
force. Military takeover, reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution days, 
8. "Over 10,000 Students in Shanghai Demonstrate," Chung Pao, December 22, 1986, 
p. I. 
9. See Chapter XI on Human Rights Cases. 
10. Edward A. Gargan, "Police Warnings Cool China Protests," New York Times, De-
cember 23, 1986, p. A 12. 
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was reportedly discussed seriously. 11 At one of these meetings, the 
records of which were later distributed as guidelines for action, Deng 
urged stern measures to put down the demonstrations. He said: 
"When necessary, we must deal severely with those who defy orders. 
We can afford to shed some blood." Citing Wei Jingsheng as an exam-
ple, Deng said: "Just look at Wei Jingsheng. "We put him behind 
bars and the democracy movement died." "We haven't released him, 
but that did not raise much of an international uproar," Deng added 
contemptuously. He also told the meeting: "These few years, we have 
been too lax in curbing the tide of bourgeois liberalism." 12 
By December 26, the official New China News Agency reported 
the arrest of several workers who overturned and burned automobiles 
during the demonstrations in Shanghai. 13 Earlier, on the campus of 
Nankai University in Tianjin, wall posters urged emulating the people 
of the Philippines in overthrowing the Marcos regime. "Marcos has 
left Manila. The Filipino people have taught us what democracy is 
and what the people are capable of," said one poster. 14 
Meanwhile, demonstrations continued despite the official ban and 
news blackout. On December 26, students in Nanjing, Jiangsu prov-
ince and Jinan, Shandong province continued to demonstrate in sup-
port of students in Beijing and Shanghai. At Beijing University 
students gathered in front of wall posters. One poster compared the 
Chinese Communist Party with the most tyrannical rule in Chinese 
history in every respect, specifically pointing to its jailing people for 
political and religious beliefs. Another poster quoted Wan Li, a Vice 
Premier, as saying "Democracy is only a gift from us to certain de-
serving people" in an earlier debate with Fang Lizhi, then vice presi-
dent of the National University of Science and Technology in Anhui 
province. Fang has since been dismissed and expelled from the Party, 
after Deng Xiaoping named him as one of the culprits behind the stu-
dent unrest and criticized him for opposing socialism in China. Other 
posters reported student activities in Hefei, Shanghai, Nanjing and 
many other cities, concluding with the slogan "Long Live Democ-
II. "Chinese Communists Order Armed Police to Suppress Demonstrators," Shih-
chieh Jih-pao (World Journal), (Taipei), December 27, 1986, p.l. 
12. Edward A. Gargan, "Deng's Crushing of Protest is Described," New York Times, 
January 14, 1987, p. A3. 
13. Shih-chieh Jih-pao, supra note II. 
14. "Campus Posters Urge Emulating Filipino 'People's Revolution,'" Chung Pao, 
December 27, 1986, p. I. 
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racy!" and "End Tyranny!" underlined in red. 15 
On December 30, according to an AFP report, Beijing Normal 
University locked its gates to prevent students from leaving the cam-
pus. Blue-uniformed security personnel were dispatched to the scene 
to disperse those milling around the gates waiting to get out. One 
person from the crowd was arrested. Later, He Dongchang, deputy 
director of the State Education Commission, said the arrested individ-
ual was an "unemployed person from out-of-town." 16 Meanwhile, a 
United Press International (UPI) report said Beijing students, defying 
a government ban, put up posters that described the economic and 
social progress in capitalist Taiwan and South Korea, adding: "The 
CCP (Chinese Communist Party) is supposed to do better than the 
Kuomintang in Taiwan." 17 Not surprisingly, the New China News 
Agency on December 31 quoting a Beijing city official blamed "Tai-
wan agents" and radio broadcasts from Taiwan for instigating the pro-
tests. The allegation was immediately dismissed by Beijing University 
students. 18 
Following the ban in Shanghai, the Beijing city government also 
hastily drew up rules that virtually made any further public protests 
impossible and illegal. Under the new rules, the city required would-
be demonstrators to apply to the police for a permit in advance. The 
applicants had to state their names, the purpose of the demonstration, 
the number of people involved, and the time and route of the proposed 
march, the police said. In addition, the new rules forbade demonstra-
tions at the Great Hall of the People, the large conference hall in the 
city's center where senior leaders often meet state guests; the Beijing 
airport; the Zhongnanhai compound, where Communist leaders live 
and work; and the Diaoyutai state guesthouse, where visiting foreign 
dignitaries stay. The intention was clear: demonstrations, if ever to 
take place, are to be shielded from the view of foreigners so that infor-
mation could be controlled, and top leaders are to be protected from 
any eventuality. 19 
The rules were ostensibly issued to "uphold the legal rights of 
citizens to demonstrate and maintain public order;" in effect they out-
lawed public demonstrations. If the new regulations were not enough, 
Beijing's mayor made clear his attitude toward the protesters. Com-
15. "Over 1,000 Students Protesting on Tian An Men Square," Chung Pao, January 3, 
1987, p. I. 
16. Chung·yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), (Taipei), December 31, 1986, p. I. 
17. Chung·kuo Shih-pao (China Times), (Taipei), December 31, 1986, p. I. 
18. San Francisco Chronicle, January I, 1987, p. 16. 
19. "Beijing Promulgates Strict Regulations," Chung Pao, December 29, 1986, p. I. 
REFORM IN REVERSE 15 
paring the students to the rampaging Red Guards of the Cultural 
Revolution, he echoed the official line, proclaimed earlier in the 
Renmin Ribao editorial, on the necessity of preserving "unity and sta-
bility." "Demonstrations are useless," Mayor Chen Xitong said cate-
gorically, adding that he would oppose any further demonstrations by 
Beijing students. Warning against anarchy of the Cultural Revolution 
days in order to frighten the populace, the Renmin Ribao editorial 
stressed that "all further reforms need a stable environment."20 
The official press was mobilized in an all-out attack on "bourgeois 
liberaism" and those who allegedly sought "complete Westerniza-
tion," a convenient catch-all way of designating the critics of the Party 
in the current campaign. On January 14, 1987, major newspapers re-
printed a commentary from the Hongqi (Red Flag), the authoritative 
journal of the Party Central Committee. The article was blunt, saying 
that people who put up posters, handed out leaflets and gave speeches 
should be punished according to criminal law. Students had engaged 
in all three activities during the demonstrations.2 1 
U.S. A Beacon of Hope 
One of the most significant aspects of the student demonstrations, 
overlooked in the West and particularly in the United States, was how 
the U.S. figured in the unrest, or more precisely, what the demonstra-
tors hoped Americans could do for their cause. Rather than the 
source of "bourgeois decadence" as the official line had it, America 
stood as a "beacon of hope" for most. They saw America as the inspi-
rational source of their movement, and they anxiously looked to the 
United States for help. The experience of a Voice of America reporter 
was revealing. 
When his identity became known, the U.S. reporter was mobbed 
by enthusiastic students who wanted him to bring the news to 
America and to the world. They began to chant "America, America 
. . . , " forcing the reporter to seek refuge behind police lines. 22 
Akin to the daring youths during the "Beijing Spring" period, the 
demonstrating students in late 1986 and early 1987 anxiously sought 
out foreign correspondents. They knew matter-of-factly that without 
the foreign correspondents, the government would be able to totally 
20. Edward A. Gargan, "Protests by Students Spread to Beijing," New York Times, 
December 24, 1986, p. A3. 
21. James R. Schiffman, "Deng's Crackdown Raises Questions About Stability at 
Top," Wall Street Journal, January 15, 1987, p. 28. 
22. "Students March for Freedom," New Haven Register, December 21, 1986, p. A29. 
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manage news just like in South Africa, making sure that there was no 
coverage of what it did not want the outside world to knowY Indeed, 
demonstrators complained to foreign correspondents about the lack of 
freedom of the press in China. They stated that they got much of their 
information about student political activities in other parts of their 
own country from Western radio broadcasts. 
Soon after the demonstrations started, central government offi-
cials ordered a nationwide news blackout. When this happened, the 
presence of foreign correspondents with their television cameras was 
even more welcome to the students. This was the only way for the 
world to be informed of their movement. In Shanghai, students 
marched past the American consulate office, shouting that they 
wanted their demands to be publicized around the world. 24 
Wave of Arrests 
Following Hu Yaobang's fall as Secretary-General of the CCP in 
January 1987, a drastic change in the Party line was evident. Arrests 
and severe punishments of those who ran afoul of the new line were 
soon reported, notwithstanding a news blackout imposed by the au-
thorities. Several prominent cases have since become known to the 
outside world, all involving young intellectuals "unduly influenced by 
the West." 
In January, a returned student (from the United States), Yang 
Wei, was arrested in Shanghai for participating in student demonstra-
tions. The arrest of Yang, who returned to China in late 1986 after 
receiving a master degree in molecular biology at the University of 
Arizona, was never reported in the press in China. It was made 
known by his wife, Che Shaoli, a graduate student at Baylor College of 
Medicine in Houston, Texas. Che said in an interview that her hus-
band was arrested on January 11 and was denied visits by family mem-
bers. Che said: "We don't even know where he is," and pointed out 
that "This kind of treatment of a returned student is frightening to all 
students now studying in the West." Ms. Che noted in particular that 
it was "a dangerous sign" for more than 1,000 Chinese students in 
American universities and colleges who had signed an open letter (see 
appendix) to the leadership in Beijing, expressing concern over the dis-
23. Under South Africa's state of emergency, proclaimed in June 1986 and extended in 
June 1987, the government has imposed tough curbs on the press and banned journalists 
from witnessing racial unrest and covering actions by security forces to curb black protest. 
See "A Gunfight in Soweto Marks an Anniversary," New York Times, June 12, 1987, 
p.AIO. 
24. E.A. Gargan, supra note 2, p. I. 
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missal of Party Secretary-General Hu Yaobang and the persecution of 
several leading intellectuals. 25 After a one-day trial, Yang was sen-
tenced to two years in prison on December 21, 1987 for conducting 
"demagogical propaganda for counterrevolutionary ends."26 
In early February, another young intellectual was sentenced to 
seven years in jail on "counterrevolutionary" charges. The young 
man, Liu De, editor of Jiannan Literature, a literary magazine in 
Sichuan province, "desperately pursued and preached the so-called 
'democracy' and 'freedom' of capitalist countries," according to a re-
port detailing the charges. The official paper, China Legal News, said 
that the young editor, in a lecture before students, "uglified the social-
ist system," criticized China's economic reforms and called on the au-
dience to "take immediate action and join in a common struggle."27 
News of the unrest soon reached across the ocean to the United 
States, where more than 18,000 students from the People's Republic of 
China were studying at different colleges and universities. Most of 
them came of age during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 or 
were younger. They were a different breed from their predecessors 
who had not been politically very active. In an unprecedented move in 
January, more than 1,000 of them signed the open letter mentioned 
above protesting the ouster of Hu Y aobang as Party Secretary-General 
and the disciplining of three leading intellectuals in the wake of the 
student demonstrations for democracy and freedom in China. Risking 
possible retaliation against themselves and/or their families, nearly 
half of them signed the letter using their real names. 
Wang Bingzhang, himself a former student who founded the Chi-
nese Alliance for Democracy in New York in 1982, said the student 
movement had "awakened" Chinese students in the United States to a 
new activism that could help bring change in their homeland. Wang 
was a former medical student from China who gave up a career in 
medicine to devote himself to campaigning for democracy in China. 
His group publishes the widely popular monthly journal China Spring 
in New York which promotes "democracy, freedom, human rights 
and the rule of law" in China. 
"In the past, Chinese students in the United States would just 
agree with the government. Now, overseas Chinese students and 
25. Marvine Howe, "Ex-graduate Student in U.S. Is Among Detailed Chinese," New 
York Times, February 2, 1987, p.A8. 
26. Edward A. Gargan, "Shanghai Court Convicts Student," New York Times, Decem-
ber 23, 1987, p. A9. 
27. "China Sentences Editor As a Critic of Socialism," New York Times, February 7, 
1987, p. A4. 
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scholars are awakening," Wang said in an interview after addressing a 
student group at Stanford University. Referring to the large number 
of Chinese students who signed the letter, Wang said: "This has never 
happened before. They are very upset by the retrogression in China." 
He called the student demonstrations in China "a beautiful page in the 
history of politics. They are very significant because they have created 
new leaders for the future. "28 
28. L.A. Chung, "Chinese Students Praised for Protests," San Francisco Chronicle, 
January 22. 1987, p. 18. 
III. "DOUBLE HUNDRED": A NEW HUNDRED 
FLOWERS CAMPAIGN? 
A slogan that gained much currency during the period under 
study was that of the "Double Hundred." Aimed mainly at intellectu-
als, it was a resurrection of Mao Zedong's famous slogan in 1956-
1957, designed ostensibly to promote open discussion and elicit criti-
cisms on major issues from the nation's intellectuals. 
With economic reforms bogged down by mid-1986, Beijing lead-
ers all the more had reason to call for new ideas from the nation's 
professors, writers and scientists. Observers in Beijing and many 
outside China agreed that further economic reform would depend on 
the pace of political reforms which Party intellectuals, taking a cue 
from some Party leaders, were already beginning to urge on the au-
thorities. "If China is to modernize and be a great power, it has got to 
have intellectual ferment and change," one diplomat in Beijing ob-
served. However, his boldness was not shared by timid and victimized 
Chinese intellectuals, whose attitude could best be summed up in the 
following observation: "People are still feeling their way. They are 
not completely sure yet. . . . There are a lot of artists and writers out 
there who are still sitting on their hands." 1 
Referring to the renewed "Double Hundred" slogan-"let one 
hundred flowers bloom and one hundred schools contend" as enunci-
ated by Mao in 1956--intellectuals remembered well how the "Hun-
dred Flowers" was followed by the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957. 
Hundreds were executed and hundreds of thousands were condemned 
to labor camps as rightists, with their families and even friends stigma-
tized and persecuted. The Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao summed 
up the views of the delegates at a Shanghai seminar on cultural policy 
this way: 
In the past decades, we experienced many storms and only 
saw that there were merely two 'schools' (Marxist and non-
Marxist) rather than a hundred 'schools,' and only one 
'flower' rather than a hundred 'flowers,' and that the 'double 
hundred principle' was merely a strategum for 'luring the 
snakes out of their caves. '2 
1. Daniel Southerland, "China Solicits New Ideas," Washington Post, July 21, 1986, 
p. A12. 
2. Julian Baum, "China Party Leaders Stir Debate on Freedom of Dissent," Christian 
Science Monitor, July 2, 1986, p.3. 
(19) 
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The officially-directed drive toward limited relaxation of political 
control over intellectuals began in early May 1986, with a long article 
in the intellectual newspaper Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily) by 
Lu Dingyi, retired former Party propaganda head, reviving the 
"Double Hundred" policy. Lu played an important role in the earlier 
Hundred Flowers Campaign and the subsequent Anti-Rightist Cam-
paign in 1957 as the head of the Party propaganda department. Later, 
during the Cultural Revolution, Lu fell from favor and suffered perse-
cution. A victim himself, Lu was in a good position to tell intellectu-
als that the slogan had been previously misused as a weapon, but this 
time around it was in the hands of genuine reformers. 3 A prelude to 
Lu's weighty article was one printed in the same newspaper a week 
earlier, in which the director of the paper's theoretical department, Su 
Shuangbi, said that differences in academic views could only be re-
solved by "letting one hundred schools contend." He continued 
boldly: "Non-Marxist views are nothing reactionary, and not all non-
Marxist views are wrong either."4 
By August, Renmin Ribao came out even more boldly with a 
commentary entitled "Establishing Modern Concept of Democracy 
and the Rule of Law," which posed a remarkable rhetorical question 
by quoting a top leader: "As is pointed out by a leader of the Central 
Committee, if we don't talk about freedom, democracy, human rights, 
humanitarianism, labelling them capitalistic, what then is left of so-
cialism? Should we only talk about dictatorship, punishment and 
struggle?"5 The passage could be interpreted by both the reformists 
and hardliners to their respective advantage; these views were later 
included in the long resolution on building a "socialist society with an 
advanced culture and ideology" adopted by the Party Central Com-
mittee in late September, 1986.6 
The clamor for political reform received lukewarm encourage-
ment from Deng Xiaoping in early July, when he referred to it during 
a meeting with a visiting North Korean leader. At the meeting, Deng 
said, without elaborating, that China's ongoing economic changes 
would include reforming some aspects of the country's "political 
3. Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily), May 7, 1986, cited in Robert Delfs, "Con-
tending Thoughts," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 19, 1986, p.20. 
4. Guangming Ribao, April 30, 1986, cited in Ibid. p.20. 
5. Zhang Zhonghou, "Foster Modern Concept of Democracy and Rule of Law," 
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), August 8, 1986, p.2. 
6. Beijing Review, No. 40, October 6, 1986, centerfold. 
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structure."7 The need for political reform was also discussed in a se-
ries of seminars, including one held early July at the Central Party 
School in Beijing, the highest political study institute for ranking 
Communist Party officials. According to the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao 
in Hong Kong, the seminars were organized at Deng's suggestion. At 
the seminars, the participants heard Zhu Houze, the Party propa-
ganda chief who, since himself dismissed from the post, stressed the 
need for political reform if long-term economic changes were to take 
hold. The Ta Kung Pao writer said the meeting addressed the "ques-
tion of the Party's present role, its relationship with the government 
and ways the Party organizations could be changed and how the pres-
ent political system poses obstacles to the economic reform."8 Indeed, 
Zhu at the meeting quoted Deng as saying that political change was 
"urgent and necessary."9 
Change the "Undemocratic System" 
One of the boldest suggestions for sweeping political reform was 
made by Yan Jiaqi, the 42-year-old director of the Institute for Polit-
ical Science of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and an idol of 
reform-minded young people in China. In an interview with the 
Christian Science Monitor, Yan discussed the "main features" of poli-
tics in China. He said: "Since the Chinese people have experienced 
the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution, they want to change the 
undemocratic system." The biggest need was to distinguish the 
Party's functions from the government's and to bring the Party's pow-
ers in line with China's latest Constitution, adopted in 1982. 10 In an-
other interview, Yan told the Guangming Ribao: "A country that 
lacks democracy may achieve temporary economic prosperity, but its 
long-term development will inevitably be hindered." 11 While democ-
racy was often referred to in vague terms, one of the concrete and 
widely-discussed features in democratic reforms was how to separate 
the Party from the government and put it under the rule of law. Feng 
Shengbao, deputy chief of the research section on foreign political sys-
tems at the Institute of Foreign Affairs, once offered a succinct expla-
7. Julian Baum, "China Talks Party Reform," Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 
1986, p.3. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Edward A. Gargan, "Chinese Party Dismisses Top Propaganda Official," New 
York Times, February 5, 1987, p. A26. In this despatch from Beijing, Zhu's dismissal as 
Party propaganda chief was confirmed. 
10. J. Baum, supra note 7, p.3. 
II. Ibid. 
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nation of what was to be achieved. Speaking before the 
aforementioned seminars at the Central Party School, Feng said: 
"Having the Party do the work of the government is like trying to run 
modern industry with old-fashioned handicraft technique." 12 
The United States, where many elite intellectuals have gone for 
advanced study or short visits under government sponsorship, in re-
cent years, inevitably came up in the discussions on political reform. 
Yan Jiaqi cited the Watergate case to illustrate the limits of power 
under a democracy. "When Nixon proved unable to control the pros-
ecutor and the courts, he was forced to resign. This shows that the 
rule of law and respect for the division of powers in government are 
deeply rooted in the United States," he told the Guangming Ribao. 
Yan quoted Deng Xiaoping as once severely criticizing Stalin for seri-
ously damaging the socialist legal system and then accusing Mao of 
committing the same mistake. "Mao Zedong once said that this 
couldn't have happened in the Western countries such as France, Brit-
ain and the United States," Deng was quoted as saying, underscoring 
Mao's awareness of the importance of the rule of law. However, 
"Although Mao realized this," Deng continued, "he failed to solve the 
problem of leadership and this, plus other causes, led to the Cultural 
Revolution." Calling for the rule of law so that basic directions of the 
government would not swing violently with a change of leaders, Yan 
said "I think Deny Xiaoping shares the same view." 13 How wrong he 
was! 
To provide needed ideological underpinnings for Deng's eco-
nomic reforms and more importantly to counter charges that Deng 
was following the capitalist road, Marxism had to be stretched by ide-
ologues from the Dengist camp. The new official line was that Marx-
ism itself, being a scientific and living truth, must be constantly 
brought up-to-date rather than being treated as a rigid doctrine formu-
lated over 100 years ago. And updating Marxism in this spirit was the 
responsibility of those intellectuals in the field of ideological studies. 
Several times during 1986, Zhu Houze, as Party propaganda 
chief, spearheaded liberalization in the ideological sphere. Zhu, who 
was closely identified with the now deposed Party Secretary-General 
Hu Yaobang, was generally considered to be a reformist. He replaced 
Deng Liqun, a hardline stalwart, who was forced out after the Anti-
Spiritual Pollution Campaign went into low gear in 1984. 
In an article in the Renmin Ribao in April 1986, Zhu said it was 
12. E.A. Gargan, supra note 9, p. A26. 
13. J. Baum, supra note 7, p.3. 
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only normal that differences of opinions would emerge in theoretical 
studies and inquiries. Indeed, only through comparison and conten-
tion among different viewpoints could people gradually arrive at a bet-
ter understanding of objective rules and truth in all matters, Zhu 
stressed. "Therefore, among theoretical workers, we not only should 
promote independent thinking, we should also promote mutual criti-
cism, through which we try to persuade and convince others with 
reason." 14 
In August, Zhu further pursued his views in another article titled 
"Some Thoughts on Ideological and Cultural Questions," in which he 
made five points: 1) reappraisal of CCP ideology; 2) no government 
intervention in ideological matters; 3) absorbing good elements from 
Western culture to modify Chinese ways; 4) study of non-Marxist the-
ories; and 5) advancement and promotion of the overall educational 
and scientific levels of the people, moving away from over-emphasis on 
ideological concerns. 15 
Marxism Stretched 
Addressing intellectuals involved in Marxist studies in particular, 
Zhu urged that on cultural and ideological questions, "A Marxist atti-
tude must be adopted toward non-Marxist works." To spur intellectu-
als into following the new line, Zhu declared that the basic theory of 
Marxism was in fact "derived through studying non-Marxist materi-
als." Therefore, "if we are to follow the authors of Marxist classics, 
we should not be so dogmatic. Rather, we must keep up with the 
changing times and absorb new nutrients through practice, thereby 
ensuring the vigor of this system of scientific theory." 16 
Helping to lead the way in calling for measured political change 
was another establishment ideologue, Su Shaozhi, director of the Insti-
tute on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought at the National 
Academy of Social Sciences. In an article in the Renmin Ribao, he 
said that the present "four modernizations" were far from enough. He 
boldly called for modernization of "political structure, social institu-
tions and ideology." Problems existing in the political structure and 
issues of ideology had begun to affect economic reforms adversely, he 
said. Without reforms in political structure and in other areas to go 
14. "Ideological Breakthrough Needed for Further Reform," Renmin Ribao, April 25, 
1986, p. 4. 
15. Zhu Houze, "Some Thoughts on Ideological and Cultural Questions," Renmin 
Ribao, August II, 1986, p. 2. 
16. Ibid. 
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with the economic reform, further advances in the economic reform 
would be difficult and the results already achieved would be hard to 
maintain. Specifically, he identified the "basic problems" as the "lack 
of fully guaranteed rights of political participation, free speech and 
involvement in the policy-making process" by the people, despite per-
tinent Constitutional provisions. 17 
It is noteworthy that on the surface, what Su urged does not seem 
very different from the "fifth modernization"-political moderniza-
tion-demanded by Wei Jingsheng several years earlier. Wei, China's 
most famous dissident, is still serving a 15-year jail term. There is no 
sign of his early release, despite the fact that his views have since been 
espoused by official spokesmen. Unfortunately, Wei spoke out too 
early, without the sanction of Party authorities and before the change 
of the official line. In a society ruled by shifting official lines for people 
to follow but not to challenge, Wei's real crime was that he was the 
wrong person who expressed the wrong views at the wrong time. 18 
Apparently, the views of Zhu and Su did not please the leftist 
orthodox Party ideologues who began to sound warnings against at-
tempts to weaken the role of ideology. By late September, at the Sixth 
Plenum of the 12th Party Central Committee, further reform suffered 
a serious setback. The most important statement issued at the conclu-
sion of the Party meeting was one stressing the importance of building 
"socialist spiritual civilization" in China, foreshadowing the coming of 
the campaign against "Western bourgeois liberalization." 
A few courageous people continued to speak out, despite personal 
pain. Wang Ruoshui, who was fired from his post as deputy editor-in-
chief of the Renmin Ribao a few years earlier, is a case in point. The 
fact that the Party continued to tolerate a few dissenting voices for a 
little while longer is not nearly as significant as what the dissenters had 
to say. 
In a long essay in August on "The Double Hundred Policy and 
Constitutional Rights," Wang raised the question why the Constitu-
tion was not as authoritative as the words of a leader, who could freely 
brag about granting or withdrawing the "Double Hundred" policy at 
will, leaving his audience in gratitude or in despair. Pointing to the 
Constitution, which was passed in 1982, Wang said: 
Freedom to engage in literary and artistic creation is the 
right of a citizen, not a gift from anyone and therefore cannot 
17. Su Shaozhi, "The Impact of Political Reform and Anti-feudalism," Renmin Ribao, 
August 16, 1986, p. 2. 
18. See also Chapter XI on Human Rights Cases. 
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be arbitrarily abolished by anyone. This right is guaranteed 
by the Constitution .... But, unfortunately, the Constitution 
is all too often ignored, hence the words of a national leader 
invariably are taken much more seriously. 19 
25 
After recounting the suffering of the people in the past years as a 
result of the total disregard of the Constitution by the Party and its 
leaders, Wang reminded his readers: 
Don't just remember the Party's 'Double Hundred' policy 
but forget or ignore your Constitutionally guaranteed citi-
zens' rights. Only then will we be able to recognize our own 
unshirkable responsibility. In the past, we only passively 
waited for someone to grant us such rights. Hence we have 
lived with this strange situation: one day we are allowed to 
speak up; a few days later we are no longer allowed to do the 
same.20 
It is well to remember that Wang has been denounced as a "spokes-
man" for bourgeois liberalization by Hu Qiaomu, the Party's ideology 
czar, and that stigma has never been removed.zt 
"Democracy Must Be Fought For" 
Li Honglin, another victim of the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Cam-
paign in late 1983, was fired from his post as deputy director of the 
Bureau of Theoretical Studies under the Party Propaganda Depart-
ment for advocating "socialist democracy" at the time. A respected 
scholar, he was banished to a local position in Fujian province, but 
was allowed to remain active. In late 1986, upon his return from a six-
month stay at Princeton University as a visiting scholar, Li became 
even more convinced that "democracy must be fought for." He urged 
that "those involved in theoretical work must strive to create an at-
mosphere conducive to the study and promotion of democracy in 
China." However, Li, ever mindful of the limits of official tolerance, 
was quick to add that he was not "blindly optimistic" about the pros-
pect of democracy in China, for he fully realized that "China's society 
today cannot withstand great shocks. " 22 
In early July, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
19. Wang Ruoshui, "Double Hundred Policy and Citizen's Rights," Cheng Ming, 
(Hong Kong), No. 107, September, 1986, p. 60. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Tung Hu, "Is 'Relaxation and Harmony' a Sign of Spring?" Cheng Ming, (Hong 
Kong), No. 107, September, 1986, p. 13. 
22. Lin Chia, "Democracy Can Be Fought For," Chung Pao, October 31, 1986, p. 6. 
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ences openly urged the government to abandon the Soviet model and 
turn to the West to borrow from its experience in modernization. At 
the seminar, the scholar, Tan Jian, said that the model of centralized 
government developed in the Soviet Union in the 1930s was outmo-
ded. In his words, "The centralized power structure may be useful 
militarily and politically, but it is no longer suitable to the develop-
ment of socialist economy in the present modernization in China." 
Tan was regarded as one of the most outspoken critics of the govern-
ment since top leaders urged intellectuals to speak up in April. 23 
Nothing has been heard of him since the onset of the Anti-Bourgeois 
Liberalization Campaign in September 1986. 
Another aspect of the agitation for greater intellectual freedom in 
1986 manifested in the academic circles was a call for the elimination 
of "forbidden zones" (jinqu ), that is, areas from which scholars should 
voluntarily or involuntarily refrain, despite the "Double Hundred" 
policy proclaimed by the authorities. In May 1986, the Shanghai Wen 
Hui Bao lamented the status of "academic democracy" and mentioned 
many "forbidden zones." It said that there were people who would: 
1) only follow the doctrines from higher levels and dare not voice dif-
fering views, 2) follow the doctrines in books and dare not put forth 
personal views, 3) have a superstitious belief in authority and dare not 
differ from it; and 4) follow the majority and dare not be unorthodox. 
The paper then went on to explain why scholars so behaved: "If the 
divisions of leftist, centrist and rightist are used as a criterion for judg-
ing academic merit," then scholars would feel intimidated and worried 
about their future and "they would not be able to develop freely in 
their scholarly work." It warned that "socialist academic democracy 
is an integral part of socialist democracy," which could not develop 
without full academic freedom. 24 
Academic and Political Freedom "Inseparable" 
The paper was later joined by the Renmin Ribao which in a long 
article pointed out that the difficulty in implementing the "Double 
Hundred" policy lay in the fact that academic freedom and political 
freedom were inseparable. "It may be a little easier with natural sci-
ences, but in the social sciences, such as in politics, law, sociology and 
scientific socialism, it is very hard to draw a clear line between aca-
23. "Scholar Urges Government to Abandon Soviet Model in Favor of Western Sys-
tem," Chung Pao, July 12, 1986, p. I. 
24. Wen Hui Boo, May 25, 1986, cited in "Where are the Forbidden Zones?" Inside 
Mainland China, (Taipei), August, 1986, p. 5. 
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demic freedom and political freedom," the article said with rare can-
dor, touching on the crux of the problem. It went on to give the 
following example: 
In law, there is a theory of the presumption of innocence. 
But today this has been a forbidden zone. Even if our coun-
try's criminal law incorporated this principle, anyone writing 
an essay to expound it would be thought to argue against the 
current Party and government policy of cracking down hard 
on crime-and wouldn't that become a political problem?25 
In economics, it was the same. If, in the course of discussing the 
four modernizations, one expressed views labelled as "carrying out 
bourgeois liberalization" or "taking the capitalist road," it would be 
hard for one to vindicate oneself," the Renmin Ribao article contin-
ued. In politics, it was even more difficult. One might get in trouble 
even discussing Ch'in Shih-huang (the despotic First Emperor of the 
Ch'in Dynasty in the third century, B.C.) and Montesquieu. "Dis-
cussing the former, one may be suspected of making veiled insinua-
tions. Discussing the latter, one may be guilty of introducing 'high-
level pollution' via American bourgeois students of politics," the paper 
said. "If a person is constantly worried when putting his pen to paper 
or giving a lecture, about the fact that some of his formulations might 
go beyond the bounds of academic problems to become a political 
problem," the paper said, "then he has no choice but to keep his 
mouth shut."26 
Stressing that academic questions and political questions were re-
ally indistinguishable, the article concluded: 
If no citizen has the right to air his views on politics, then 
politics would remain a forbidden zone and the people will 
have no alternative but to warn one another that 'disaster 
comes from careless talk' and that one should avoid 'incrimi-
nating oneself by what one has to say.' What kind of 'mas-
ters of the state' will the people be? Wouldn't the 'high-level 
socialist democracy' be nothing but empty talk?27 
While daringly setting forth the new official line of limited liberal-
ization, Renmin Ribao, as the Party's mouthpiece, was also quick to 
draw the line so that one did not get carried away. "The expression of 
counterrevolutionary views," it warned, "is against the law and should 
25. Yu Haocheng, "Double Hundred Policy and Legal Guarantee," Renmin Ribao, 
May 30, 1986, p. 2. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid. 
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be punished according to law." It went on to include in the "expres-
sion of counterrevolutionary views" such hard-to-define crimes as 
"spreading inflammatory counterrevolutionary propaganda, revealing 
state secrets, starting false rumors or slandering others."28 
While the majority of intellectuals was still wavering, many were 
quick to respond to the call to once again speak their minds, despite, at 
least for some, memories of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957. At a 
symposium on political reform in June, political scientists urged 
greater citizen participation in government and more checks and bal-
ances to counter "errors in leadership," the English-language China 
Daily said. Summarizing the views expressed by over 100 social and 
political scientists at the meeting, the paper specifically described how 
many people tried to hide behind Marx and Lenin in offering their 
views: 
Some recalled that Marx and Lenin had both said that lead-
ers of proletarian power might become corrupted into mas-
ters instead of servants of their class and under such 
circumstances, workers might often be betrayed. . . . So 
checks and balances were the best protection against errors 
in political leadership. 29 
Hu Qili, the youngest member in the Party politburo and once 
regarded as a likely candidate to succeed Hu Yaobang as the Party 
Secretary-General, was prominently mentioned by many participants 
as a prime source of inspiration. He had earlier announced that 
China's economic changes must be accompanied by changes in the 
political system, specifically including a stronger legal system. "The 
economic reforms would inevitably shake the political and social foun-
dations of Chinese life," he was quoted as saying. 30 However, with the 
fall of his mentor Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili was rumored to be slipping 
from power or switching his allegiance. In the shifting political winds, 
once again it was those who dared to speak up that would suffer. 
28. Ibid. 
29. China Daily, June 9, 1986, cited in "Chinese Political Scientists Call for Demo-
cratic Reform," Washington Times, June 10, 1986, p. 88. 
30. Ibid. 
IV. ANTI-BOURGEOIS LIBERALIZATION CAMPAIGN 
Early in April 1986, Hu Qili travelled to Shanghai where, in a 
series of speeches and talks with literature and art groups, he men-
tioned a "relaxed and harmonious atmosphere," which was taken to 
mean the Party would be kind to progressive writers and artists. Hu, 
who had proclaimed the new "Double Hundred" policy on art and 
literature before the Writers' Congress in early 1985, had won the en-
thusiastic support of many writers and artists for advocating the "free-
dom to engage in literary and artistic creation." However, Hu was 
also quick at all times to stress the "strengthening of Party 
leadership." 
It was Hu, people remember well, who drew the line limiting de-
bate on political reform: the reform would only be structural, not sys-
temic, and no debate should touch on the basic socialist system. It 
was also he, as the senior member overseeing the day-to-day operation 
of the Party Central Secretariat, who presumably was mainly responsi-
ble for drafting the important document on "socialist civilization" 
adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee in Sep-
tember 1986-a document unmistakably aimed at curbing the growing 
trend toward "bourgeois liberalism" among intellectuals. 
Even before the promulgation of the Party document on "socialist 
civilization," there were already signs of serious factional squabbles in 
the Party leadership on the issue of intellectual freedom, with the "re-
form faction" advocating limited relaxation and the orthodox ideo-
logues clamoring for tight control. The economic difficulties in which 
the reform faction was mired did not help matters as they would only 
give fresh ammunition to the old guards to attack the "reformists" and 
force concessions. Indeed, it was no less than the now deposed Party 
Secretary-General Hu Yaobang, the younger Hu Qili's patron, who 
not long after the latter's promise of "freedom of creativity" to writers, 
boasted: "They have the right to create, but we have the right not to 
publish." 1 
"The Right Not to Publish" 
After Hu's statement, a series of actions were taken by the au-
thorities. Magazines that published questionable-meaning pro-de-
I. Tung Hu, "Is 'Relaxation and Harmony' a Sign of Spring?" Cheng Ming, (Hong 
Kong), No. 107, September, 1986, p. 13. 
(29) 
30 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
mocracy or human rights-works were ordered closed and their 
editors fired. Writers were under heavy fire; many were forced to 
write self-criticisms. The most celebrated case was that of Liu Binyan, 
whose life story about one Ni Yuxian in "Another Type of Loyalty" 
caused such an uproar that the magazine Kaituo (Pioneer), in which 
the story appeared, was closed down and its editor dismissed. Liu 
wrote a long self-criticism to defend himself. He said that of the 
700,000 words he had written since he was rehabilitated from his 
"rightist" past after the fall of the "Gang of Four," only 200,000 
words, or about 23 percent, were exposed of the "dark side." The bulk 
of his writings was hailing the "new atmosphere" and on "progressive 
models" since Deng Xiaoping's reform. 2 Liu's self-defense, quite 
apart from its revealing nature, was of no avail. After he was attacked 
by Deng Xiaoping by name, he lost his job at the Renmin Ribao and 
was expelled from the Communist Party on January 23, 1987.3 
On the heels of this incident, a large number of legally registered 
magazines were banned by the Publication Bureau, over 180 in Beijing 
alone. The series of bans earned the National Bureau of Publications 
the nickname "National Bureau to Ban Publications."4 
Even as the spreading student protests were being reported from 
university campuses by the wire services to the Western press (but not 
in the Chinese media), Renmin Ribao continued to promote political 
reform. In a long commentary, the official newspaper said that univer-
sal suffrage, democracy and freedom were concepts reflecting human 
needs and, therefore, should not be considered bourgeois in nature. 
With an eye on the opening to the West, Renmin Ribao specifically 
quoted Deng Xiaoping as saying that scientific knowledge and man-
agement methods from Western countries "do not have class 
characteristics. " 5 
Freely quoting more from Deng and Lenin, the authoritative 
Renmin Ribao commentary said that not only in the area of material 
life, but also in the realm of politics, there were developments under 
the rule of the bourgeois class that cannot be considered characteristi-
cally bourgeois. "Some of the institutions and concepts formed under 
2. Liu Binyan, "Self-Criticism," Cheng Ming, (Hong Kong), No. 108, October 1986, 
pp. 70-74. This is an "internal material" of the Chinese Communist Party, obtained and 
published in full by this authoritative Hong Kong magazine for the first time. 
3. Edward A. Gargan, "China Party Ousts a Top Journalist," New York Times, Janu-
ary 25, 1987, p. A I. 
4. Tung Hu, supra note I. 
5. Zhou Xiuqiang, "Correctly Handle Civilization Created Under Bourgeois Rule," 
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) December 16, 1986, p. 2. 
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bourgeois rule were of course needed by the bourgeoisie, but they also 
reflected what humans at that time needed in order to handle relation-
ships between the people."6 Singling out the system of universal suf-
frage as one example, the commentary added: "For a long time, we 
considered freedom and democracy as slogans belonging solely to the 
bourgeois class, and this has been inappropriate. " 7 
This mid-December 1986 commentary was to be the last on the 
theme of political reform before the crackdown. As the backlash to 
the student protests gathered further momentum, the newspaper 
quickly changed its tone, trumpeting the new tough anti-bourgeois lib-
eralization line. It began to condemn the student demonstrations and 
attack "bourgeois liberalization." As happened during previous cam-
paigns, CCP leaders took action to ensure that political and civil rights 
did not grow and become a check on Party authority. As a conse-
quence, the chorus on political reforms came to an abrupt end. 
In the wake of the clampdown, the official press quickly redefined 
the meaning of the "hundred flowers." Party newspapers published 
articles stating that when the Party urged intellectuals in 1986 to voice 
their opinions with the call to "let one hundred schools of thought 
contend," it meant for the debate to be conducted under the "guidance 
of Marxism." Jia Lin, a Party ideologue, wrote: "Some people take 
letting one hundred schools contend to mean that Marxism is just one 
school in contention with others. This denies Marxism as providing 
the basic theoretical premises guiding our thought." Jia stressed: 
"Marxism isn't just another school in contention. It is the school with 
the function of guiding. " 8 
The renewed call for the primacy of Marxism in the wake of the 
new "Double Hundred" Campaign evoked memories of the first one in 
1956-1957, in which intellectuals expressed the same initial skepticism 
which was soon borne out. Questioning whether Marxism was to be 
treated as one of various schools of thought or as the guiding set of 
principles which would obviously render any debate meaningless, Li 
Jianxun, vice president of Tianjin Normal College, said in 1957: 
Is Marxism-Leninism to be considered the guiding ideology 
in the process of contending? If it is, it may stop other 
schools of thought from contending; if it is not, a state of 
6. In the Chinese Communist usage, the term "people" is defined rather narrowly. 
"Enemies of the people" are not regarded as part of "the people." Hence a counter-revolu-
tionary is a nor.-pcrson. 
7. Zhou Xiuqiang, supra note 5. 
8. "New China Party Chief's Pledge," San Francisco Chronicle, January 19, 1987, p. 
I. 
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ideological confusion may result. . . . In my opinion, Marx-
ism-Leninism should be taken as a weapon in contending to 
voice one's views, but should not be definitely laid down as 
the guiding standard. Since Marxism-Leninism eventually 
will win in the contention, it is the same as taking Marxism-
Leninism as the guiding ideology."9 
Almost 30 years separate the two campaigns, yet there has been 
little change, either in the ideological position of the authorities or in 
the techniques used in conducting the campaigns. 
"China's Sakharov" 
During the student demonstrations for freedom and democracy, 
one of the early voices in support of the students' demands was that of 
Fang Lizhi, vice president of the University of Science and Technol-
ogy. Often referred to as "China's Andrei Sakharov," Fang was are-
nowned astrophysicist. But he was even better known as a critic of the 
Party, widely admired by the young people for his reformist views and 
his courage to express them. Little did Fang realize in late 1986 that 
he had already been marked for purge. By the time the student dem-
onstrations spread to more than a dozen major cities, Deng Xiaoping 
attacked Fang by name along with two other leading intellectuals (Liu 
Binyan and Wang Ruowang) for "spreading Western bourgeois liberal 
ideas" and demanded their expulsion from the Party. Accordingly, 
Fang was first fired from his university post and then expelled from 
the Party. 10 
The New China News Agency said that Fang was expelled from 
the Party because he "attempted to incite intellectuals against the 
Party and students to make trouble, causing grave consequences." 
Among Fang's crimes were that he "denied Marxism, villified China's 
socialist system as 'modern feudalism' and called for independence of 
universities from Party leadership." 11 
Soon after Fang's dismissal, another leading intellectual became a 
victim of the new campaign against bourgeois liberalization. Liu 
Xinwu, editor of China's largest and most influential literary journal, 
the People's Literature, was suspended from his job and forced to con-
duct self-criticisms for allowing his journal to become "infected with 
9. Renmin Ribao, April 21, 1957, p. 7. 
10. "Fang Lizhi Dismissed from Job and Expelled from Party," Chung Pao (Centre 
Daily News), eastern U.S. edition, January 21, 1987, p. I; also see supra note 3. 
II. "Party Expels Students' Hero in China," San Francisco Chronicle, January 20, 
1987, p. II. 
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bourgeois liberalization and other erroneous ideas." The specific 
charge was that Liu, as editor, allowed the publication of a short story 
(in the journal's January-February issue) which allegedly contained of-
fensive and sensational language about Tibetans. The Party Central 
Committee attributed the "low taste and filthy content" of the journal 
to bourgeois influence from the West and ordered all copies of the 
issue withdrawn. 12 Liu, a prominent writer who did much to expose 
the dark side of the Cultural Revolution years and its resulting social 
injustices, took over the job at the People's Literature in March 1986 
when his predecessor, Wang Meng, another famous writer, became 
Minister of Cultural Affairs. Wang was condemned as a "rightist" in 
1957 and spent the next 20 years in labor camps before his rehabilita-
tion after the death of Mao. 
By January 1987, Party officials were busy propagating the new 
line. In Shanghai, for example, municipal party secretary Rui 
Xingwen lashed out at the trend toward bourgeois liberalization in a 
meeting with students from ten local universities. Attacking the 
"multi-party system" which according to him was advocated "by a 
small number of people" in China, he said that the system was used in 
foreign countries to "represent different classes with the support of big 
financial groups." He warned that a multi-party system in China 
would "split up the nation." 13 
In his talk to the nation during Chinese New Year celebrations, 
Premier Zhao Ziyang said that the drive against bourgeois liberaliza-
tion would not become another major campaign affecting the whole 
nation. He assured the nation that the drive would be directed mainly 
toward ideological areas and the methods used would be primarily ed-
ucation. The Renmin Ribao, expanding on Zhao's remarks, followed 
up with an editorial which declared: 
The anti-bourgeois liberalization struggle is to be conducted 
strictly within the Party ... against the wrong tendencies 
against socialism and the attempts to move away from Party 
leadership. . . . It will not affect economic reforms, science, 
art and literature. This struggle will not involve "democratic 
parties" elements and intellectuals outside the Party. 14 
12. "Chinese Get Tough on 'Filth,' " New Haven Register, February 22, 1987. p. A 16. 
13. Jim Mann, "No. 2 Man in China Quits as Party Chief," San Frand5CO Chronicle, 
January 17, 1987, p. I. 
14. "Continue to Conduct the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign,'' Reumin 
Ribao editorial, February 2, 1987, p. I. 
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Peng Invokes "Y anan Spirit" 
However, despite Party assurances, Chinese intellectuals, burned 
so many times in the past, simply could no longer trust the authorities. 
What they saw was the onset of yet another round of ideological cam-
paigns in which they and their works would once again be condemned. 
Indeed, their fear was borne out by Peng Zhen, the octogenarian 
chairman of the National People's Congress and its Standing Commit-
tee. Peng was widely regarded as one of the prime movers behind the 
leftist campaign against reform and democracy. Meeting writers 
before Chinese New Year, Peng admonished them to study Mao's fa-
mous 1942 Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art, which 
laid down the guidelines that literature and art must "serve the peas-
ants, workers and soldiers." Peng urged a rekindling of the "Yanan 
spirit" in the face of what he regarded as "decadent bourgeois 
influence." 15 
The fear of a crackdown on free expression was confirmed by no 
less than Deng Xiaoping himself. Ordering an end to student demon-
strations, Deng put the blame on intellectuals. In a meeting with 
Noboru Takeshita, Secretary-General of Japan's governing Liberal 
Democratic Party, Deng specifically attacked three leading intellectu-
als for ignoring the Party line. He told Takeshita that it was not the 
students who created the unsettled situation, but intellectuals who 
continually spoke in favor of capitalism and Western values. 16 He sin-
gled out three people by name: the aforementioned Fang Lizhi, Liu 
Binyan and Wang Ruowang. 17 All three were expelled from the Party 
and their views have come under a concerted attack in the media. 
These three intellectuals along with many others were potential 
targets during the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign in 1983, so the 
renewed attack on them came as no surprise. Indeed, those who wish-
fully believed that the 1983 campaign had ended were once again 
proven wrong, this time by no less than the Party Central Committee. 
One of the Party documents made public in early March 1987 de-
clared categorically: "The Central Committee believes that spiritual 
pollution and bourgeois liberalization are one and the same thing." 18 
15. Ming Pao, (Hong Kong), February 3, 1987, cited in "Serious Rift in Chinese Com-
munist Top Echelon," Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), (Taipei), February 6, 
1987, p. 2. 
16. Edward A. Gargan, "Deng's Crushing of Protest Is Described," New York Times, 
January 14, 1987, p. A3. 
17. Also see Chapter III on the "Double Hundred" campaign. 
18. Edward A. Gargan, "Beijing Party Directives Criticize Ousted Leader," New York 
Times, March 8, 1987, p. 12. 
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In a renewed offensive by the orthodox Maoist faction in August 
1987, eight more leading intellectuals were forced to resign their Party 
membership, including a well-known playright, a former deputy edi-
tor-in-chief of the Renmin Ribao and a widely respected Marxist theo-
rist. They were accused of questioning the superiority of socialism and 
spreading bourgeois values. The eight were said to have been whittled 
down from a list of more than 20 only at the insistence of Premier 
Zhao Ziyang. 19 
Wu Zhuguang, the playwright, was vice chairman of China's 
Playwrights' Association. Wang Ruoshui, first dismissed from his 
post at the Party newspaper in 1984 after the Anti-Spiritual Pollution 
Campaign, annoyed the orthodox ideologues by continuing to write 
about humanism and alienation under socialism. The disgraced Marx-
ist theorist, Su Shaozhi, was director of the Institute of Marxism, Len-
inism and Mao Zedong Thought under the National Academy of 
Social Sciences, the most prestigeous research body. His fitness to re-
main in that position was openly questioned. 20 
19. Chung Pao, August 14, 1987, p. I; China Daily .Yews, (New York), August 15, 
1987, p. 2. 
20. Chung Puo, August 26, 1987, p. 2. 

V. ART AND LITERATURE 
In a totalitarian society guided by a supreme and inviolable ideol-
ogy, freedom of expression, in the final analysis, does not exist. Hence 
it is not surprising that in the People' Republic of China, freedom of 
expression is not regarded by political leaders as a human right, but as 
a gift to the people by the Party and government. 
The year 1986 opened with ominous signs of a return to tight 
Party control in the areas of literature and art after a period of tenta-
tive relaxation resulting from Deng Xiaoping's opening to the West. 
Inevitably, many in high Party positions became gravely concerned 
about the nation's "spiritual health" as published materials and new 
art forms were believed to be polluting the minds of people, particu-
larly the young. In January, a major crackdown was ordered. The 
publication of all books, magazines and newspapers without official 
government approval was outlawed. Issued by three government min-
istries, the ban required all publishers to register with the government 
and it empowered local authorities to confiscate unregistered books 
and magazines. In addition, the publishers and printing companies of 
such unauthorized material were subject to fines and confiscation of 
their income. 1 
Hu Qili, who promised writers "freedom to engage in creative 
writing" at the 1985 Writers' Congress, was the one who sounded the 
latest policy shift. In his capacity as the leading member of the Party 
Central Secretariat, Hu declared, "There are still some low-level, vul-
gar, obscene and poisonous works being produced."2 
Hu was referring to the increasingly popular "yellow press," 
which was in his view one of the byproducts of the market-oriented 
economic reforms. Opportunistic and profit-motivated merchants be-
gan to flood the market with low-budget, low quality tabloids, 
magazines and books on sex, violence and crime. These publications 
not only "contaminate people's minds," according to the New China 
News Agency (Xinhua), but caused a severe shortage of paper and a 
sizable (8.6 percent) drop of subscriptions to the official Renmin 
Ribao.3 The concern about "contamination" may well be genuine on 
the part of many leaders; but the policy shift, coming so soon on the 
1. "China's new Curb on Publishers," San Francisco Chronicle, January 20, 1986, p. 
13. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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heels of proclaimed relaxation, only served once again as a clear re-
minder that freedom was granted by the powers-that-be, not guaran-
teed by law which in any case remained a tool for control. 
Despite the appointment of a former victim of intellectual perse-
cution as the new Minister of Cultural affairs in early 1986 and the 
subsequent appointment of a well-known actor, Ying Ruocheng, also a 
victim of the Cultural Revolution, as Vice Minister of Cultural Affairs 
in charge of the performing arts, no measurable relaxation was seen in 
artistic expression during 1986. If anything, the trend was toward 
tightening controls. As a matter of fact, in August, the Ministry of 
Cultural Affairs renewed the ban on some 26 plays going back to the 
early 1950s. At the same time, the Ministry also declared that an ear-
lier press report about the lifting of a ban on another 80 plays was in 
error, asserting that the ban remained in effect.4 
Plays once banned have since been revised. The revised plays 
must first be reviewed by local Party authorities in charge of cultural 
affairs where local groups intended to perform them. The local Party 
authorities must report their findings to their superiors up the echelon 
until final approval is granted by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs for 
public performance. The first bans dated back to between 1950 and 
1953, when 26 plays were prohibited because their contents were 
judged to be 1) promoting "feudal superstition," 2) "lustful and ob-
scene," and 3) "insensitive to the feelings of minority nationalities." 
More plays were added to the proscribed list in the ensuing years, with 
occasional removal from the list of certain plays which had gone 
through revisions in order to cater to the official lines. Two such cases 
were the well-known traditional Beijing operas Wu Peng Ji and Tan 
Yin Shan, both dealing with ghosts and the after world but also with 
retributions of injustices, which were revised and approved for public 
performance in 1956 and 1957. 5 
Control over art and culture reached an extreme during the years 
of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao's wife Jiang Qing was China's 
"cultural czar." She prescribed by decree eight now infamous "model" 
plays and virtually banned anything else. After the fall of the "Gang 
of Four," according to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, a period of 
confusion set in during which proscribed plays were staged in various 
places. A reiteration of the old ban was issued in 1980, but it appar-
ently failed to stem the trend. The Ministry, therefore, found it neces-
4. "Ministry of Cultural Affairs Reiterates Ban on Plays," Chung Pao, (Centre Daily 
News), eastern U.S. edition, August 4, 1986, p. 17. 
5. Ibid. 
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sary to reaffirm the ban once again in August 1986.6 
While he was on record as favoring "creative freedom" and op-
posing the kind of punishments he had suffered, both as a writer and 
as an intellectual, Wang Meng, the new Minister of Cultural Affairs 
since March 1986, nevertheless, believed firmly that the Party must 
retain the power to limit the dissemination of views considered inimi-
cal to its basic policies. It is precisely such judgments-on books, 
plays, films, paintings and virtually every conceivable aspect of the 
arts-that Wang was now required to make in his day-to-day work as 
the Minister of Cultural Affairs. Deng Y oumei, a fellow novelist who 
worked with Wang at the Writers' Association where both were once 
senior officers, said that being "a good writer and a good minister" 
simultaneously was impossible. Speaking of Wang's new job, Deng 
said, "I am so grateful that this God-bestowed disaster did not fall on 
me."7 
Wang has called on writers to reconcile "creative freedom and 
social responsibility" in their works, urging them "not to go with the 
tide or follow the wind," but be true to their conscience. "Neither 
administrative measures nor propaganda are effective in defining what 
is true, good and beautiful," he once said. At the same time, he has 
also made it clear that writers should be aware of "proper directions" 
and should shun "residual feudal ideologies."8 Presumably, it is the 
latter belief that endeared him to Deng Xiaoping despite his past. 
The "cultural" crackdown was not limited to publications. It ap-
plied equally to other art forms, notably rock music. Following re-
newed government calls for "social responsibility" in art and 
literature, a controversial play was closed in Beijing and Shanghai and 
the tours of two Western rock groups were cancelled before the year 
1985 was out, culminating in the last-minute removal from the air of a 
New Year's Day broadcast of the Live Aid Famine Relief rock con-
cert. In January 1986, the government continued the campaign with 
the widely publicized story of the arrest and jailing of a popular pop 
singer on charges of "hooliganism." 
The singer, Zhang Xing, who rose to stardom after winning a 
singing contest a few years earlier was allegedly involved in sexual re-
lations with several of his female admirers. The real reason for his 
arrest, many believed, was that the singer, whose apolitical lyrics deal 
6. Ibid. 
7. John F. Burns, "Writer, Exiled by Mao, Now Gets Top Culture Post He Didn't 
Want," New York Times, June 26, 1986, p. A4. 
8. Ibid. 
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with love and romance, earned official scorn because he had become 
too popular, had too many girl friends, made too much money and 
sang "spiritual rubbish" that had a bad influence on young people. 
His records and tapes were banned following his arrest. 9 In photo-
graphs accompanying news reports about Zhang, he was shown in 
handcuffs sitting in a Shanghai jail. Meanwhile the press reported that 
a large number of readers had written letters demanding that Zhang 
be severely punished. It is probably true that Zhang's behavior would 
be frowned upon by most tradition-minded people; but his conviction 
on charges of "hooliganism" is a clear indication of the abuse of 
power. 
We are reminded in this connection of the controversy caused 
here in the United States by one of pop singer Madonna's latest hits, 
with explicit lyrics about a pregnant unwed girl pleading with her fa-
ther not to force her to give up the baby. There were debates among 
parents, teachers, concerned citizens and community leaders about 
whether the impact of the song was good or bad on the young 
people. 10 
However, the similarity between Madonna and Zhang stops here. 
In America, differences are aired in public, and the public debate, as a 
way of arriving at a decision democratically, is supposed to lead to a 
policy with public support. In this case, the publicity surrounding the 
debate may well, in addition, enhance the notoriety of the principal 
and consequently increase her wealth and fame. In China, however, it 
is the government, or more precisely the Party, that determines the 
right and wrong as the final arbiter; those who dare to go against the 
official line land in jail. 
To the purists, "spiritual pollution" continued on the rise with 
the opening to the West, and periodical pruning has been necessary 
and permissible limits must be maintained. Pop singer Zhang Xing 
might be the idol of Chinese youths with his hits such as "Lonely 
Boy" and "There is More Than One Road to Success," but to Party 
authorities he was just another "hooligan" deserving three years in 
jail. One young man from a relatively wealthy family was expelled 
from a university for introducing dancing with lights out. "It is com-
pletely forbidden in China, even though we are all fully clothed and 
are just dancing," the young man said. "Now I am classified by the 
public security office as a trouble-maker in the neighborhood. I have 
9. "Chinese Jail Pop Singer for 'Hooliganism,' "San Francisco Chronicle, January 10, 
1986, p. 72. 
10. Georgia Dullea, "Madonna's New Beat Is a Hit, But Song's Message Rankles," 
New York Times, September 18, 1986, p. Bl. 
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this bad reputation, just because of dancing." 11 
II. Richard S. Ehrlich, "Pop Star Discovers Extent of China's Victorianism," Wash-
ington Times, June 27, 1986, p. 15. 

VI. THE ECONOMY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Having discussed human rights in the ideological and cultural 
realms, we switch to the economic field in this chapter, focusing atten-
tion on both the basic structure of the PRC economy and in particular 
the Dengist reforms during the period under review to see how human 
rights have been impacted. 
In the economic sphere, the material well-being and rights and 
freedom of the ordinary people in the PRC, like everything else in a 
country under totalitarian rule, are determined by the rulers' political 
and personal needs and the struggle for dominance among them and 
their factions. Both ideology and the attempt to safeguard vested in-
terests also play a critical role. Expediency and the changing percep-
tions of an unstable and developing economy on the part of the 
surviving leaders after Mao Zedong's death have also continually af-
fected the attitudes and behavior of the Communist Party's principal 
factions. This situation prevailed in 1986 and has continued in 1987. 
Under these conditions, Dengist policies of economic reform re-
sulted initially in substantial economic improvement during the first 
half of the 1980's, especially in the rural economy. In terms of quanti-
tative progress, however, the non-economist and/or non-professional 
"China-watcher" may find the following caveats and reminders partic-
ularly pertinent and useful in evaluating both past and future changes. 
A principal caveat centers around the valuation of various PRC eco-
nomic indicators and the absolute values and growth rates based on 
them. In this respect, readers accustomed to popular Western con-
cepts like the gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product 
(GDP) who wish to compare the Chinese performance with that of 
other countries should be wary of the following: 
A) Such concepts like "industrial production," "agricultural pro-
duction," and "industrial and agricultural production," whether or 
not preceded by the term "gross," are gross value concepts including 
the value of inputs used. They are unlike the GNP and the GDP 
which are net values of output. The gross value concepts used in the 
PRC are derived from Soviet usage and would actually show higher 
values if more inputs are used as a result of decreasing productivity 
due to low labor efficiency. 
B) The Chinese gross value index of "industrial and agricultural 
production" is, however, narrower in coverage than the Western con-
cept of GNP as a result of its exclusion of intangible output in most 
(43) 
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service industries like passenger transportation, personal service, etc. 
The same kind of exclusion applies to the Soviet-type concept of "net 
material product" which the PRC sometimes employs. 
C) Valuation for comparison of growth rates over time, or of 
structural changes like proportions between industrial and agricultural 
outputs in different years, is plagued by price changes. Price changes 
during the 1980s up to this writing have been mostly a mixture of 
changes in administratively set prices, but, to a much lesser degree 
because of the smaller scope of the market sector, also of "market 
price" changes. Besides, where prices have remained unchanged, re-
ported increases in output do not necessarily reflect an improvement 
in economic well-being because "bulging warehouses," a frequent 
complaint, may simply mean excessive production of unwanted 
goods-a topic of far-reaching implication to be discussed later in this 
section-or failure in distribution. Finally, the "comparable prices" in 
PRC usage are not the same as "constant prices" in Western 
terminology. 
D) When Chinese currency values are converted into foreign cur-
rency units, a common practice is to use official or even market ex-
change rates, which, even if rates quoted on foreign markets are used, 
merely beg the question what such rates really mean in terms of rela-
tive purchasing power under conditions of trade and exchange control 
and state trading, as well as government allocation of domestic sup-
plies at administered prices. 
Superimposed upon these essentially methological caveats are a 
few reminders that are specifically associated with the PRC situation. 
A) Statistical reporting in the PRC has increased in the 1980s, 
but its inaccuracy and the persistent tendency to exaggerate have not 
been eliminated. 
B) The initial impact of relaxing control, such as allowing private 
proprietors to operate some service businesses in a given area, may 
represent "one-time" institutional changes that cannot be repeated in-
definitely in the same area. 
C) Most important of all, in spite of the much vaunted beneficial 
effect of Dengist reform, the PRC economy remains one of the world's 
poorest economies, and vast discrepancies exist between "rich" and 
"poor." 
D) Finally, even within the short period of several years since the 
onset of Dengist reform, there were changes in policy affecting differ-
ent economic sectors unequally so that statements of economic im-
provement or stagnation should really be closely qualified by 
specifying time periods. 
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Given the preceding caveats and reminders, it would be helpful to 
point to some economic realities. First, according to the World Bank, 
the PRC's GNP per capita in 1985 was an estimated $310. 1 While this 
puts the PRC among the very low income countries and its ranking in 
the world has not improved over the last three decades, the poorest 
segment of the population in China is even poorer. Over 100 million 
poor farmers, according to the Statistical Bureau, had a per capita an-
nual income of 159 yuan, equivalent to $55 at 2.8633 yuan to the dol-
lar for 1985. This compares with a minimal official poverty line of 200 
yuan (about $70) per person per year. 2 (In contrast, at the other end 
of the spectrum, some 110 million farmers were said to have a per 
capita income of 1,311 yuan or $458, which would be over a third 
higher than the average of $310 given by the World Bank.) 
One can hypothesize why richer countries tend to exhibit less eco-
nomic inequality than their poor neighbors. Given the small size of 
the GNP, the struggle for a larger share is likely to be more intense. 
Hence a stronger and/or more privileged group of the population will 
end up with a larger share and the process of acquiring and maintain-
ing its disproportionate share is bound to affect the human rights of 
the less fortunate. This has happened in the PRC. 3 In this context, 
human rights have suffered in China not only because the country con-
tinues to be extremely poor and the rate of improvement has been very 
low, but changes under reformist policies have had undesirable conse-
quences from the point of view of the authorities. Of the conse-
quences, some are avoidable; others are inevitable and have been 
misinterpreted-either unwittingly or on purpose-and have thus be-
come entangled in the ongoing political struggle which has led to the 
reversal of policy at the end of 1986. 
Economic Crimes 
Reports from China indicate that many people have suffered from 
misappropriations of their income outside the regular system of taxes 
and fees through extraordinary levies and forcible contributions to pri-
vate and "public" causes including local tolls on goods in internal 
commerce. These levies are exacted by both government and Commu-
nist Party cadres by virtue of their administrative or arbitrary author-
I. This is calculated on the basis of a population of 1,029,156,000. The World Bank, 
Annual Report, Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 92. 
2. China Daily, (Beijing,) December 18, 1985, p. 4, reprinted by Reuters on the fol-
lowing day. 
3. See Human Rights in the People's Republic of China (forthcoming), Boulder, Colo-
rado, Westview Press, 1988. 
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ity over the people whose activities they happen to control. The 
practice reminds one of similar acts in the period of warlords who 
controlled parts of the country during the 1920s and earlier. When 
such payments are demanded without even the pretense of sanction by 
a nominally official entity, they are virtually akin to outright demands 
for bribes, a practice of common knowledge in recent years. 
Cases of misuse of power and position for personal gain, when 
reported in the Chinese press, have often been attributed to inadequate 
supervision and discipline within the Communist Party. These acts of 
corruption are sometimes perpetrated collectively by cadres working 
in a group. Heavy extra-legal demands on the taxpayer are more 
likely when individuals or groups are believed to be "rich." The im-
pression, however, that some people are wealthy is sometimes based 
on unreliable reports which have exaggerated the subjects' economic 
accomplishments because the reporting cadres are eager to earn per-
sonal rewards by pointing to special progress under their control. Re-
ports in the Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and other official 
publications have pointed to exaggerations about the emergence of 
well-to-do peasants, some earning more than 10,000 yuan a year per 
household ("wan yuan hu"), to explain why demands have been made 
on farmers in general.4 The same applies to rural households special-
izing in non-grain production, trade, handicrafts, etc. that have be-
come better off than other households in the same area. The "new 
rich," in particular, have been victimized in this manner. 
Not the least of the uncertainties facing Chinese farmers and 
small businessmen stems from the indiscriminate use of the term "cor-
ruption." To the Chinese Communist Party, corrupt acts would in-
clude squandering of public funds (foreign exchange included), 
acceptance (presumably also the offer) of bribes, use of one's official 
position for personal gain, favoritism in personnel matters, and the 
sheltering of criminals. But "serious" cases of dereliction of duty and 
bureaucratic conduct not so easily defined also often fall under the 
category of "corruption." Finally, Western businessmen may be sur-
prised by the inclusion among corrupt practices of "speculation and 
purchasing goods for resale," which are frequently regarded as 
equivalent to "robbery and theft." Thus both retail and wholesale on 
the basis of anticipated price differences can be treated as acts of cor-
ruption. In fact, the catalogue of corrupt acts includes everything the 
4. See Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), August 17, p. I, and November I, 1985, p. I. 
and Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily) Beijing, August 3, 1985, p. 3 (editorial and report on 
Wenzhou). Other cases are quoted in "July Reports," in The Quest No.7, Brooklyn, N.Y .. 
July 1986, pp. 22-25. 
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Party in power may at one time or another regard as repprehensible, 
ranging from illegality to impropriety and incompetence. Above all, 
such a list flies against the very concept of the market economy which 
Dengist economic reform is supposed to be about by treating the ser-
vice trade and distribution as illegal and exploitative. 
Market practices that supposedly victimize the innocent public 
are generally reported in the Chinese Communist press together with 
instances of misappropriation of public funds and malfeasance in of-
fice. They are what the official Commission on Party Discipline is sup-
posed to eradicate and constitute an unspecifiable portion of the 
sporadically reported "economic crimes." 
However, as long as the policy of "economic reform" as advo-
cated by Deng, Zhao, and, until recently, Hu Yaobang, remains offi-
cial policy, individual enterprises as well as individuals are allowed 
greater leeway in pursuing their respective economic activities. Per-
sonal gain as a result of superior economic performance was therefore 
permitted in many cases through 1986 and acted as the very kind of 
material incentive planned under the reform program. But when some 
of the individuals perform so much better than others and the income 
differential grows, orthodox Communist Party cadres began to per-
ceive the widening income difference as contrary to Communist ideol-
ogy. Envy too doubtless played its role. 
Apparently opinion has differed within the Party on the permissi-
ble range of income differentials. At any rate, even in the absence of 
an official edict from the very top, fear on the part of local cadres that 
"too high" incomes above the average might be regarded, perhaps 
sometime in the future, as being "capitalistic" and therefore "counter-
revolutionary" has been sufficient cause for them to put the "offend-
ers" under "reform through labor." Thus quite normal behavior, 
legally sanctioned and encouraged by reformist policy, could well be 
treated as criminal. The perception of incomes being too high is of 
course altogether subjective and its use by local officials in policy en-
forcement compounds their power on individual citizens. 
It is against this background that officially sanctioned economic 
behavior has been occasionally treated as a crime. Thus economic 
crime statistics must be viewed with a grain of salt. Some cadres, still 
steeped in the Maoist tradition, misinterpret policy. Some factions in 
the Party leadership fear that reform along the capitalist road might 
go too far even though the pursuit of material gain has really been 
sanctioned by official policy. To mete out punishment against these 
"crimes" is therefore to commit an offense against economic rights 
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sanctioned by the Party authorities themselves as well as a violation of 
human rights. 
According to a Renmin Ribao report in mid-January 1986, courts 
in the PRC handled a total of 41,635 cases of graft, bribery, specula-
tion, theft of public property, profiteering, and other economic crimes 
in the first 11 months of 1985 (italics added). 54,836 persons were said 
to be involved in these cases, which constituted 11 percent of the na-
tional total. 5 
The United Press International, quoting the China Daily of the 
same date, reported on July 31, 1986 that "economic crimes" in the 
PRC during the first half of 1986 had risen by 130% over the corre-
sponding level a year earlier. 6 The information came from the Peo-
ple's Supreme Court which reported in addition an increase of 480% 
in "serious economic crimes"-defined as involving an amount ex-
ceeding 10,000 Yuan in each case. Furthermore, there were 8,900 se-
rious economic crimes during the first 6 months of 1986, accounting 
for 31.8% of all economic crimes. The increase was even greater, 
however, for cases involving larger amounts. There were 1,881 cases 
that involved amounts exceeding 20,000 to 30,000 Yuan per case dur-
ing the first half of 1986. 
The Right to Mobility and Choice of Residence 
Relaxation of controls, whether officially sanctioned or not, have 
also had other effects on human rights that are subject to diverse inter-
pretations and controversy. One of these is the reverse migration from 
regions where life is harder and from rural areas, to which students 
and others were exiled during the Cultural Revolution, back to urban 
centers. This development has contributed to, although it is by no 
means the sole cause of, an increase in apparently unemployed persons 
and of beggars in the latter places. This phenomenon has an adverse 
impact on civic appearance and pride, not the least where foreign tour-
ism is concerned, and is sometimes blamed on reform. Critics of re-
form, however, neglect to mention that the same persons had been sent 
to, or held back in, areas where they would not have gone or re-
mained, had they had a choice. Besides, they may have been held in 
either "reform" or "education through labor" settlements where they 
were denied the freedom of choice of residence. Is it a lesser infringe-
ment of personal and economic freedom to be forcibly sent to a place 
5. Quoted in Japan Times, (Tokyo), January 15, 1986, p. 4. 
6. Reprinted in the Central Daily News, (Taipei), overseas edition, August 3, 1986, p. 
6. 
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where one does not wish to go than to have to scrounge for a bare 
existence in places where one would rather reside, perhaps in the mis-
taken belief that one could have done better? How should the ques-
tion be answered by the individuals in question? By a third party? 
Economic Reform and/or Political Reform 
Demand for political reform in the PRC as a sine qua non of gen-
uine modernization has grown over the years since the overthrow of 
Mao's immediate radical successors in 1976. The demand has arisen 
for a number of different reasons, some more important than others, as 
far as the different groups of Mao's victims and opponents are con-
cerned. Among the more educated Chinese, few came through the 
rampage and irrationality of the Cultural Revolution completely un-
scathed, at least psychologically.7 But of these, probably a somewhat 
smaller number of persons would blame the very possibility of such a 
national disaster not just on Mao's personal despotism, but more fun-
damentally on the over-concentration of power within the communist 
system and the absence of adequate checks and balances that made the 
Maoist abuse possible. To this perhaps numerically smaller minority, 
political reform is urgently needed regardless of what may have to be 
done or will happen in the economy. However, among the multitudes 
who were disenchanted with Maoist despotism and irrationality, but 
not with the communist system, there are two sub-groups holding dif-
ferent views on the issue of economic reform. Their opinions differ on 
the viability of Soviet-type economic planning and the need for intro-
ducing large doses of decentralized decision making, market pricing, 
and private property ownership. 
Persons who consider Stalinist centralized planning already to-
tally discredited tend to view the political and economic precepts of 
Marx, Lenin and Mao as no longer relevant. If so, the Chinese Com-
munist Party's role as the vanguard of the revolution can hardly be 
defended. Moreover, if Party cadres at all levels are seen as either 
incompetent or corrupt or both, then economic and political reform 
must be pursued vigorously hand in hand. 
To others, like Peng Zhen and Li Peng, who have not lost faith in 
socialism and Soviet-style governance, lower limits must be set for 
both political and economic decentralization and/or liberalization. It 
appears that Deng may be closer to the former Party Secretary-Gen-
eral Hu Yaobang, who was dismissed in mid-January 1987, on eco-
nomic matters. On political matter, however, Deng may be closer to 
7. Human Rights in the PRC, supra note 3. 
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the Party stalwarts like Peng Zhen and Chen Yun. One can hypothe-
size that the first position made him go so far in economic reform but 
the second position contributed to his acceptance of Hu Yaobang's 
opponents' demand to oust Hu in January 1987. Deng has, on pur-
pose, maintained ambivalence for both domestic political and foreign 
policy reasons. That such major divisions of opinion existed m 
China's decision-making circles became quite clear in 1986. 
Sharpening of Ideological Differences in Economic and Political 
Reform 
As the year 1986 advanced, the ideological difference between the 
two sides in economics and political/cultural affairs sharpened overtly. 
A mid-year report in the Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily) brought out 
plainly the wide cleavage in opinion among participants in a confer-
ence on the "theory of governmental functions." 8 One group wanted 
to improve the Communist Party's leadership in government, to stress 
enterprise and service by government, to strengthen Soviet-style law 
and legality,9 and to promote "socialist democratic principles," i.e. 
"democratic centralism." 10 These are the ideas both Peng Zhen and 
Chen Yun advocate; they coincide with Deng Xiaoping's four basic 
principles that have been enshrined in the 1982 Constitution. 
A second group of participants at the conference called upon the 
government to focus on four primarily economic tasks which were, 
however, chock full of far-reaching political consequences: formula-
tion of principles for market regulation and government leadership; 
removing the government from its role in operating enterprises while 
enlarging the individual enterprises' independence and responsibility 
for themselves; opening markets for capital, labor, producer goods and 
information; coordination of macro- and micro-economic aspects of 
reform. The development of a market for information implies a freer 
press and greater leeway for independent publications. Marketization 
for labor, capital and producer goods would restrict the size of the 
government sector and resource use by the government. The princi-
ples outlined by these advocates of political reform are those of a 
mixed economy. 
Problems Concerning Property Rights and Failing Enterprises 
These broad differences in principle took on specific forms in sev-
8. Jingji Ribao, July 12, 1986, p. 3. 
9. See the sources in supra note 4. 
10. Ibid. 
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eral important developments during 1986. The debate first crystal-
lized in a discussion on the General Principles of the Civil Code as 
published in April of that year. A principal issue centered on the 
kinds of enterprise ownership (state, collective, individual, and other) 
and rights to properties of the enterprises. The General Principles 
stated firmly that farm land, for instance, could not be mortgaged. 
The same principles were not at all clear about the right of collective 
and other forms of enterprises in disposing 'Jf property they own as 
means of production. The right of sale, disposal and alienation in 
other ways is of paramount importance for at least two principal rea-
sons. In the first place, inter-enterprise contracts require precise defi-
nitions of property rights for purposes of contract enforcement; this is 
true especially where foreign businessmen are involved, in joint ven-
tures or in contracts between a foreign and a Chinese enterprise. Sec-
ondly, when adjustments of ownership in case of liquidation or 
bankruptcy or merger take place, successor firms, or creditors, need to 
know where they stand. The lack of clarity on property rights the 
owners possess, a result of ideological uncertainties, thus made the 
problem of devolving the responsibilities of management and for profit 
and loss on the individual enterprise unit quite impossible. 
A great deal of public fuss was made when a plant in Shenyang 
was allowed to go bankrupt as an experiment, but the National Peo-
ple's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee headed by Peng Zhen re-
fused to accept the law in the fall of 1986, preferring to postpone the 
general application of the proposed law until an enterprise law could 
be adopted at the NPC meeting in March 1987. But when the matter 
came before the NPC Standing Committee in early 1987, it was re-
jected. Peng Zhen probably had his political reasons for postponing 
the adoption of the bankruptcy law. Setting aside the enterprise law 
effectively put an end to the bankruptcy law and thus the legal possi-
bility of removing workers in a failing enterprise from the payroll that 
must then be sustained by government subsidy. This development 
cripples a sorely needed means of effecting structural change in the 
economy. 
During 1986, individual enterprises in Shanghai and Shenyang 
exercised the right which they at least enjoyed briefly to raise capital 
for their own use by issuing bonds and stocks respectively. A report 
on the second case described how worker stockholders who alone were 
allowed to purchase the stocks-presumably an arrangement copied 
from the Yugoslavs-had occasion to sell their stock; an informal 
market soon developed although transfers to non-workers were pre-
sumably illegal. At any rate, it appears that this practice proved to be 
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privatization beyond the degree envisaged as permissible by some 
Party leaders. This capitalistic method of financing individual enter-
prise parallels the emergence of inter-enterprise credit relationships, 
credits between enterprises and consumers and between enterprises 
and banks. 11 These are, of course, the kind of "horizontal linkages," 
as against "vertical commands" in centralized planning, that follow 
logically in economic reform. 12 However, as orthodox communists 
rightly fear, giving enterprises the right and incentive to follow the 
path of their own self-interest will eventually place the enterprises in 
conflict with the goals of the state and Party. They will most likely 
upset the latter's goals. 
Jobs, Privileges and Vested Interests 
However, giving enterprises more power to run their own affairs 
by technically competent people would entail personnel changes re-
sulting in the dilution of Party control. What would the Party cadres 
previously in controlling positions do? Perhaps even more important 
to these bureaucrats than their nominal status is the material well-
being which in turn depends upon their positions of power. (This is 
what the punishments meted out to "liberal" intellectuals in 1987 
meant to some of them.) Shorn of such power, they lose influence, 
control over personnel policy, and financial wherewithal and thereby 
the very basis of favoritism and corruption. This threat to the Party 
cadres' vested interest is shared by all echelons and stems from the 
shrinking of the size of the central and lower-level bureaucratic appa-
ratus no less than the slogan of taking the Party and government out 
of enterprises or taking the Party out of government. Hence "political 
reform" even at the level of administrative reform can be opposed by 
vested interests, and this obviously has happened in the People's Re-
public of China. The opposition is likely to be more strenuous when 
the average standard of living of persons without special privilege is 
unbelievably low and when other opportunities of employment outside 
the government and Party are scarce and not expanding. Finally, 
while such "bread and butter" issues can be powerful incentives in any 
society, in a society where there is ideological opposition to change at 
the top, as has been the case in China, the lower-level opposition can 
be expected to coalesce around such leaders like Peng Zhen. The bulk 
II. Jingji Ribao, September 16, 1986, p. 2. See also the Hong Kong Ming Pao, October 
31, 1986, pp. 4 and 10 (reports on Wuhan and Quangzhou). 
12. Liaowang (The Outlook), No. 28, 1986, p. 12. 
REFORM IN REVERSE 53 
of the Party cadres can be quite adept at utilizing orthodox communist 
doctrine to "legitimize" their self-interest in public pronouncements. 
There are numerous large and middle-sized state and collective 
enterprises in the PRC-400,000 in the industrial sector is a figure not 
infrequently cited in discussion by Chinese economists. In each of 
these one can count on at least several party cadres whose vested inter-
ests would be threatened by "reform." To them one should add the 
corresponding group in government agencies that have been and 
might be cut back further. Disgruntled military men and functiona-
ries adversely affected by budget cuts in the early 1980s should be 
included. 
In the years immediately after 1976 there may have been a widely 
shared common interest to sweep the Cultural Revolution elements 
out of positions of power. This common interest breaks down when 
the traditional Party cadres must now defend their own vested inter-
ests against the "younger" and "more educated" technocrats and "re-
formers." A decline in the expansion of individual enterprises, itself 
partly caused by discouragement by cadres at lower levels, has in turn 
contributed to the need to defend the jobs they hold. 
Economic Reform and Economic Rights: Management of Forced 
Labor Contingents 
The stalling economic reforms in the winter of 1986-87 had sev-
eral distinct implications for the individual's economic rights. First, 
the individual's right to set up his or her own business has been further 
discouraged. Second, ownership of stocks and bonds issued by state 
and collective enterprise has been placed under stricter control. Since 
both the enterprise law and the bankruptcy law have been shelved, any 
extension of private property rights under different kinds of ownership 
through revisions of the "General Principles" of the civil code is 
bound to be delayed. All this implies that the individual's ability to 
stand up against the state as the dominant, if not sole, employer has 
again been weakened. Given these conditions, it is well to remind our-
selves that the rights of free labor have always been under the threat of 
the twin forced labor systems-"reform through labor" within the sys-
tem of criminal justice and "education through labor" as a system of 
forced labor for individuals who have not been sentenced by the regu-
lar courts. 
An interesting report on the new Central Academy for Cadres in 
Reform through Labor and Education through Labor appeared in 
Zhongguo Fazhi Bao (China Legal News) of November 1, 1986. The 
academy's predecessor was the Cadre School for Labor Reform which 
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was reorganized in 1985 to meet changing needs. According to the 
Party Committee overseeing the Academy's activities, management 
personnel currently employed in these forced labor institutions num-
bered more than 200,000, and the Academy has been engaged in train-
ing new recruits. A two-year course for leaders as well as short 
training courses for cadres are taught by ninety instructors who have a 
very heavy schedule to keep up with the demand. 13 One can only 
speculate on the source of new supply of the forced labor contingents 
and whether there would be an unusual increase in their numbers. A 
second reminder is the employment of large labor contingents in for-
eign countries. According to a private European source in 1986, 
70,000 Chinese workers were leased by the PRC to work in foreign 
countries, mainly Third World countries, during 1980-1985. No an-
nual figures are available; information on terms and pay and the de-
gree of "voluntariness" is also withheld. Prison and forced labor as an 
institution of normal practice, however, continue. 
13. Zhongguo Fazhi Bao (China Legal News), November I, 1986, p. 3. 
VII: POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
The practice of political and civil rights in China is influenced by 
a variety of factors. In the past it has depended to a large extent on 
the degree of centralization of political power, factionalism in the Chi-
nese Communist Party, power struggles, and campaigns and move-
ments. The PRC's human rights record in the realm of political and 
civil liberties has generally been better during times of less centraliza-
tion of political power and when ideology has been de-emphasized, 
especially radical leftist communism. 1 Factional struggles have gener-
ally worsened the human rights condition. Mao's campaigns and 
movements, generally launched to increase the control of the Party 
over human activity, diminished the practice of political and civil 
liberties. 
The year 1986 witnessed some improvements in the practice of 
political and civil rights in China as a result of weaker Party control 
and greater political freedom which the regime seemed to perceive 
were necessary to keep economic growth on track. Specific examples 
include the "reversal of verdicts" concerning a number of people la-
beled "counterrevolutionaries" during the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, the launching of a nationwide legal education program, 
the passage of China's first postal service law guaranteeing the privacy 
of the mails and the reinvigoration of the "democratic" parliament or 
the National People's Congress. There were even moves to have more 
than one candidate in some elections. 
In many cases, however, changes were simply announced; there 
was no framework provided for their implementation. In addition, 
side effects or negative impacts of the reform movement tended to off-
set what might otherwise have been considerable progress overall. Fi-
nally, the human rights condition in China was affected adversely by 
the anti-reform movement in late 1986 and early 1987. 
The reason for the decline in political and civil rights toward the 
end of the period was that the reforms carried out during 1986 were 
opposed by the Party left or orthodox communists-who saw them as 
dangerous and threatening to their power and authority. The progres-
sives in the Party pushed changes in most cases beyond what was po-
litically feasible in order to force the orthodox communists to accept 
I. Practices regarding political and civil rights improved considerably, for example, 
during the Hundred Flowers Campaign in the mid-1950s and the period of Democracy 
Wall in 1979. 
(55) 
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reform-often presented as afait accompli. 2 Deng Xiaoping also had 
to prevent any threat to the Party's authority and as a consequence 
had to check any spontaneous, and in some senses any real, exercise of 
civil and political rights in order to avoid criticism from the left. 
The effect of the reform on China's human rights record has also 
been exaggerated. For example, while there was a "reversal of ver-
dicts" regarding victims of the Cultural Revolution, large numbers of 
young people who ten or more years earlier had helped to launch the 
movement and carried it out, remained "undesirables" and were not 
allowed to return to urban areas. They continued to languish in 
China's hinterland separated from families and friends. Meanwhile, 
Deng tried to purge still more members from the Party who joined 
during the Cultural Revolution. Similarly the law protecting the pri-
vacy of the mail must be viewed in the context of more sophisticated 
domestic spying and the enforcement of a national identity card sys-
tem passed into law in late 1985. 
Many of the "reforms" which might have evoked more civil and 
political freedoms were cancelled as a result of events in late 1986 and 
early 1987: the student demonstrations, the fall of Hu Yaobang, the 
rise of the Party diehards and Deng's retreat or retrenchment. These 
events created a leftist backlash. 
Clearly there was a setback for Deng's reforms-particularly 
democratic reform. However, Deng himself seemed behind the move 
to scrap the reformers; at least it appeared that he had changed his 
position on reform-whether or not voluntarily. Symbolizing this, 
three Party statements issued in February 1987 were especially re-
vealing in terms of Deng's changes in attitude about the Chinese polit-
ical system: Deng praised the Communist Party of Poland for its 
"cool head" and the way it used martial law in dealing with Solidarity 
and the Roman Catholic Church. He condemned the student demon-
strations and spoke critically of intellectuals, accusing both of under-
mining social order. He said that the protest should be ended 
"severely." He went on to rescind his earlier appeals for more decen-
tralization of political power, noting that the separation of powers in 
the U.S. political system results "in three governments," and that the 
U.S. tries to export its system in order to "weaken" other countries. 3 
2. See "Tightening the Screws," Asiaweek, February I, 1987, pp. 8-10. 
3. Daniel Southerland, "Chinese Documents Reveal Deng"s Hard Line on Protest ... 
Washington Post, February 26, 1987, p. A4. 
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Recentralization of Power 
During late 1986 and early 1987 the Chinese polity experienced a 
recentralization of political power. Decisions were also made that re-
established the importance of ideology. Finally, there was a resuscita-
tion of the Party's power to control the government. All of this spread 
a pall over the country, dampening confidence that the individual had 
rights, that the government was not oppressive and that conformity 
was not the first rule of order in terms of the citizen's relationship to 
the state. The effect was clear: few people regarded the recently 
granted freedoms, as limited as they were, as permanent. Most per-
ceived that the "line" advocating more freedoms had changed again. 
Following the reversal of Deng's reforms it was still uncertain 
where the PRC was going politically, particularly in terms of civil and 
political rights. Though few expected China to suffer another Cultural 
Revolution, it was generally perceived that democratic reforms were 
dead at least for months, possibly for some years. 
During the period when the reformists were on the ascendancy, 
human rights abuses occurred, ironically because of the reforms or in 
order to protect the reforms. There was, for example, a massive Party 
purge or "rectification" in progress during most of 1986. This began 
in 1983 and continued up to the end of 1986. It was originally to 
include 20 million of the 43 plus million members of the Chinese Com-
munist Party. Marked for purge were three categories: those with 
"Gang" tendencies (meaning the radical left "Gang of Four" associ-
ated with Mao), "factionalists," and those who were once involved in 
"beating, smashing and looting" (referring to leftists committing vio-
lence during the Cultural Revolution period as well as those taking 
advantage of the free market system.)4 
It is uncertain to what extent this rectification movement resulted 
in human rights violations. In most individual cases the result was a 
loss of Party membership. Some purged Party members were put in 
"reform through labor" and "education through labor" camps. How-
ever, the campaign was not carried to fruition, and it is estimated that 
only 3 million of the 20 million targeted were affected. 
Neither did reform, in the sense of democratizing the Party, go 
very far. Some elections were held with more than one candidate-
giving the voter a choice for the first time. But this was not wide-
spread, and it was reported that of the "alternative" democratic par-
ties (with a total membership of only 83,000) all were "patriotic united 
4. See Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), November 25, 1985, pp. I, 4. 
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front organizations" led by the Communist Party. 5 
So too with legal reform. Several months into 1986, there ap-
peared to be positive reform in the legal system that might foster im-
provements in political and civil liberties. Establishing a system of 
law, however, did not go very far; some, in fact, called it tokenism. 
The Chinese government announced an increase of 4,000 lawyers in 
the 1986 budget, but at the same time it stated that "legal work" was 
not a "free profession" and that lawyers were to be regarded as "tools 
of the people's dictatorship." Meanwhile, again according to an offi-
cial Chinese source, only 20 percent of criminal defendants were repre-
sented by counsel and 6. 7 percent of defendants in civil cases. 6 
During 1986 the legal system continued to be used against 
"counterrevolutionaries," noted political and civil rights advocates, 
students, and women opposing abortion. In August the government 
announced that it was planning to establish laws requiring foreigners 
to take blood tests for AIDS and other diseases. 7 On January 1, 1987 
this law was put in effect, and all foreign students and teachers had to 
undergo AIDS tests. Official government spokesmen said it was be-
cause of the prevalence of AIDS in the West, resulting from a society 
rampant with homosexuality, drug addiction and social deviance. 8 
Foreigners who became AIDS victims in China were not allowed to 
leave the country on commercial planes and were forced to pay large 
sums for private transportation.9 
In the implementation of a legal system, due process was much 
more noticeable in China's cities, and especially in areas that were 
open to foreign tourists and the Western media. Due process was gen-
erally ignored in the countryside and the remote places. In the late 
summer, a blatant though somewhat humorous case came to light in 
rural Hubei province-when a judge had a lawyer chained to a tree to 
prevent him from getting into the courtroom to speak on behalf of his 
client. 10 
The arrest and punishment of criminals in China during the pe-
riod in question also seemed very much to reflect party factionalism 
based on support or opposition to Deng's reforms. Deng and his sup-
5. Mary Lee, "Outlet for the Important Ninth," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 
20, 1985, p. 83. 
6. See Zhongguo Fazhi Boo (China Legal News), July 7, 1986, cited in Inside Main-
land China, October, 1986, p. 8. 
7. San Francisco Chronicle, April 7, 1987, p. 42. 
8. Ibid. 
9. "China Holds Tourist With AIDS," San Francisco Chronicle, July 13, 1987, p. 13. 
10. "Lawyer Chained to Tree," Washington Times, August 29. 1986, p. 6A. 
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porters maintained tough policies in dealing with criminals-espe-
cially economic criminals (to satisfy the left or to prevent the left from 
winning support for a campaign against crime). However, it became 
obvious that they preferred to punish and make an example of only 
certain crimes-particularly violent crimes and theft. It also appeared 
that the reformists often arrested and punished criminals while flout-
ing criminal procedures. 
Mass Executions 
In January 1986 mass executions were held in several cities in 
China-reportedly as a New Year's "resolution." The mayor of Bei-
jing told a crowd of 13,000 at the time that "wrongdoers would face 
stern punishment in the year of the tiger." At the time 18 murderers, 
rapists and thieves were convicted, sentenced and executed on the 
spot. II 
Other executions in several of China's major cities early in 1986 
were said to have been ordered to "set the stage" for a Party meeting. 
A Qinghai (province) official said that this "destroyed the arrogance of 
criminals" and helped the atmosphere of the "meeting of 8,000" called 
by the Secretary-General of the Party. Few doubted that this was the 
reason for the executions. (The September 1985 Party meeting was 
preceded by similar executions accompanied by mass rallies to attract 
attention to the tough policies of the government and underscore the 
Party's authority at a time when policy decisions were to be 
announced). 12 
In June 1986, it was reported that 31 "criminals" had been exe-
cuted in Beijing; this was said to be the highest number on a single day 
in recent memory. 13 The Christian Science Monitor reported that most 
of those executed were not convicted of violent crimes. 14 Executions 
in violation of Constitutional guidelines and generally in disregard of 
due process continued throughout China during the rest of the year. 
Chinese officials gave no exact figures on the number of criminals 
executed in China during 1986 or 1987. Western reporters continued 
to speak of ten to fifteen thousand since 1983 when the wave of execu-
II. "China Holds Mass Executions as a New Year's Reolution," San Francisco Chroni-
cle, January 22, 1986, p. II. 
12. See Mary Lee, "Happy Holidays and Burying Killing Fields," Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, February 20, 1986, p. 47. 
13. "Chinese Ministry Position Filled by Former Rightist," Washington Times, June 
26, 1986, p. 9A. 
14. George Jochnowitz, "Punishment Chinese-style: Beware of Red Check Mark," 
Christian Science .'11onitor, June 25, 1986, p. 14. 
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tions began. 15 Clearly 1986-87 saw no letup in death sentences. Offi-
cial sources, however, did reveal that China had only 20,000 attorneys 
(including part-time ones) and it was not possible for all defendants to 
have an attorney. They also revealed that attorneys are not usually 
involved in a case until the investigation is complete. They averred 
that criminals involved in crimes that carry death sentences always 
have the right to appeal-yet given the shortness of time from convic-
tion to the carrying out of the sentence, appeals were not often granted 
and often executions were completed within a matter of minutes or 
hours of conviction. 16 
In reply to questions about executions, several Chinese officials 
asserted that "reform through labor is not enough." They also said 
openly that hooligans, those practicing "feudal superstitions," and 
"reactionaries" should be executed. (Hooliganism, according to the 
Chinese definition, includes wearing outlandish clothing or giving vul-
gar finger signs.) Liu Yunfeng, President of Beijing's Superior Peo-
ple's Court, noted in this connection that "by killing one we educate 
100." The Vice President of the same court said that "executing Party 
members during the 1952 Five-Antis Campaign didn't hurt the Party's 
image; it helped." 17 
Criminal justice was also carried out without consistency during 
1986-87. Inordinately larger numbers of executions were recorded in 
certain parts of the country than others. The crimes for which the 
death penalty was used also varied. Most of the crimes were not con-
sidered capital crimes in most Western countries. And public execu-
tions remained popular notwithstanding the fact that they violate the 
Constitution. 
The inconsistent use of the death penalty was most blatant in the 
case of Party officials and their sons and daughters. It was widely 
known that the children of high officials could avoid going to court for 
graft, blackmarketing and a host of other crimes and even rape and 
assault (which are generally a capital crime), if they had connections 
with China's security organs or police. 18 Thus many were involved in 
shady business deals, making huge amounts of money through illegal 
15. For details see Liu Fong Da with John Creger, "'Execution Day in Zhengzhou,"' 
American Spectator, December, 1986, pp. 19-20. 
16. Supra note 12. 
17. Ibid. 
18. See David Bonavia, "Commissars Eat Quische,"' Far Eastern Economic Review, 
September 18, 1986, p. 57. 
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channels without any fear of punishment. 19 
On the other hand, some relatives of high officials were punished 
with unusual or extraordinary severity. Yu Zemin, Deputy Director 
of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, was expelled from the Party and given a life sentence in prison 
for receiving $8,100 in bribes.2° Three sons of Party members were 
executed for rape. And one official was given a long jail sentence for 
visiting a red light district while in Japan.2 1 
In the case of two Shanghai Party officials whose sons were exe-
cuted for "sex crimes," the convicted were publicly displayed, includ-
ing a showing on television, before they were executed (with the T.V. 
audience pre-warned that they would be shot). This was the first "ti-
ger cub" (son of a high Party official) execution publicly announced in 
advance since the execution of Marshal Zhu De's grandson and Presi-
dent Li Xiannian's nephew in 1983. Some said that the executions 
were carried out with fanfare in order "to weaken the position and 
authority of someone at the top of the Party." Others said that it was 
because the fathers of those put to death were no longer in power and 
could not prevent it; or it was revenge taken against them. 22 
It was obvious that the law was not being applied evenly and that 
death sentences were often carried out to scare would-be criminals 
rather than because it was deserving. Law enforcement was in large 
part based on the whims of officials and the perception of a need to 
crack down on crime at a given time. Clearly due process was not 
followed as an established legal principle. 
Arrests and punishments were also used to warn the populace 
against certain activities which the Party, or certain segments of the 
Party, did not like. In August 1986 a European teacher was arrested 
for association with a Children of God cult based in Switzerland. 23 A 
singer was reportedly arrested in Shanghai "because he was too popu-
lar, had too many girlfriends and sang spiritual rubbish. "24 The 
Shanghai Liberation Daily also reported the arrests of 9,000 beggars 
19. Linda Jarvin, "Dragon to Dragon, Phoenix to Phoenix," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, September 18, 1986, pp. 58-59. 
20. "Chinese Communists Hit 'Open Door' Policy," Washington Times, August 18, 
1986, p. 7A. 
21. Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, "In China, the Year ... and Claws of the Tiger," 
New Yark Times, March 8, 1986, p. 27. 
22. See Mary Lee, "Death of the Tigers," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 6, 
1986, p. 34. 
23. "Intelligence Report," Washington Times, August 18, 1986, p. 3A. 
24. "Chinese Jail Pop Singer for Hooliganism," San Francisco Chronicle, January 10, 
1986, p. 72. 
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and vagrants who were picked up on the streets of the city because 
they were not "really in distress" (meaning they were not skinny). 25 
Factionalism and infighting in the top leadership in the PRC also 
gave rise to increased use of intelligence gathering (both domestic and 
foreign) and tighter security precautions. This was promoted primar-
ily by the reformists in order to preclude problems that might give 
ammunition to their opponents. It was also, however, pushed by the 
anti-reformist left because it controlled China's intelligence and secur-
ity agencies. 
Contention between orthodox communists and reformers in the 
leadership was also reflected in the arrest of New York Times corre-
spondent John Burns. The Ministry of Public Security expelled him. 
The two national intelligence/police organizations did not cooperate 
in the matter and may have vied to get control of the case. 26 In fact, 
his arrest may have occurred in order to cause embarrassment to cer-
tain political leaders. Alternatively it was a case of one government 
agency trying to be aggressive to upstage another. Further demon-
strating factionalism in the Chinese leadership, in June the Minister of 
State Security Ruan Congwu told foreign news reporters that there 
was "not one person imprisoned in China because of political 
views. " 27 Subsequently other Chinese leaders, including provincial 
leaders, divulged information on political prisoners-including in 
some cases locations of camps and numbers of inmates. 
In January Yu Zhensan, who headed the foreign affairs office of 
the Ministry of State Security, defected, apparently passing informa-
tion to U.S. intelligence organizations about espionage in the United 
States and spying on foreigners residing in China. The Ministry of 
State Security, established in 1983 after the model of the Soviet KGB, 
to coordinate foreign intelligence with domestic security functions, has 
had to try to cope with problems resulting from the PRC's "open 
door" policy and has increasingly linked internal political control to 
spying on foreigners and intelligence efforts abroad. This became a 
more serious problem in 1986, and more stress on internal spying was 
the result. 
In August the Ministry for the first time arrested an American 
citizen, Roland Lao, for spying, and sentenced him to 12 years in 
prison. Several Chinese citizens were also arrested in the case. Little 
25. See "Beggars Can Be Choosers," Washington Times, November 5, 1986, p. 9A. 
26. William Rusher, "Arrest of New York Times Man in Peking Might Indicate High 
Level Party Revolt," New York City Tribune, August II, 1986, p. 5. 
27. "China's Security Chief Meets Foreign Press," Washington Post, June 21, 1986, p. 
Al9. 
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evidence against the accused was made public. The officially stated 
reason was that it involved classified issues. Some observers concluded 
that the Yu defection had led to the arrest of PRC spy Larry Chin in 
Washington and that Lao was arrested in retaliation. 28 Meanwhile the 
FBI reported that the PRC was giving top priority to obtaining intelli-
gence information in the U.S.-using money, favors, coercion or fa-
vored treatment of relatives in China (in the case of Chinese-
Americans). Two different interpretations of increased Chinese intelli-
gence efforts in the U.S. are possible: One, China needed more tech-
nology than the U.S. was willing to provide. Two, leftists in the 
Chinese Communist Party that controlled the Ministry of State Secur-
ity sought to damage relations with the U.S. 
Foreigners living in the PRC becamse increasingly aware of being 
followed, finding their telephones and buildings bugged and in general 
being the object of official spying. This included persons supposedly 
enjoying diplomatic immunity. When asked about this, the defection 
of Yu, and other issues by foreign reporters, the Minister of State Se-
curity replied: "If you ask again, it will not be good."29 
In short, the political system in China seemed to be in a state of 
flux during the period in question. Totalitarian rule seemed to be loos-
ening up somewhat in order to promote economic development and 
improve China's relations with Western countries. But this had little 
favorable impact on human rights. Meanwhile the need to maintain 
control and factional struggles in the Party engendered new and differ-
ent kinds of human rights abuses. 
28. See "Chinese Official Said Exposer of CIA Turncoat," Washington Post, September 
5, 1986, p. A18. 
29. Daniel Southerland, "China Silent on Reported Defection of Intelligence Official," 
Washington Post, September 4, 1986, p. A30. 

VIII. THE PRESS: PARTY'S MOUTHPIECE 
Freedom of the press in the Western sense is alien to Leninist-
Stalinist thinking, which regards the media as essentially a tool for 
propaganda to mobilize the masses in support of set Party lines and 
policies. To the leaders of the People's Republic of China, the press is 
a powerful weapon in the hands of the Party to serve political and 
ideological ends. In fact, the mass media have been called the mouth-
piece (hou she, literally "throat and tongue") of the Party, responsible 
for propagating the Party line and educating the public. This position 
was emphasized by Hu Yaobang as late as February 1985, when the 
now deposed Party Secretary-General carefully outlined the permissi-
ble limits of reforms in a long talk "On the Mass Media Work of Our 
Party." 1 
Hu, in this authoritative talk, reiterated that the mass media were 
the "hou she of the Party, government and people," and those working 
in mass media must abide by the "ideological line and policies of the 
Party Central" without deviation. "Only in accordance with the line 
and policies with the Party Central," Hu declared, could journalists 
have the "freedom" to "correctly understand" objective realities ac-
cording to their individual perception. They should then "report the 
news and express their views this way," Hu continued, urging journal-
ists to further develop their "enthusiasm, initiative and creativity" 
within the ideological and policy perimeters of the Party. 
"What is the primary goal behind the tasks our Party expects the 
mass media to perform?" Hu asked rhetorically in his talk and then 
furnished the answer. "That goal is to arouse the broadest masses to 
struggle with one heart for the realization of the objectives of the 
Party." Based on this fundamental goal, Hu set the specific guidelines 
for newspapers: "In general, newspapers should devote 80 percent of 
their space to achievements, the positive side of affairs and praise, and 
20 percent to shortcomings, the gloomy aspects and criticism. "2 
No Absolute "Right to Know" 
Referring to the discussion on the limits of freedom of literary 
and artistic creation to be granted to writers and artists then in pro-
I. Hu Yaobang, "On the Mass Media Work of the Party," Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 8, 
April 16, 1985, pp. 2-12. Hu's speech can also be found in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 
April 14, 1985, p. I. 
2. Ibid. 
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gress, Hu made it plain that the slogan of "freedom to pursue literary 
and artistic creation" should not apply to mass media work. "Mass 
media have different characters and functions from literature and art," 
Hu declared. "The Party's mass media speak on behalf of the Party 
and government. Mass media workers must follow the line and poli-
cies of the Party in their work." To advocate the freedom to pursue 
creative work, Hu stressed, "does not mean that newspapers and jour-
nals and editors of publishing houses must publish everything."3 
Hu's directive that media workers must follow the Party line was 
explained in August 1966 by Teng Teng, then deputy director of the 
Party's Propaganda Department, at a national conference of editors of 
all provincial newspapers. At the conference held in Harbin in north-
eastern China, ostensibly on reforms in the mass media, Teng declared 
that reform in mass media work "does not mean change in the basic 
nature of the mass media as the hou she of the Party." On the con-
trary, Teng said, "it means trying to do a better job to serve as the hou 
she of the Party, to better educate the public, to make the masses like 
to read your papers." 
Teng told the editors that reforms in the media should be carried 
out "on the premises that newspapers retain their character as the 
Party's newspaper and that they do not go against the four cardinal 
principles." The key to reform in the mass media, Teng concluded, 
"lies in Party secretaries strengthening and improving their leadership 
over Party newspapers. "4 
With the recent intensifying of the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization 
Campaign, not only were the mass media once again mobilized as a 
political tool to "educate the public" on Party lines and policies, but 
control over the media was further tightened. What little hope seen 
earlier in 1986 about reforms in substance evaporated, and the passage 
of a press law, mentioned off and on since 1984, was put off 
indefinitely. 5 
In one of the Party Central Committee documents issued follow-
ing the fall of Hu Yaobang, the role of the press as the mouthpiece was 
once again reiterated. The press, said the document, "should uncondi-
tionally propagate the Party line and policy and should perform the 
role of the Party's mouthpiece. It should strengthen the system of cen-
sorship." (Italics added.) Those publications that have committed 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ting Cheng, "The Dismissal of Zhu Houze and Chinese Communist Ideological 
Trends," Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), (Taipei), February 7, 1986, p. 2. 
5. "Chinese Communists Relax Control of Mass Media," Chung Pao (Centre Daily 
News), eastern U.S. edition, September II, 1986, p. 2. 
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political mistakes as well as those that are of low quality should all be 
closed. 6 To strengthen the system of censorship, a Media and Publica-
tions Office was set up in late January 1987, under the State Council. 
The office will have responsibility for approving all newspapers, 
magazines and publishing houses in China. It will also control the sale 
of books, magazines and newspapers, supervise the distribution of pa-
per and newsprint and "oversee the publication of news."7 
Expulsion of Foreign Newsmen and Control of Information 
The tightened control over the press inevitably affected foreign 
corresponents in China. During 1986, two Western correspondents 
were expelled from China: John Burns of the New York Times and 
Lawrence MacDonald of the Agence-France Presse. In both cases, 
their Chinese contacts or friends were arrested. The Burns case is par-
ticularly noteworthy, because it occurred even before the Anti-Bour-
geois Liberalization Campaign of late 1986. 
Burns was expelled from China on July 23 after six days of deten-
tion. He was accused of violating a travel ban applied to foreigners 
and gathering military intelligence in a restricted area. A government 
statement issued upon his expulsion said that Burns had engaged in 
activities incompatible with his status as a journalist and had deliber-
ately trespassed upon Chinese areas closed to aliens. 
On a trip in June with two companions, Burns traveled into areas 
in southern Shaanxi province off-limits to foreigners. After a week of 
travel on motorcycle, the group-including Edward McNally, a U.S. 
Justice Department lawyer on leave teaching at Beijing University, 
and Zhang Daxing, a Chinese student who recently returned to China 
from graduate studies in the United States-arrived in a small town in 
the backward countryside in the early morning hours. In trying to get 
the attention of a drowsy innkeeper, Burns sounded the horn of his 
motorcycle. This alerted the police who then detained the group for 
two days for entering the area without a permit. 8 Burns was released 
after signing a confession, but was arrested ten days later at the Beijing 
airport as he tried to leave the country with his family for vacation. 
He was held incommunicado and his apartment was searched before 
the expulsion. 
6. Edward A. Gargan, "Beijing Party Directives Criticize Ousted Leader," New York 
Times, March 8, 1987, p. 12. 
7. Jim Mann, "China Sets Up an Office to Make Sure the Press Kowtows," San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, January 22, 1987, p. 19. 
8. Julian Baum, "China Expels U.S. Journalist After Six Days Detention," Christian 
Science Monitor, July 24, 1986, p. 10. 
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Many believed that Burns ran afoul of the State Security Minis-
try, the new cabinet-level ministry created in 1983 modeled on the 
KGB in the Soviet Union to handle espionage cases. (See Chapter 
VII.) The Ministry was unwilling to free him-despite lack of evi-
dence of anything more serious than violating travel regulations. 
Others believed that the case indicated opposition within the security 
bureaucracy to the presence of foreign journalists and general dissatis-
faction with the large numbers of foreigners travelling widely in areas 
that had been closed for more than three decades.9 Interestingly, the 
official statement issued upon Burns' expulsion came from the State 
Security Ministry, and the charge of gathering intelligence information 
was not supported by evidence in the statement. 
In an editorial, the Christian Science Monitor reminded its readers 
that the Burns incident illustrated "what is often easily forgotten in 
dealing with authoritarian nations such as China." Quite apart from 
the issue of freedom of the press, the case showed how "day-to-day 
relationships between outsiders and the host government can be tenu-
ous, and subject to unexpected changes in national policy as well as 
infighting by competing forces within the central government." Cast-
ing a prophetic look into the future, the paper asked: "Has China's 
tolerance in recent years for foreigners gone just about as far as it will 
go? What about the drive for economic modernization? Are influ-
ences within China building for its arrestment, as well as those foreign-
ers who symbolize that modernization effort?" 10 
The statement issued by the State Security Bureau in Beijing upon 
Burns' expulsion said that Burns and McNally "broke into a restricted 
military zone of our country and took numerous photographs of clas-
sified objects." "Such demeanor obviously constitutes an act of spying 
and intelligence gathering which will not be tolerated by any sovereign 
state," the statement read. It continued that "needless to say (this) is 
also a regrettable incident" and added almost in an apologetic tone: 
"We attach great importance to friendly relations between China and 
the United States and are loath to see such a relationship impaired. " 11 
The statement reveals, in a rather glaring way, how laws in the 
PRC are manipulated by the Party and the government for political 
purposes, and how a private citizen is powerless and at the mercy of 
the selective application of the law. After accusing Burns and his 
travelling companions of violating travel regulations and engaging in 
9. Ibid. 
10. "Mr. Burns and China," Christian Science Monitor editorial, July 29, 1986, p. 17. 
II. "Times Reporter Is Expelled from China," New York Times, July 24, 1986, p. AJ. 
Full text of the statement on Burns' expulsion is found in the appendix. 
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espionage, the authorities chose not to "investigate and affix criminal 
responsibility through judicial procedures," but to conclude the case 
by merely expelling Burns, as a friendly gesture to the United States. 
Lest this point was not clear, the statement pointedly added that "we 
hope this is taken notice of by the United States side." 12 
Six months after his expulsion, John Burns himself provided 
some details of the case in a long-awaited article in the New York 
Times Magazine. 13 After recounting his unauthorized motorcycle 
journey through what he called "unrehearsed China," and his subse-
quent arrest and jailing, Burns cited the written statement read to him 
by an officer on the morning of his release from jail: 
John Fisher Burns, correspondent of the New York Times, 
born 1944, citizen of Great Britain, male, resident of Beijing, 
the State Security Bureau has investigated your activities. 
You have broken into restricted military areas and commit-
ted espionage. The facts are clear and proven. You have 
endangered the security of the People's Republic of China. 
You are ordered deported. 
The only "espionage" that Burns committed came out in the fol-
lowing passage, with almost comical exchanges with the interrogator 
while in jail: 
Under Chinese travel law, the three of us could have 
been punished with a warning or a fine. But because the 
State Security Bureau insisted throughout that the issue was 
not unauthorized travel but espionage, we had to wonder 
whether we had inadvertently approached a sensitive mili-
tary installation. If so, it was in innocence. 
I challenged General Zhang (the interrogator) to tell me 
what he meant by the "classified military objects" we were 
supposed to have photographed. 
"Think hard," he said. "Did you not photograph a 
bridge?'' 
I remembered that we had-a 1,000-year-old marble 
structure in a village in south Shaanxi. I snapped Mr. Mc-
Nally on the bridge, seated on the motorcycle and sur-
rounded by local children. 
"Ah ha," the general said. "So you admit photograph-
12. Ibid. 
13. John F. Burns, "A Reporter's Odyssey in Unseen China," New York Times Maga-
zine, February 8, 1987, p. 29. 
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ing strategic installations." 14 
Burns' expulsion turned out to be a much lighter punishment 
when compared with that received by his Chinese travel companion, 
the U.S.-returned student Zhang Daxing. According to Burns, Zhang 
was arrested 16 hours before him, briefly released and then re-arrested, 
and was kept in jail for two months. When he was finally released, it 
was on the face-saving basis that his four years as a student in the 
United States had "disoriented him and made him susceptible to the 
wiles of foreigners," Burns wrote. 15 
Burns and Daniloff: Double-Standard 
After the arrest of Burns, the subdued reaction from the United 
States was very strange. When compared with the violent reaction 
against the arrest of U.S. News and World Report reporter Nick 
Daniloff in the Soviet Union, the indifference in the Burns arrest was 
almost incomprehensible. 
Within hours of Daniloff's arrest on trumped-up charges of spy-
ing, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow protested to the Soviet Foreign Min-
istry, calling the detention of Daniloff "an obvious provocation." 16 
Senior officials of the Reagan administration openly threatened retalia-
tion, including "a whole range of political, economic and cultural 
moves that could be taken to put pressure on the Kremlin." Even 
arms talks and the future relations between the two countries were put 
on the line. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it most bluntly. 
"No summit. No grain sales. None but minimal relations for as long 
as is necessary." 17 It was the relentless pressure from the United 
States and the intense behind-the-scenes negotiations that finally 
brought about Daniloff's quick release in September 12 in the form of 
an exchange with a Soviet spy caught earlier in the United States, 
Gennadi F. Zakharov. 18 
In sharp contrast to the Daniloff case, a day after Burns' arrest, a 
State Department spokesman in Washington said merely that the 
United States government was "taking this case very seriously," and 
that the Department had "registered its concern" with the Chinese 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Philip Taubman, "A U.S. Journalist Is Held in Moscow," New York Times, August 
31, 1986, p. AI. 
17. Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Plans Anti-Soviet Measures If American Reporter Is 
Not Freed," New York Times, September I, 1986, p. A I. 
18. Bernard Gwertzman, "Russian Physicist and U.S. Newsman Freed from Jail," New 
York Times, September 13, 1986, p. AI. 
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Embassy in Washington. 19 In Beijing, meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy 
said that the United States had not filed a protest because it did not 
have all the facts but that it had asked for full information. Winston 
Lord, the United States Ambassador to the PRC, who interrupted a 
trip to return to Beijing upon being informed of the case, "conveyed 
his personal concern about the matter to the Chinese Foreign Minis-
try," but was otherwise conspicuously silent.20 Nor did Sir Richard 
Evans, the British Ambassador, have much to say. Indeed, three days 
into Burns' imprisonment and after a 15-hour interrogation session at 
the airport which the press knew about, Sir Richard said that he had 
no information on Mr. Burns' condition or the status of the investiga-
tion, despite a 1984 British-Chinese consular agreement which grants 
British officials access to imprisoned Britons in China. 21 
A.M. Rosenthal, executive editor of the New York Times and the 
paper's foreign editor, Warren Hoge, rushed to Beijing, but got only as 
far as meeting with a deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's Infor-
mation Department three days after their arrival. "I think there is a 
misunderstanding. God willing, it will be cleared up soon," Rosenthal 
said in Beijing. 22 After Burns' expulsion, the State Department con-
tinued its conspicuous silence, while in New York, the publisher of the 
Times, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, issued a one-line statement: "We are 
grateful for the prompt resolution of the problem. " 23 
What brought about the Chinese decision to drop the espionage 
charges and to release Burns will probably never be known. Specula-
tion ranges from an embarrassing disclosure of inter-ministerial squab-
bles, to the approaching visit of Queen Elizabeth to China. But one 
thing is clear: Unlike the Daniloff case, Washington adopted a differ-
ent standard by refraining from applying any pressure, presumably for 
fear of damaging the developing strategic as well as trade relations. 
The double-standard is unmistakable; its rationale and premises re-
main obscure. 
United States' attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China present a study in contrast. Vigorous pressure is 
always put on Moscow as a result of human rights abuses, often bring-
ing tangible results. Human rights issues are routinely raised with the 
19. "Times Reporter Being Held in Peking," New York Times, July 18, 1986, p. A3. 
20. "China Offers Correspondent No Sign of Quick Release," New York Times, July 
22, 1986, p. A3. 
21. "China Allows Visits to Reporter," New York Times, July 21, 1986, p. A3. 
22. "Envoys Ask to See Detained Peking Reporter," i'Vew York Times, July 20, 1986, p. 
A6. 
23. See supra note II. 
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Kremlin, as an integral part of U.S. foreign policy; and the treatments 
of Soviet dissidents and Jewish emigration are areas where the United 
States has consistently used leverage to force concessions from the So-
viet Union, even putting formal relations between the two countries on 
the line. Not so with China. 
Arriving in the United States to join her husband in January 
1987, after more than eight years of tireless campaigns with the help of 
many in the United States, Sonia Melnikova-Eichenvald presented 
herself as a "living proof" that the Soviet Union responded to pressure 
to free its Jewish dissidents. At the same time, the Senate overwhelm-
ingly passed a resolution condemning the Soviet Union for "cqntinued 
human rights repression" by a 99-0 vote. 24 
With respect to the People's Republic of China, however, it has 
been far different. The United States often has gone out of its way not 
to "offend the Chinese," preferring not to raise human rights issues 
with Beijing. U.S. policy, it seems, is to disregard what happens inside 
China. Fully aware that when it comes to human rights, the United 
States has a moral responsibility to speak out and that pressure helps 
as shown in the Soviet case, the United States has nevertheless chosen 
to adopt a double-standard in this regard in its different attitudes to-
ward Moscow and Beijing. 
In late January 1987, another foreign correspondent in Beijing 
was expelled and a Chinese student was arrested for secretly "furnish-
ing intelligence" to him. Lin Jie, a student at Tianjin University, was 
accused of "secret collusion" with Lawrence MacDonald, Agence-
France Presse correspondent in Beijing. The National Security Bu-
reau of Tianjin "has obtained indisputable evidence," according to an 
official New China News Agency release on January 25. Without sub-
stantiating the charges, MacDonald was later expelled from China, 
despite protests from his home office.25 MacDonald, who speaks flu-
ent Chinese, was active in reporting on the student demonstrations in 
China. His expulsion was viewed by other foreign journalists as an 
attempt to intimidate them and their Chinese sources. Before the ac-
tion was taken, there had been rumors in Beijing that a Western corre-
spondent would be expelled for "unfriendly reporting."26 The rumors 
were confirmed on May 8, when another foreign correpsondent with 
24. Larry Liebert, "Soviet Dissident Says Pressure Helps," San Francisco Chronicle. 
January 22, 1987, p. 13. 
25. "China Denies Plea, Ousts Reporter," New Haven Register, January 28, 1987. p. 
13. 
26. "American Journalist Being Ousted by China," San Francisco Chronicle, January 
27, 1987, p. 10. 
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extensive contracts, Shuitsu Henmi of Japan's Kyodo News Service, 
was ordered to leave for "stealing information related to national 
security."27 
As a part of the crackdown on "bourgeois liberalization" follow-
ing the suppression of student demonstrations, the arrest of a univer-
sity student on charges of furnishing intelligence to a Western reporter 
and the expulsions were seen as unmistakable signs of the authorities' 
intention to further tighten up their control over foreign correspon-
dents in China. Indeed, two weeks after the expulsion of MacDonald, 
the PRC Foreign Ministry outlined what amounted to a set of loosely 
defined rules for foreign correspondents in China. 
Rules of Reporting and Surveillance 
At a press conference, a spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, in 
answer to questions by foreign correspondents, said that entering areas 
not yet opened to foreigners, or entering military areas to take pic-
tures, would be regarded as "improper activities." Among other im-
proper activities cited by the spokesman were correspondents trying to 
"buy classified information," or obtaining such information through 
"other illegitimate means" and "masquerading as students or visiting 
scholars to enter university campuses without permission."28 The last 
point was particularly important: Beijing clearly wanted to keep for-
eign correspondents as far away from Chinese students as possible fol-
lowing the suppression of the month-long student demonstrations for 
democratic reforms that swept 150 university campuses in at least 17 
cities. 29 
Government surveillance is a way of life to foreign newsmen 
working in China. Even during periods of seeming relaxation, various 
forms of surveillance continued in effect and were freely acknowledged 
by correspondents. Summing up Western newsmen's frustrations in 
Beijing, James P. Sterba of the Wall Street Journal wrote in July 1986: 
A China assignment may look nice on a resume, but the cor-
respondents claim this is a frustrating place to work and de-
pressing place to live. The new, open-to-the-outside-world 
China may flaunt heretofore confidential coal production 
27. Edward A. Gargan, "Chinese Order a Japanese Reporter to Leave," New York 
Times, May 9, 1987, p. 32. 
28. "'Code of Conduct' for Foreign Correspondents in China," Chung Pao. February 
13, 1987. p. I. 
29. Lawrence MacDonald, "Teacher Faces Beijing's Wrath," South China Morning 
Post, (Hong Kong), January 12, 1987, p. I. 
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figures, but it remains a secretive, hard-to-crack Communist 
society laced with informers and wary of snoopy scribes 
from the West. 30 
Sterba quoted Charles Taylor, former Beijing correspondent of 
the Toronto Globe and Mail, who once described the Chinese govern-
ment as "determined to engulf the correspondent with vacuous propa-
ganda while denying him hard information and spontaneous contacts 
with ordinary Chinese." Describing the close surveillance, Sterba 
wrote: 
Foreign correspondents and their families live among 
diplomats in apartment blocks in three Peking compounds. 
The gates are manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week, by 
uniformed guards with pistols strapped to their belts. 
Inside, the foreigners are watched by specially trained 
Chinese workers ranging from elevator operators to baby sit-
ters. They assume that their offices are bugged and their 
telephones are tapped. They can come and go freely, but 
they are sometimes followed. They visit Chinese friends, but 
they never know when the visits are reported by informants 
or their friends are questioned by agents of the Ministry of 
Public Security, China's national police. 31 
Befriending an ordinary Chinese can be dangerous to both par-
ties, as AFP's Lawrence MacDonald and his friend from Tianjin Uni-
versity have found out. Despite the seeming openness before the onset 
of the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign reflecting a police state 
mentality, mutual distrust prevailed among many Chinese. Although 
it was possible to invite some Chinese officials, academicians and 
others to lunch or dinner at a restaurant, Sterba said that he was once 
told by a young social scientist recently back from study in the United 
States: "If you want me to speak frankly, don't invite any other 
Chinese. " 32 
Much of what Sterba had to say was confirmed by John Burns, 
who was among the few Western correspondents with two tours of 
duty in China, the first for the Toronto Globe and Mail in the early 
1970s. Comparing his two assignments a decade apart, he wrote: 
The working environment was more relaxed than a decade 
30. James P. Sterba, "Foreign Journalists No Longer See China as Plum Assignment," 
Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1986, p. I. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
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earlier, but few of my requests for assistance in obtaining in-
terviews or trips were answered, much less granted. There 
were other unpalatable reminders of the suspicions that at-
tach to Westerners. Staff members assigned to us by the gov-
ernment rifted through our personal papers and reported 
regularly to their superiors on our private lives as well as on 
work-related matters. 33 
75 
During his long visit to Sichuan province, Sinologist Ross Terrill 
reported in May 1986 that although people were "less afraid to speak 
up," "state manipulation of all news remain unchanged." He wit-
nessed a student demonstration involving 300 to 400 chemistry stu-
dents at Chongqing University protesting the school's indifference 
toward the release of cobalt into the air following an explosion at the 
chemistry laboratories at the university. He predicted correctly: "The 
protest will never be seen about in the Chinese press. " 34 
The tight control of news in China put foreign correspondents 
and indeed touring and resident foreigners in a special position in the 
eyes of the Chinese people. In the midst of the student demonstra-
tions, for example, Westerners were sought out and asked all sorts of 
questions. "Were the demonstrations shown on American television? 
Did President Reagan know about the unrest?" A Wall Street Journal 
correspondent reported from Shanghai: "Our domestic newspapers 
are controlled very tightly," he quoted one from a group huddled 
around a short-wave radio listening to Voice of America broadcast in 
Chinese. "We get all our information about the domestic situation 
from the Voice of America. " 35 
33. See supra note 13. 
34. Ross Terrill. ''China Awaits its Students' Verdict," Chicago Tribune, May 13, 
1986. Section I, p. IS. 
35. James R. Schiffman, "Letter from Shanghai," Wall Street Journal, January 6, 1987, 
p. 32. 

IX: HONG KONG 
Since the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration on Hong Kong was signed 
in 1984, there has been growing concern about the future civil and 
political rights of the people of Hong Kong. Hong Kong, according to 
the Sino-British Agreement, will become a part of the People's Repub-
lic of China in 1997. There is apprehension-both in Hong Kong and 
elsewhere-about respect for human rights as a result. 
The most salient issues during 1986-87 were: the declining pros-
pects for self-rule in Hong Kong, diminishing press freedoms, and 
events in the PRC surrounding the year-end student demonstrations 
followed by the fall of Hu Yaobang as Secretary-General of the Chi-
nese Communist Party (which Hong Kong residents took as a 
portentous event). A special issue of concern to the population of 
Hong Kong during the period was the building of a nuclear power 
plant near Hong Kong by the PRC and the danger it posed to Hong 
Kong. 
Blocking the Development of a Democratic System 
Events of late 1985 seemed already to be steering Hong Kong in 
the wrong direction in terms of democracy and self government devel-
oping in the colony. In the Sino-U.K. Agreement the U.K. did not try 
to guarantee the establishment of democratic institutions before de-
parting. In the eyes of many observers London sacrificed the popula-
tion of Hong Kong for better relations with Beijing. The British 
government's stance was a passive, almost fatalist one. 
Late in the year in 1985 the British Foreign Office, in an apparent 
effort to give Hong Kong some hope of democracy and self-rule, de-
clared that it would not interfere with the process of constitutional 
reform in Hong Kong. In response Xu Jiatun, head of the Hong Kong 
office of the New China News Agency (Xinhua) and the PRC's top 
official representative in Hong Kong, said that the U.K. was deviating 
from the agreement and that London was to administer Hong Kong, 
but not let it develop a democratic government. 1 Following a Novem-
ber 1985 election of Hong Kong's Legislative Council, Xu spoke of 
"unfortunate consequences" if these "deviations" (meaning efforts to 
I. Asia 1987 Yearbook, Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1986. p. 
137. 
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build a democratic framework) continued.2 London did not respond. 
Shortly after this, Xu pressured the Executive Committee of the 
Basic Law Consultative Committee (a group established in Hong 
Kong to reflect public opinion regarding Hong Kong's Basic Law) to 
accept seven of his hand picked members so that he could control the 
Committee. Xu argued that "consultation" was a form of election-
though most saw his move as a violation of the Basic Law Consulta-
tive Committee constitution.3 Again no British response. Not even a 
protest that this violated the Sino-U.K. Declaration. 
Subsequently Ji Pengfei, State Council Member and Director of 
the Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs under the State Council in 
the PRC, declared publicly that Hong Kong could "make only small 
changes" in how it would be run politically.4 He also said that the 
Basic Law would be interpreted by the National People's Congress 
(NPC) in the PRC-meaning it would be altered to suit the leaders of 
the Chinese Communist Party, the NPC being a rubber stamping or-
gan of the government controlled by the Party. Clearly the PRC's aim 
was to prevent self-government, or anything approaching it, in Hong 
Kong. 
In March 1986, local council elections were held in Hong Kong, 
after which the PRC charged that democratic institutions are a "plot 
against China's future sovereignty." In fact, PRC officials called for 
"no more democracy" and put more pressure on Hong Kong and Brit-
ish officials not to go any further with either democratic reform or self-
government. 5 
Meanwhile the Basic Law being written to serve as Hong Kong's 
constitution was, in fact, being drafted in Beijing. Regarding the inter-
pretation of the "law," Beijing said at the time that the PRC's and 
Hong Kong's interests "must converge."6 Hong Kong leaders inter-
preted the Basic Law (which came out of the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee in April and whose legal charge was provided for in the 
Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration of 1984) to mean that powers and prerog-
atives not taken away would be given to the local government of Hong 
Kong. The interpretation in Beijing was different: "What is not writ-
2. Adam Platt, "Capitalistic Hong Kong Faces Future Under Communists," Wash-
ington Times, June 10, 1986, p. 40. 
3. Asia 1987 Yearbook, p. 137. 
4. Ibid., p. 138. 
5. See "Hong Kong's Hopes for Years of Freedom Fading Fast," Gazette (Montreal), 
May 7, 1986, p. 3. 
6. Gwynne Dyer, "Muscling In: British Offer Poor Defense of Hong Kong Against 
China's Early Moves," Orange Cou/1/y Register, May 13, 1986, p. 6. 
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ten in is written out. " 7 
In June the Basic Law Drafting Committee in discussions with 
PRC officials reached an impasse regarding the issue of the relation-
ship between the Basic Law and the PRC Constitution. Hong Kong 
officials saw PRC obstructionist efforts as an attempt to weaken the 
authority and credibility of Hong Kong's representatives by delaying 
tactics. 8 The PRC's position, which was hardly veiled, was that Bei-
jing should have the right to interpret the Basic Law-thereby making 
the document virtually useless in serving as a "constitution" or in pro-
tecting the rights of Hong Kong residents.9 Chinese leaders wanted to 
give no such guarantees through the Basic Law. 
Political Parties and Other Democratic Institutions Banned 
Meanwhile, Li Hou of the PRC State Council and deputy to Ji 
Pengfei, asserted that Hong Kong should not have political parties. In 
that context he said that Hong Kong would be under the control of 
the National People's Congress, the State Council and the Military 
Commission. 10 This smothered efforts by several groups in Hong 
Kong to form political parties. Allen Lee, a member of both the Exec-
utive and Legislative Councils of the Hong Kong government, subse-
quently dropped his plan to form a party. So did Maria Tam, who had 
already formed the Progressive Hong Kong Society Party in mid-
1985. II 
In July 1986, Beijing again warned Hong Kong against forming 
political parties; in fact, an official said that there "would be no polit-
ical parties in Hong Kong." The same official later publicly declared 
that political parties "may be banned in 1997." 12 Lu Ping, Secretary-
General of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office in the State 
Council, also went on record saying that a ministerial system (refer-
ring to any parliamentary style-system) of government in Hong Kong 
was "unacceptable." He said that it "violated the Sino-U.K. Joint 
Agreement" and that high officials would be picked by the Executive 
Council and the Central People's Government (of the PRC). 13 
By late 1986, these events and the previous chain of events 
seemed to Hong Kong leaders as orchestrated to undermine even a 
7. Asia /987 Yearbook, p. 141. 
8. See "No Party Politics Envisioned For," Asia Bulletin, August 1986, pp. 41-46. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
I I. Asia /987 Yearbook, p. 138. 
12. "Dissention in BLCC," Asia Bulletin, September 1986, p. 47. 
13. Ibid. 
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modicum of democracy and self-rule in Hong Kong, and provoked 
discussions regarding the powers of the Executive and Legislative 
branches of government in Hong Kong. It was the PRC's position 
that the Executive would be supreme and dominant. Since the Execu-
tive (in whatever form) would be appointed by Beijing (though ostensi-
bly after an election or "consultations"), Hong Kong would, it was 
perceived, have no legislative branch of government of any signifi-
cance. In other words, Beijing would have a veto over all important 
decisions made by the Hong Kong government by appointing the ex-
ecutive branch of government and by creating a system based on exec-
utive supremacy. 14 
One writer summarized Beijing's attitude toward the political sys-
tem in Hong Kong as follows: The PRC will not consider changing its 
constitution out of deference to Hong Kong, nor will it stipulate in the 
Basic Law that any item in the PRC constitution might not apply to 
Hong Kong; Beijing interprets elections to mean the "election of nom-
inated candidates," not direct or indirect elections; there will be no 
checks and balances in Hong Kong's political system; there will be no 
collective bargaining; the executives will be appointed by Beijing and 
will not be responsible to a legislative body. 15 
All of Beijing's actions toward these ends violated the spirit, if not 
the letter, of the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration, which states among 
other things that the "legislature of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region shall be constituted by elections. . .and the executive 
authorities ... shall be accountable to the legislature." Given the disre-
gard of these provisions, it seemed clear to most in Hong Kong that 
basic freedoms and human rights in general would not be respected 
after 1997 and unveiled attempts were being made in this context to 
prevent democratization and to eliminate any obstacles to total control 
over Hong Kong by Beijing. 16 
Reflecting the widespread lack of confidence regarding the future, 
a poll in 1986 revealed that 31 percent of the population wanted to 
leave if possible. 17 Meanwhile the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (in 
Hong Kong) reported that it was maintaining only 2 percent of its 
assets at home. Capital investment growth in Hong Kong fell from 
the normal level of 10 to 12 percent to 5 percent in 1986. 18 Of 1,469 
14. "Dissention in BLCC," Asia Bulletin, October 1986, p. 47. 
15. See "No Party Politics Envisioned For," Asian Bulletin, August 1988, pp. 41-46. 
16. See Patrick L. Smith, "Peking Moves to Curb Development of Democracy in Hong 
Kong," Christian Science Monitor, July 14, 1986, p. 12. 
17. See supra note 2. 
18. Ibid. 
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officers of the Hong Kong government working on a contractual basis, 
only 5 percent said that they planned to stay beyond 1997. 19 In July, 
the Catholic clergy stated that it did not have confidence about various 
freedoms in Hong Kong in the future and was dropping plans for a 
Catholic political party.20 
In addition to the general dismay stemming from the dashing of 
hopes for democracy and self-rule in Hong Kong by its population, 
there were specific events or problems during 1986-1987 that could be 
regarded as either human rights abuses or bad omens regarding 
human rights in the future. 
In June 1986, the Hong Kong government announced (appar-
ently at the behest of Beijing) that new identity cards would be issued 
to the residents of Hong Kong, and they would not state specifically 
whether the holder has the right to reside in Hong Kong. In fact, 
these new papers-to be issued in July 1987-were not to be given to 
Hong Kong residents that do not possess British Dependent Territory 
Citizen passports or some other equivalent document. 21 
In other words, if an individual does not possess these documents 
or cannot prove that he or she has resided in Hong Kong for seven 
years, the individual will have to seek citizenship elsewhere. This 
means that recent escapees from the PRC will have to return home 
against their will. (This rule will ostensibly be enforced whether or 
not the individual concerned has a family or business in Hong Kong). 
In addition, approximately 11,000 people of non-Chinese ethnic back-
ground will become stateless. In fact, several countries had received 
inquiries and petitions from these people for special immigration privi-
leges. Meanwhile many Hong Kong Chinese have either found new 
nationality, or are looking because those holding "Hong Kong-Brit-
ish" passports cannot ask for residence in the U.K. and their children 
cannot inherit their passports. 
According to these policies which were put into effect in mid-
1987, a Hong Kong resident of Filipino, Indian or Portuguese descent 
(Hong Kong's principal non-British minorities) without a Chinese 
parent cannot be regarded as having "lived in Hong Kong" even if he 
or she was born in Hong Kong and has never resided anywhere else. 
Such a policy is clearly racist. Moreover, it clearly violates China's 
nationality law. 
19. "Dissension in BLCC, .. Asia Bulletin, September 1986, p. 48. 
20. Hong Kong Standard, July 18, 1986, cited in ibid. 
21. Phillip Browning, "Dogs and Chinese," Far Eastem Economic Review, July 9, 
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Some observers say that the policy violates the International Cov-
enant of Human Rights provisions against racial discrimination. In 
fact, the PRC was so accused. The official reply from Beijing was that 
non-Chinese are not deprived of any specific right spelled out in the 
covenant and that granting rights of entry based on race is "legal. " 22 
A human rights-related issue is the PRC's plan to build a large 
nuclear power plant only 30 miles from Hong Kong. Opposition to 
the plant had been voiced in Hong Kong since the idea was first 
broached in 1979. It increased many fold after the Chernobyl acci-
dent. A campaign by Friends of the Earth and other groups in Hong 
Kong began in the fall of 1986 against the building of the plant so 
close to Hong Kong as it would be impossible to relocate Hong 
Kong's 5 plus million residents in the event of an accident. The 
protesters won support from the Legislative Council and obtained over 
a million signatures on a petition. 23 The petition was then delivered to 
PRC officials-who refused to reply. In the meantime Hong Kong 
legislators and other officials were treated rudely by PRC officials 
when they asked questions about the safety of the plant (in view of the 
PRC's lack of experience with nuclear power plants).24 
Some interpreted the PRC's plan to build the plant so close to 
Hong Kong as a deliberate attempt to intimidate Hong Kong and to 
divert attention from other issues. The PRC in the future could 
frighten the population by talking about a nuclear accident or the pos-
sibility of one after the plant is built. 25 In any event Hong Kong's 
Legislative Council, under blatant pressure from Beijing, voted down a 
proposal for a special session to discuss these and other problems re-
lated to the plant; at nearly the same time the same body guaranteed 
$38 million in loans for building the plant and promised to purchase 
70 percent of the electricity produced by the plant. 26 
Curbing Press Freedom and Student Demonstrations 
A third human rights concern to arise in 1986-87 was a press law 
passed by the Hong Kong government early in 1987-clearly pursuant 
to pressure from the PRC. Under the new law Hong Kong residents 
can be arrested and punished for publishing "false news likely to alarm 
public opinion or disturb public order." And the government would 
22. "No Party Politics Envisioned For," Asia Bulletin, August 1986, p. 43. 
23. Keesings Contemporary Archives June 1987, p. 35201. 
24. Jasper Becker & P.T. Banssberg, "China Contracts for Nuclear Unit," Joumol of 
Commerce, September 24, 1986, p. 12A. 
25. ''Daya Bay Contract Set," Asia Bulletin, November 1986, p. 38. 
26. Ibid. 
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not have to prove malice. The defendant in such a case would have to 
prove his innocence; he would not be assumed innocent until proven 
guilty. This, naturally, intimidated the media and to some extent 
ended, or at least damaged, Hong Kong's free press. 27 
Four journalist organizations and forty civic, religious, legal and 
student groups protested the new law. They tried to block the bill in 
the Letgislative Council, but failed (because of what many alleged to 
be either PRC intimidation or a British concession to Beijing to guar-
antee a smooth transition of power-which some said was the same 
thing). 28 
Coinciding with the new press control law, local textbook pub-
lishers-obviously getting the "word"-began altering (in reality cen-
soring) textbooks. In deference to Beijing, for example, Hong Kong is 
now no longer referred to as a colony. Films have likewise been 
banned or censored-particularly those depicting the Nationalist Chi-
nese government as heroic during the war against Japan and/or show-
ing economic and social conditions better in Taiwan than in China. 29 
Another series of events that shook hard and deep the confidence 
of the people of Hong Kong was the suppression of the student dem-
onstrations in the PRC and the forced resignation of Party Secretary-
General Hu Y aobang. Hong Kong leaders had seen the "open door" 
policy in China as well as reform and democratization as signs that the 
"one country, two systems" formula for ruling Hong Kong might 
work and the rights of the people in Hong Kong might not be abused. 
This "bubble of idealism" (in the eyes of many observers) was broken 
in December and January. 
Visitors to Hong Kong at the time reported a "down mood" and 
a sudden drop in hope and optimism about the future. Many Hong 
Kong residents began to perceive that efforts to build a democratically 
based government were futile; in other words, respect for political free-
dom and rights depended entirely on the PRC's sincerity and good 
will. Optimism about the latter changed with Beijing's handling of the 
student problems. 
There was a reaction in Hong Kong. But the protests accom-
plished little. In January 1987, the head of the Hong Kong Federation 
of Students read a statement at the office of the official PRC news 
agency (Xinhua) protesting the PRC's treatment of intellectuals as 
27. See June Kronholiz, "Few in Hong Kong Still Trust Promises of Britain and 
China," Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1987, pp. I and 13. 
28. "Furor Over a 'False News' Bill," Asiaweek, March 22, 1987, p. 30. 
29. Ibid. 
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"not only unjustified but threatening."30 A few days later more than 
seven thousand students and faculty from the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong signed a manifesto opposing Beijing's moves to "persecute 
students and restrict intellectual freedom." 31 Hong Kong journalists 
at the time expressed the fear that this would lead to a crackdown on 
press freedom in China. This, of course, was true. 
There was further cause for disillusionment and pessimism fol-
lowing statements by Deng Xiaoping reflecting his turning away from 
reforms and adopting a more leftist position (or accommodating to 
pressure from the left). In April 1987, speaking to the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, Deng averred that universal sufferage was not 
desirable for Hong Kong and that the concept of separation of powers 
and elections to a representative assembly were unsuitable for Hong 
Kong "because it was not a country." Deng went on to say that the 
Basic Law should not be too detailed and definitely not borrowed from 
the West. 32 Deng also suggested that any Hong Kong government 
would not be allowed to become critical of the PRC and reiterated 
that the (PRC's) People's Liberation Army would intervene in the 
event of major disturbances in Hong Kong. 33 
Deng's statements were interpreted to mean that reform was be-
ing scrapped in the PRC and this applied to Hong Kong as well. 
Others said the comments were intended to be a warning to the new 
British governor of Hong Kong, David Wilson, who was installed only 
a month before. Still others felt that Deng was "setting in concrete" 
earlier warnings to Hong Kong and was exerting additional pressure 
to stop efforts aimed at holding an election in Hong Kong in 1988.34 
In early 1987 the concern for democracy and human rights issues 
in Hong Kong were matched by concern over Macao's future. In 
March a Sino-Portuguese agreement was signed between Lisbon and 
Beijing on the return of Macao to the PRC, reflecting Beijing's desire 
not to see democracy develop or allow political and civil rights to resi-
dents of either area. 
In the agreement Beijing refused to grant dual citizenship to resi-
dents of Macae--suggesting that they would have to leave or apply for 
Chinese citizenship (which some have never had). This refusal im-
30. "Alarmed by Mainland China's Political Purges," Asia Bulletin, March 1987, p. 
28. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Emily Lau, "Now, Down to Basics," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 30, 1987, 
p. 12. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. 
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plied that some Macao residents would become stateless and that, in 
particular, the fate of those of Chinese-Portuguese parentage was in 
question. 35 PRC officials took no notice of these special problems or 
the human elements involved in the transfer of sovereignty over Ma-
cao. Meanwhile, a law similar to the "Basic Law" being altered to suit 
PRC designs on Hong Kong, was being written for Macao, but with 
greater candor. It had the effect of dampening any hope for democ-
racy before such hope got started. The "Basic Law" for Macao envi-
sioned a political system with an executive chosen "by elections or 
consultations" and a legislative branch of government with a large 
portion of its membership appointed. 36 Clearly it would not be demo-
cratic in its operation. 
The only thing good that could be said about the situation in Ma-
cao was that it was no worse than what had happened or was in the 
process of happening to Hong Kong. 
35. ""1999: A Date With Destiny."" Asiaweek, April 5, 1987, p. 10. 
36. Ibid., p. II. 

X: MINORITIES 
While the backlash against Deng's reforms in late 1986 and early 
1987 and the return to power of leftist, orthodox communists had no 
immediate visible impact on China's various minority groups and re-
form in the legal system had ostensibly extended somewhat greater 
protections to minority groups and allowed for a measure of individu-
alism and nonconformism, minority rights during this period suffered 
in several respects. Women, particularly because of another crack-
down on violators of population control policies, suffered. A thaw in 
draconian birth control policies was associated, in early 1987, with 
bourgeois liberalization and was criticized; and actions against preg-
nant women violating official birth control guidelines got even harsher. 
Minorities didn't fare well in human rights terms in general dur-
ing the early part of the period in question in spite of official efforts to 
make a good impression for several reasons: First, the reformists gen-
erally ignored ethnic minority rights, especially their economic rights, 
in order to further economic development. Some costly social pro-
grams were scrapped and guaranteed employment ceased to be the 
norm. This affected minority groups more than Han Chinese. 
Second, Deng and his faction of the Party had to satisfy their 
opponents that they had not shifted too far in the direction of West-
ernization. For this reason, religious groups were generally not per-
mitted foreign contacts and in some cases church and religious 
organizations and even individual practitioners were dealt with 
harshly by the government. Foreign students studying in China exper-
ienced increasing problems for the same reason. 
Third, for some time the Party and government continued to en-
joy a good image abroad generally and there were few instances of the 
Western press criticizing either for discriminatory politics against mi-
nority groups, with the possible exception regarding Tibet. In short, 
there was little pressure either internal or external to improve the 
human rights condition of minority groups in China during the period 
nnder study. 
Ethnic minority groups continued to enjoy special status in the 
Chinese constitution, and the Chinese Communist Party continued the 
practice of recruiting members from minority groups according to 
what might be calied affirmative action guidelines. Laws allowing mi-
nority nationalities to practice their own customs, religions and lan-
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guages remained in the books and were frequently flaunted to 
foreigners visiting China. 
On the other hand, there was no evidence of the government al-
lowing meaningful autonomy or doing anything to stop the trend to-
ward de facto extinction of various minority groups through 
assimilation policies involving the resettlement of Han Chinese in mi-
nority areas-a policy that has been in effect since the establishment of 
the People's Republic of China. In fact, resettlement was stepped up 
in 1986-1987 in many minority areas of China. 
During 1986-87 there were some special problems involving 
human rights abuses of minority groups. These deserve special 
attention. 
Difficulties of Racial and Ethnic Minorities 
In May, Uighurs and other minority groups in Western China 
complained about nuclear experiments in Xinjiang Autonomous Re-
gion and staged protest demonstrations in Beijing, Shanghai and some 
other cities of China. Beijing Radio at the time admitted that some 
radioactive materials "had been mislaid," causing some operators to 
be "radiated unusually." Government authorities also admitted that 
accident victims had not been dealt with properly and this had 
"caused some disturbances.'' Beyond providing this information the 
PRC government refused to discuss the issue. 1 It was unclear if the 
accident had involved a nuclear weapon or an experiment. 
Whatever accident that occurred was probably contained imme-
diately inasmuch as nuclear contamination did not spread sufficiently 
to be detected elsewhere. The complaints made by local minority 
groups probably reflected some injuries and likely some deaths, to-
gether with the view that the nuclear facilities are there because the 
Chinese government chose not to put them in areas populated by Chi-
nese. Moreover, two of China's nuclear reactors in Xinjiang were So-
viet models and were assumed to be similar to the one at Chernobyl. 2 
There were also complaints in that part of China as well as Tibet 
and South China that the PRC's atmospheric nuclear tests that had 
been conducted in large numbers up to 1983 had caused health 
problems of serious proportions in the areas where the tests were con-
ducted and to the south where the wind had blown nuclear fallout. 
Since all of these areas are populated by minorities, again the charge 
I. Colina Macdougall, "Concern Grows in China over Safety of Nuclear Program," 
Financial Times, May 27, 1986, p. 5. 
2. Ibid. 
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arose that the government conducted the tests where it did because it 
did not care about the ethnic minorities living there. Others saw the 
tests as a deliberate policy of causing them problems and making them 
susceptible to forced relocation, or even to reduce their population. 3 
Though the government continued to try to put a good face on 
problems experienced by ethnic minorities, especially for the foreign 
press, it was not possible to disguise all human rights issues involving 
minority groups. In mid-year it was reported in the foreign press that 
only 30 to 40 percent of children in Tibet and Qinghai Province were 
in school, that 20 percent of the population was illiterate and that 70 
percent of the illiterates were female. Three million (or more than a 
third) of elementary and middle school teachers in minority areas were 
found by the government to be unqualified.4 
Widespread mistreatment of Tibetans also occurred because of 
the Party's efforts to wipe out "leftism" (meaning remnants of the Cul-
tural Revolution) there. "Reform" policies disallowed the use of the 
Tibetan language in schools and workplaces and referred to Tibetan 
art and literature as "spiritual pollution." In addition, those who fol-
lowed Tibetan religious practice were frequently punished (under laws 
banning the practice of superstition) or made difficult. In one inci-
dent, ancient Buddhist scriptures were burned.5 
Problems were also reported in Tibet because of efforts by the 
Dalai Lama to place deputized "Living Buddhas" sent from abroad in 
monasteries in Tibetan-populated areas. This violated a 27-year-old 
government ban on efforts to find successors to Tibetan religious lead-
ers. Chinese officials reported that the Buddhas had been expelled for 
advocating Tibetan independence and stirring up ethnic tensions be-
tween Tibetans and Chinese. The deputy director of the PRC's Reli-
gious Affairs Bureau said that "the Lamas can't hide behind religion 
to carry out illegal activities. " 6 
Religious Freedom 
The condition of religious freedom in the PRC remained little 
changed legally during the period 1986-87. Constitutional provisions 
3. Ibid. 
4. "China Takes Another Step Forward," Journal of Commerce, July 25, 1986, p. 4. 
The government, however, did report that 3.5 million school age girls, mostly in minority 
areas, were not in school. See Beijing Review, March 24, 1986, p. 35. 
5. Mary Lee, "Lhasa's Lingering Left," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 30, 
1986, p. 22. 
6. "Espionage and Human Rights Issues," Asian Bulletin, November 1986, pp. 146-
47. 
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guaranteeing freedom of religious beliefs remained intact; but so did 
laws preventing foreign control of religious organizations. Proselytiz-
ing, except in places of worship and homes, remained against the law; 
and religious organizations still have to associate with eight national 
bodies representing the four major religions (Buddhism, Christianity, 
Daoism and Islam). 
The number of churches and people practicing various religions 
increased as a result of the reforms in China, and this was given con-
siderable play in the press. The government, however, acted to pre-
vent the growth of a clergy in the case of all religions and made sure 
that the practices of religious beliefs did not conflict with loyalty to-
ward the Party and the government. In short, religious freedom was 
increased mainly for publicity reasons. 
During 1986 Chinese authorities took actions against a Catholic 
seminary, which government spokesman said was loyal to the Vatican 
and was set up illegally. Amnesty International complained later that 
nuns had been raped, priests beaten and a number of Catholics ar-
rested. According to other reports the seminary had been raided by 
the police and was closed.7 Elsewhere many Catholics were not al-
lowed to pratice their religion because the government claimed the 
Catholic priesthood in China still maintained its loyalty to the Vati-
can. Meanwhile the Vatican continued to withhold diplomatic recog-
nition of the PRC. 
Foreign Students Charge Racism 
During the period under study there were a number of incidents 
involving foreigners studying in China and protests against racial and 
other forms of discrimination. In May 1986, 400 or more Chinese 
students besieged 40 African students and guests at a party in a dormi-
tory at Tianjin University. Five hours lapsed before the police acted. 
In the meantime three African students were hurt. 8 
It was reported that the incident started over the African students 
playing noisy music. Chinese students also complained that they re-
ceived favorable treatment, including much larger stipends than the 
Chinese students received. Brick and bottle throwing followed argu-
ments about the music, with authorities refusing to take any action to 
7. Ibid., p. 148; Walter Cheung, "Rape of Nuns in China Claimed," South China 
Morning Post, (Hong Kong), October 8, 1986, p. I. 
8. John F. Burns, "Africans Accuse Chinese of Racism," New York Times, June 10. 
1986, p. 5. 
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stop the Chinese students. 9 According to later reports the students in 
the dormitory "feared for their lives for several hours." 
Eighteen foreign students were arrested-"for their safety" ac-
cording to PRC officials. 10 Subsequently African students formed a 
protest march to Beijing to complain about being discriminated 
against in examinations because of their race and the maltreatment 
they received during the Tianjin University dormitory incident. 
In January 1987, over 200 Arab and African students staged an 
illegal protest march in Beijing. They marched from the Foreign Lan-
guages Institute to the area where most African diplomatic missions 
were located. They said that they had received a letter from the Chi-
nese Students Association threatening to "teach them a lesson" for 
having insulted Chinese girls and displaying manners "acquired by life 
in tropical forests." 11 
Later 550 African students (more than a third of the African stu-
dents studying in China) boycotted examinations as a protest against 
racism. After the demonstrations the President of the African Stu-
dents Committee at Qinghua University met with Education Commis-
sion officials to express their grievances. In response the Education 
Ministry subsequently wrote a letter promising to protect the 
students. 12 
Birth Control Policies Tighten 
As in the case of the rights of minorities and religious practice, 
women's rights, meaning equality for women, received considerable 
publicity. Constitutional and other legal guarantees also remained un-
changed on paper. 
Women, however, remained very underrepresented in the govern-
ment and the Party. There was no woman full member of the 
Politburo, the Secretariat or the Military Commission. Women were 
recruited into the Party and the government, but still faced strict bar-
riers to attaining top positions. This, in fact, worsened during the last 
several years coincident with the continued criticism of Mao's wife, 
Jiang Qing, and the association of her name with the horrors and ex-
cesses of the Cultural Revolution. When asked about her, Chinese 
9. Ibid.; Donald Southerland, "Frictions between Chinese, Africans Surface," Wash-
ington Post, June S, 1986, p. A33. 
10. "Fights between Chinese and African Students," Financial Times, August 20, 
1986, p. 7. 
II. "African Students March Against Racial Discrimination," Asian Bulletin, March 
1987, p. 89. 
12. Ibid. 
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officials stated that she was in prison near Beijing and that she was 
healthy and was being treated well. No mention, however, was made 
of her release or pardon. Also there were contradictory reports about 
her health. 
In August 1986 the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Foreign Affairs passed a resolution calling on the People's Republic of 
China to guarantee freedom of the press, religion and movement, 
while criticizing China's one-child policy. The full House of Repre-
sentatives subsequently voted not to automatically allocate funds to 
the United Nations Fund for Population Activities because funds 
under the U.N. programs were used to support forced sterilizations 
and abortions in the PRC. The PRC responded that the U.S. move 
and criticisms of China's population control policies constituted an 
"extremely unfriendly act." 13 
The U.S. House of Representatives had gone on record two years 
earlier in opposition to forced sterilizations and abortions in China. 
The House action in this case, according to observers, and judging 
from the House debate, was precipitated by continued draconian poli-
cies including forced abortions in later months of pregnancy and the 
widespread infanticide of girls and the resultant altering of the sex ra-
tio among the young in many parts of China. 
Subsequently the decision to cut U.N. funds was tested in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. and upheld. Inasmuch as 
the decision was supported by the Reagan Administration, the move 
represented action by all three branches of government. The U.S. then 
cut $25 million from its contribution to the UNFP A-which had 
given the PRC $100 million. 14 
While the move initially seemed to have a positive effect on the 
PRC's population control policies and the forced abortions seemed to 
decrease in number, it subsequently became apparent that the actual 
situation was otherwise. In May 1986 the Communist Party Central 
Committee set forth new guidelines that were more strict than rules 
previously set for implementing population control. The Central 
Committee "Document 13" was secret at the time, but its contents 
were subsequently quoted and it became evident that it was more re-
pressive and contradictory to the practice of human rights than previ-
ous policies. Party proclamations subsequently referred to a 
"population birth peak" and ordered that population growth must be 
13. Washington Post, August 5, 1986, p. 3. 
14. See New Register, (West Virginia), September 10, 1986, p. 6. 
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strictly controlled. 15 
This was translated into a one-child policy, the use of IUDs for 
women with one child, forced sterilization for couples with two or 
more children and mandatory abortions for unauthorized pregnancies. 
The Party stated specifically that its policy was "universally one child 
per couple, late marriage, late birth and to strictly prohibit unplanned 
second births, excessive births and the opening of 'crooked gaps.' " 16 
In January 1987, family planning officials linked tougher enforce-
ment of the PRC's birth control program to efforts to "combat and 
repudiate bourgeois liberalization." 17 Hence recent relaxation in stick-
ing to the one child policy and forced abortions, whether or not it had 
been a response to Western influence, was now over. 
15. See John S. Aird, "Recent Trends in China's Family Planning Program." (unpub-
lished paper, 1987). 
16. See Lu Qiang, "Guangxi Notifies All Areas to Check Consciously the Family Plan-
ning Regulations Formulated Locally," Health Gazette Family Planning Edition, cited in 
Ibid, p. 70. 
17. Nanjing Radio, January 17, 1987 cited in Lu Qiang, Ibid. 
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XI. HUMAN RIGHTS CASES 
During 1986-1987 The People's Republic of China had no human 
rights organization in the country or even an equivalent. Similarly the 
PRC has still not signed any of the major United Nations human 
rights documents. The PRC's longstanding policy remains: human 
rights matters are a domestic or internal issue and neither other na-
tions nor international organizations have the right to question Chi-
nese practices. 
Because of bad press and to facilitate contacts upon which trade 
and foreign investment are based, Chinese leaders did modify this atti-
tude somewhat and provided some data on priests arrested during 
1986 and numbers of political prisoners. Information provided on 
political prisoners was no doubt inaccurate or fabricated-since offi-
cial Chinese statements were contradicted by other official statements. 
Statements were nevertheless given to the foreign press, mostly by 
anti-reform leaders, ostensibly for the purpose of embarrassing Deng 
Xiaoping (whose head of the Ministry of State Security publicly stated 
that there were no political prisoners in the PRC). Previous estimates 
of 20 to 30 million political prisoners-if education and reform of per-
sons through labor are included-probably remains close to reality. 
It continued to be a fact that for those who run afoul of the Party 
line, the penalty is years in prison or a labor camp in a remote corner 
of the country. According to a recent report in Newsweek, most polit-
ical prisoners in the PRC live in the so-called "reform through labor" 
facilities in the northwestern province of Qinghai-a sparsely popu-
lated region the size of Texas. Bitter winters, isolation and identifica-
tion with prison camps have earned for the province the epithet 
"China's Siberia." In other words, little or nothing has changed re-
garding the numbers or status of political prisoners in the People's 
Republic of China. Prisoners of conscience still work side by side with 
common criminals in mines, limestone quarries, factories, or on farms 
and ranches. China's "concentration camps" are only infrequently 
mentioned and remained generally unknown to the outside world 
since the area where they are located is closed to foreign visitors and 
off-limits to Chinese travellers as well. 1 
I. See a dispatch filed from Qinghai by the Newsweek correspondent who was barred 
from the camps. "The camps are built where we can't see them, but we know they are 
there," one worker was quoted as saying in a Qinghai factory. ("The Threat of the Gulag," 
Newsweek. January 19, 1987, p. 33.) 
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The most well documented of China's human rights abuses re-
lates to its population control policies. During 1986-87 there were nu-
merous official replies to Western, especially U.S. criticism, of China's 
birth control programs. But only in a few cases were they willing to 
discuss specific individuals. There were literally millions of cases of 
the use of force to enforce China's birth control policies. 
The most famous, or infamous, human rights case in the Peoples' 
Republic of China during the period was Wei Jingsheng, even though 
Wei's case may be considered past history. Wei was imprisoned in 
October 1979-given a 15-year sentence for spreading "counterrevolu-
tionary propaganda" and "revealing state secrets" (to foreigners). In-
asmuch as Wei did not have access to classified information and one of 
the "secrets" he was charged with giving to a foreigner was the name 
of the Chinese commander in the Sino-Vietnam War (which anyone 
living in a Western country could have easily found out), the case 
against Wei was considered bogus at the time and still is. He was, in 
fact, incarcerated for his political beliefs, his advocacy of democracy, 
his criticism of the Communist Party and the government, and his 
constant association with foreigners (which the government strongly 
discourages). Another of Wei's "crimes" was to discuss the treat-
ment-including torture-of political prisoners in China with foreign 
reporters. 2 
Wei remained in prison, incommunicado, during 1986 and into 
1987. When inquiry was made about him, PRC officials confirmed 
that he was in prison, but said that he was "healthy and happy." Chi-
nese spokesmen would say little more. The government refused to 
provide any details about Wei's health and refused to allow visits or 
communications with him (though they did say that he was seen by 
friends and relatives). 
While the government had little to say about Wei Jingsheng's 
condition, other reports indicated that Wei, imprisoned in a labor 
camp in Qinghai, was in failing health. In 1986, word on Wei's poor 
health was brought to the West by a Chinese student in France whose 
father was a ranking ca~~re in the Ministry of Public Security. Re-
turning from a home visit in early 1986, the student, Fei Ming, re-
ported Wei's poor condition, quoting unspecified sources apparently 
through his father's connections. He said that "Wei Jingsheng was 
through and he wouldn't amount to anything even if he is released." 
Wei's poor health was confirmed by a visiting French Sinologist 
2. For further details, see John F. Copper, Franz Michael and Yuan-li Wu, Human 
Righ1s in Posl Mao China (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1985). 
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known by the pseudonym Mu Ren, who was acquainted with Wei's 
former girl friend. 3 
According to Fei's report, Wei was defiant during the first two 
years of imprisonment, frequently criticizing communist authorities 
both verbally and in writing. He then sank into a deep depression and 
turned quiet and withdrawn; often he would stare at the sky for long 
periods in total silence. When Wei's condition worsened, his "dumb-
ness" finally caught the attention of the prison authorities and a thor-
ough physical checkup was ordered by the Public Security Ministry. 
However, details of the physical checkup were never revealed. Wei 
was described by a labor camp cadre who commented to a foreign 
reporter as "thin and dumb-looking, totally broken in spirits."4 
Wei was not the only one to suffer. Wei's father, a ranking Party 
official, lost his job despite repeated confessions that he did not share 
his son's views. One of Wei's sisters, Wei Shanshan, a graduate of the 
National Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing, was banished to the deso-
late northwest (to work as a primary school teacher). 5 
More was heard of Wei Jingsheng during the summer of 1987. 
According to Wei Lingling, Wei's other sister who managed to visit 
him once a year, Wei's health continued to deteriorate. She said that 
Wei, though he had not suffered a nervous breakdown as had been 
rumored, had a serious heart condition, kidney infection and had lost 
almost all his teeth. When friends, trying to comfort her, assured her 
that Wei would certainly be released after Deng Xiaoping's death, she 
said in tears: "My brother will not outlive Deng Xiaoping. He has 
been through too much torture and suffering and he is not given medi-
cal attention and nutrition."6 
On June 19, 1987, at its annual meeting in San Francisco, the 
U.S. Chapter of Amnesty International expressed concern for Wei 
Jingsheng and appealed to the government of the PRC for his early 
release. Wei's case was discussed at the meeting along with five other 
political prisoners or jailed civic rights activists in the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Chile, South Africa and South Korea. 7 
Though Wei was designated a "prisoner of conscience" by Am-
nesty International, little attention was given to his case in the West 
3. Lu Ming, "Wei Jingsheng: His Sister and Former Girl Friend," China Spring, No. 
31, January, 1986, p. 42. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Meng Xiao, "My knowledge of Wei Jingsheng's Recent Condition," China Spring. 
No. 49, July 1987, p. 59. 
7. Chung Pao (Centre Daily News), eastern U.S. edition, June 22. 1987. p. 2. 
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during the year and there was little if anything done to win his release. 
In mid-1986 a U.S. reporter noted, using a computer search, that the 
past year Wei had been mentioned only five times by major newspa-
pers or news services throughout the world. 8 
Following the resignation of Deng's heir apparent, Secretary-
General of the Party Hu Yaobang, Deng mentiond Wei in early 1987, 
saying that "no one in the international community cared anything 
about Wei Jingsheng." Deng's statement may also be taken as a warn-
ing to others who might want to press for better human rights condi-
tions in the PRC. 9 Clearly the statement, as well as the absence of any 
strong reaction from abroad, suggests that Wei and cases like his are 
not of concern to the Chinese government. Neither are Chinese offi-
cials much bothered by foreign criticism on human rights abuses in the 
PRC. 
A similar case to Wei's, but different in several respects, was Xu 
Wenli. Xu Wenli had not advocated radical political beliefs and was 
generally regarded as a political moderate. He was the editor of the 
popular journal April Fifth Forum, which, during the period of "de-
mocracy wall" and the increase in free expression in 1979, gained con-
siderable attention and acclaim. Xu did not, however, betray his 
beliefs, and when political freedom became objectionable he failed to 
make the proper adjustment. In 1981 Xu was sentenced to 15 years in 
prison for "organizing counterrevolutionary groups and propaganda 
and agitation." 
Xu wrote his memoirs while he was in prison and they were 
smuggled out and published abroad-to the embarrassment of the 
Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party. Xu's 
memoirs, banned by the PRC, describe in detail his arrest at midnight 
on April 10, 1981, his more than 200 sessions of interrogation before 
his trial, his year-and-half pre-trial detention in black-curtained cells, 
and his solitary confinement after sentencing in a 18-square-foot cell 
where he heard "screams of people beaten or receiving electric 
shock." 10 
Xu said that, in China, it was easy to be falsely accused for polit-
ical reasons. "Some of those in jail have been staying here for many 
8. Ron Dorfman, "Ask What Happened to Chinese Dissident," Tribune, (South Da-
kota), July 22, 1986, p. 4. 
9. Edward A. Gargan, "Deng's Crushing of Protest Is Described," New York Times. 
January 14, 1987, p. A3. 
10. For full text of Xu's memoirs, see Xu Wenli, "My Self Defense," China Spring. No. 
30, December, 1985, pp. 29-57. For a condensed English translation by Amnesty Interna-
tional, see China Spring Digest, (New York), Vol. I, No.2, March/April, 1987, pp. 42-49. 
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years and still haven't been charged," he said. "They can keep you as 
long as they want." Xu criticized Deng Xiaoping for repeating Mao 
Zedong's mistake in suppressing free speech. In urging reform, Xu 
insisted that he did not "advocate a change in the system, only a 
change in policy." He wrote about a two-party system, but he insisted 
that he "never tried to found a political party." 11 
When inquiry was made about him, the Ministry of Justice would 
only say that Xu was in good health. 12 Amnesty International had 
been denied any reply to questions about him in 1984 and this policy 
was continued through 1986 and 1987. 
A still different human rights case invovles Chen Mingyuan. In 
1966 Chen discovered 12 of his poems published in a work entitled 
"Collection of Unpublished Poems by Chairman Mao Zedong." Chen 
was subsequently sentenced to 12 years in prison and 4 years of labor 
for saying that he, in fact, authored Mao's poems. He was reportedly 
rehabilitated in 1978. 
However, there was no public acknowledgment of his authorship 
of the poems even though the evidence seemed to have been clear that 
this was the case. Chen's case obstensibly polarized the Party too 
much (Maoists versus Dengists) and for that reason it was 
suppressed. 13 
Nevertheless the weekly news magazine Beijing Review men-
tioned Chen in March 1986. The magazine said that Chen was al-
lowed to live a "normal life" but gave no details. It also criticized 
Western reports on the issue. 14 
Another interesting case during the period under study was Wang 
Bingzhang. Wang defected to the U.S. in 1982 and founded the maga-
zine China Spring. This magazine has since published articles about 
politics in the PRC and frequently cites human rights cases while 
gauging political dissent, democracy and other trends in China. For 
his efforts, the authoritative Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) in 1984 
called Wang a "political prostitute." Since the Renmin Ribao pub-
lishes an overseas edition in the United States, Wang sued the paper 
for libel in a U.S. court-the first suit of its kind. 
Renmin Ribao had also described Wang and his associates as 
"swindlers who used patriotism as a pretext to racketeer overseas 
II. Ibid. 
12. See Daniel Southerland, "Chinese Dissident Said to be Healthy," Washington Post, 
June 23, 1986, p. A4. 
13. See, "Mao Tse-tung: From Bad to Verse," Newsweek, March 17, 1986, p. 14. 
14. Wang Xingwu, "A Disservice to Readers," Beijing Review, March 31, 1986, p. 4. 
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Chinse so as to feather their own nests" and as "hypocrites who de-
serted their mainland wives and children to look for new lovers." In 
refuting Wang's libel case Renmin Ribao claimed that it was quoting 
from a Chinese American and that it is an organ of the Central Com-
mitee of the Chinese Communist Party and thus comes under the im-
munity provided in the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities ActY 
Wang contended that Deng and the reformers in the PRC, who were 
running the government and the Party, said that the government and 
the Chinese Community Party are separate. That being the case, the 
paper-being controlled by the Party and not the government-
should not be afforded protection under the above-mentioned law. 16 
At the time of this writing the case is still pending. However, 
clearly the Wang case is an embarrassment to the PRC. It reflects 
Chinese leaders' efforts to improve the PRC's human rights image 
abroad while refusing to make changes in the system that would fur-
ther the cause of human rights. It gives evidence of the problems Chi-
nese leaders face in trying to open the country for economic reasons, 
yet not allow civil and political rights. 
The case of Fang Lizhi is reflective of Chinese attitude toward 
human rights at the end of 1986 and 1987. In early 1987 Fang was a 
well known astrophysicist and vice president of the University of Sci-
ence and Technology in Hefei in Anhui province in south central 
China-where the December 1986 student demonstrations began. As 
a high official in the Chinese Communist Party, Fang's criticism of 
local elections (not being democratic) and of doctrinaire Marxism 
caused ripples in the Party and elsewhere. For his openness, China's 
strongman Deng Xiaopang subsequently (when the strength of his 
critics on the left became apparent) called for his expulsion from the 
Party for advocating "bourgeois liberalism." Fang was stripped of his 
Party membership. 17 
However, because Fang had become a hero to China's students 
and his case was so widely publicized abroad, the Party toned down its 
actions and arranged for him to appear in public at a scholarly meet-
ing, apparently to demonstrate that he had not been imprisoned or 
sent to a desolate area of China for "reform through education" or 
"reform through labor." In June 1987, he was even allowed to travel 
to Rome briefly to attend a scientific conference. Upon his return to 
Beijing, Fang told the press at the airport that "I have not changed my 
15. See Washington Post, September 28, 1986, p. A23. 
16. Ibid. 
17. See also Chapters on "Double Hundred" and "Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization"' 
Campaigns. 
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views" about a need for democracy in China. 18 However, his requests 
to go to England and the United States to attend conferences and to 
give lectures were turned down by the government. 19 
Following the massive student demonstrations in late 1986 and 
early 1987, little was known about the extent and severity of the pun-
ishments meted out to many leaders and participants. Several months 
after the demonstrations were suppressed, however, there was a curi-
ous wave of reports about the punishments of dozens of unruly stu-
dents in many of the nation's leading universities. These students were 
accused of leading decadent lifestyles due to Western influence-
drinking, dancing, gambling, and fighting on campus. Many were ex-
pelled from school for such alleged disciplinary infractions. 20 
With the arrival of summer vacation, over a million students from 
colleges and universities throughout the country were sent down to the 
countryside to undergo ideological indoctrination through physical la-
bor by learning from the peasants and factory workers. 21 That this is 
reverting to the old practices during the Maoist days seems unmistaka-
ble. Increasingly, observers compared Deng Xiaoping (because of his 
old age and his shift to the left) with Mao. Given this, the disciplinary 
actions against "wayward" students and the sending of over a billion 
of them to the countryside to do hard labor may well be considered a 
form of mass punishment after the student demonstrations. 
Because of the tight control of information in the PRC, news 
about individual cases of persecution in response to the student dem-
onstrations was scarce. So far, only two cases were known to the 
outside world. However, in view of the arbitrary arrests and detention 
as disclosed in Xu Wenli's memoirs, these two known cases may well 
represent many more that have gone unreported. 
One of the cases was that of Lu Di, a 25-year-old student at the 
Wuhan Conservatory in Wuhan in central China. According to an 
Agence-France Presse dispatch from Beijing, Lu was sentenced in 
June 1987 to four years in prison for taking part in the demonstra-
tions. The report said that Lu was the first known student so sen-
tenced, although many workers and unemployed youths have been 
sent to jail for taking part in the demonstrations. Lu's crime included 
18. Daniel Southerland, "China's 'Sakharov' Speaks Out," Washington Post, June 28, 
1987, p. A32. 
19. China Daily News, (New York), June 29, 1987, p. 2. 
20. Chung Pao, June 24, 1987, p. 2, June 26, 1987, p. I; China Daily News, June 24. 
1987, p. 7, June 25, 198, p. 4. 
21. Edward A. Gargan, "Students in China Turn Cynical and Apathetic," New York 
Times. Week in Review Section, July 5, 1987, p. 3. 
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"violating school regulations and threatening public order." He was 
also expelled from the conservatory.22 
While the sentencing of Lu became the first officially reported 
case of the punishment of a student for participation in the demonstra-
tions, another case, never reported inside China, became better known 
in the United States due to unique circumstances. The case was the 
arrest of Yang Wei, a former graduate student at the University of 
Arizona who returned to China in 1986 after receiving a master's de-
gree in molecular biology.23 While Yang was waiting for a scholarship 
to come back to the United States to continue work for his Ph.D., 
student demonstrations broke out in Shanghai, his hometown. Em-
boldened by democratic ideas he acquired while in the U.S., Yang 
threw himself into the movement with enthusiasm. He was arrested 
on January 11, 1987. But this was never reported in the PRC press. 
Had it not been for Yang's wife Che Shaoli, a graduate student at the 
Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas, the arrest of Yang 
would probably never have become known. 
According to Che, she was told by an official at the Chinese Con-
sulate office in Houston that her husband was arrested for "counter-
revolutionary activities" including "putting up reactionary posters in 
public places" and "disseminating reactionary propaganda materials" 
to incite students to stage demonstrations. However, no formal 
charges were filed and Yang was held incommunicado and denied vis-
its by his family. 24 
Worried about the fate of her husband, Che went to the press, the 
U.S. Congress and the State Department with the help of her relatives 
and human rights groups. Senators Jesse Helms of North Carolina 
and Richard Luger of Indiana, both members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, lodged separate inquiries about Yang's case 
with the State Department and the Chinese Embassy in Washington.Z5 
Che also made available to the press the text of "An Eye-witness Ac-
count of Student Movement in Shanghai," written by her husband, to 
show that it was not "reactionary propaganda materials" as alleged by 
the PRC authorities.26 Meanwhile, Che prepared personal appeals to 
Deng Xiaoping and Premier Zhao Ziyang, which were carried to Bei-
jing and handed over to the Chinese government by Secretary of State 
22. China Daily News, June 23, 1987, p. 4. 
23. See also the Chapter on Student Demonstrations. 
24. Chung Pao, February 21, 1987, p. I. 
25. Ann Scott, "Made Bold by Life in West, Chinese Students Speak Out," Christian 
Science Monitor, February 27, 1987, p. I. 
26. Chung Pao, February 24, 1987, p. 2. 
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George Shultz during his visit on March 2, 1987.27 
Han Xu, the Ambassador of PRC in Washington, has reiterated 
the Chinese government's position that Yang was arrested for "putting 
up reactionary slogans and propaganda leaflets." In a letter to Con-
gressman Gus Yatron, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human 
Rights and International Relations of the House of Representatives on 
February 16, 1987, Ambassador Han dismissed as "irrelevant" the is-
sue of "academic freedom and free expression." He insisted that "in 
present-day China, people enjoy all basic freedoms and liberties as em-
bodied in the Constitution. " 28 
As of mid-1987, Yang's case was still pending. However, there 
were signs that the PRC was responding to U.S. pressure. There were 
reports that the Shanghai Public Security Bureau was taken aback by 
the publicity of the case in the United States, and that the State Secur-
ity Ministry was embarrassed. 29 
However, in eary June, 1987, a visiting high official from the PRC 
disclosed that Yang would be tried for "criminal activities" soon. The 
official, He Dongchang, vice chairman of State Education Commis-
sion, said in New York that Yang would be prosecuted for an offense 
"totally unrelated" to the student protests. 30 On December 21, 1987, 
Yang was sentenced to two years in prison on "counterrevolutionary" 
charges. 31 
27. China Spring, No. 47, May 198, p. 39. 
28. Letter from Ambassador Han Xu to Congressman Gus Yatron dated February 16, 
1987. 
29. China Spring, No. 47, 1987, p. 40. 
30. "China to Try Student," New York Times, June 9, 1987, p. All. 
31. See supra note 26. 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
Looking back, events in the political, intellectual and economic 
realms in the PRC during the past year represented "one step forward, 
two steps backward" in the cause of human rights. However, the cam-
paign against "bourgeois liberalization" was nothing new, or at least 
should not be considered simply a temporary setback to the reform 
movement and the cause of human rights. In many respects, it was 
the continuation and intensification of the earlier Anti-Spiritual Pollu-
tion Campaign which had never really ended. In the 1983 campaign, 
Deng Xiaoping defined "spiritual pollution," or "cultural contamina-
tion," as the "corrosive influence of the decadent ideas of the bour-
geoisie and other exploiting classes and the dissemination of non-
confidence in socialism, communism and the leadership of the Party."' 
This definition was reiterated in Premier Zhao Ziyang's report to the 
National People's Congress in May, 1984 and by Hu Yaobang, then 
the Party Secretary-General, in his now famous talk on the Party's 
mass media work in February, 1985.2 
Hu stressed that the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign was a 
"correct policy" which was never abandoned by the Party, despite cer-
tain excesses committed at lower levels because the Party "failed to set 
the limits clearly at the beginning." Hu made clear that the campaign 
to "oppose and overcome the corrosive influence of the decadent ideas 
of capitalism" never ceased, and that it is the Party that defines the 
scale of the campaign at a given time. It is also the Party that holds 
the ultimate power to tighten up or to loosen up as it sees fit. 
The efforts at measured relaxation before the latest crackdown 
can also be described as a kind of "crisis management." Over 30 years 
of totalitarian rule, capped by the disastrous Cultural Revolution, 
have produced a deep crisis, both economically and ideologically. The 
system was shaken to its very foundation. The crisis was so deep, after 
the Cultural Revolution, that the post-Mao leadership was forced to 
make concessions economically, borrowing from capitalism, in an at-
tempt to save socialism, so to speak. 
But economic reforms are now in trouble. The tug of war be-
tween further relaxation and tightening control continued as it became 
I. "Stand on Cultural Pollution Clarified," Beijing Review, April 29, 1985, p. 8. 
2. Hu Yaobang, "On the Mass Media Work of the Party," Hongqi (Red Flag), No.8 
April 16, i985, pp. 2-22. Hu's speech can also be found in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 
April 14, 1985, p. I. 
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increasingly clear that the reform was designed to save Communist 
Party dictatorship and the socialist economy. Would further reform 
measures, in an economy already suffering from difficulties sparked by 
the reform, ultimately lead to the demise of the system? If and when 
the system collapses, where would the present power-holders be? 
The economic impasse has its parallel in the political arena, 
where the crisis reflected the bankruptcy of an ideology. The bureau-
cracy had become so inhuman, special privileges so rampant, powers 
so abused and human rights violations so commonplace that even the 
present powerholders, themselves victims of the Cultural Revolution 
produced by the system, could no longer defend it. They had to criti-
cize it, to make some superficial modifications, in the hope of main-
taining its continued survival, without changing its basic character and 
premises. Left unchanged, they perceived, the system would self-de-
struct; such could have been the case with the economy if nothing had 
been done to rescue it by the Deng regime. Going too far in the direc-
tion of reform, however, would likewise lead to the ultimate demise of 
the system, for enough "quantitative" change, in due course, would 
inevitably produce "qualitative" change. 
Hence the current reform must be carefully managed. The au-
thorities have allowed critics limited opportunities to air their views, 
giving a semblance of the sincerity of the leadership about reform, 
while at the same time making sure that the critics stay within bounds. 
But the bottom line or the limits to reform had to be reaffirmed over 
and over again, as a constant warning to the critics and a reminder to 
the Chinese people and the rest of the world that the PRC will remain 
a Communist country. 
In other words, the basic ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism may be tampered with for tactical reasons, but they will not 
be abandoned. Reforms, economic and political, are aimed to make 
the system more efficient, more powerful; they do not represent a basic 
change in the direction of Western democracy and the rule of law. 
In this context, one can see that human rights violations in the 
PRC, as in the Soviet Union, are not simply a matter of individual 
cases; they are institutional and often intentional. Basic tenets of 
human rights, of Western origin, are either irrelevant to the state sys-
tem in the People's Republic, or they threaten its existence. 
Thus the "reversal of verdict" in an individual case at a particular 
time-the correction of a case of miscarriage of justice, that is-is typ-
ically a decision made at the top. It is not the inevitable result of due 
process of law based on an affirmation of the fundamental human 
worth, with a multitude of institutional checks and guarantees. Such 
REFORM IN REVERSE 107 
decisions are made by Party leaders, nearly always on grounds of 
political expediency, rather than genuine concern for human rights. 
Decisions can be made one day, and withdrawn anytime, with little 
knowledge on the party of the public, much less participation. 
Rights are granted to the people by the political leaders at the 
top; they are not inherent in the law and do not belong to the people as 
natural rights, nor are they earned by the people as political rights. 
Following this line of thinking, a human being is not born with any 
"inalienable rights"; nor is he entitled to earn or fight for his rights. 
Whatever rights one has are a gift from those who are in a position to 
grant them when they so please, and of course to withdraw them when 
deemed necessary. 
Two further observations can be made in connection with the 
human rights condition in China. First, the human rights condition in 
the People's Republic is characterized not by superficial progress, but 
by a rather remarkable constancy. One need only realize that totali-
tarian systems institutionalize change but not necessarily progress. 
Looking at intellectual freedom, one cannot help but be amazed by not 
how much, but how little change that has taken place over the years. 
Little of the just-silenced debate on Marxism and democratic re-
form in China is new. Indeed, if one is to compare the utterances of 
the 1957 Hundred Flowers Campaign and those of the most recent 
"liberalization" days, one sees a full cycle, a 30-year waste of time. Is 
Marxism-Leninism to be considered the guiding ideology in the pro-
cess of contending? If it is, it may stop other schools of thought from 
contending. 3 The words of a skeptical university professor who, in 
1957, asked this same question ring no less true today, in the wake of 
the recent emphasis on the primacy of ideology by Party leaders from 
Deng Xiaoping on down. 
Indeed, one forgets at one's own peril that it was Deng who was 
put in charge (by Mao) of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 and 
who 16 years later also kicked off the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Cam-
paign in 1983. It was again Deng who in March 1987 presided over 
the Party Central Committee meeting which declared that "spiritual 
pollution and bourgeois liberalization are one and the same thing. " 4 
Deng has not changed; however, it is the perception of some in the 
West that he has. 
This conclusion lends to a second, related observation, in particu-
3. Renmin Ribao, April 21, 1957, p. 7. 
4. Edward A. Gargan, "Beijing Party Directives Criticize Ousted Leader," New York 
Times, March 8, 1987, p. 2. 
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Jar reference to the United States. As we have seen in the different 
U.S. reactions to the Burns and Daniloff cases and in other matters, 
the United States government and some private persons, including 
business, some press and academic circles, tend to adopt a double-
standard in attitudes toward the PRC and the Soviet Union. Leaving 
aside the wisdom of regarding Beijing as a potential quasi-ally in some 
policy-makers' global strategic thinking, the implications of Washing-
ton's soft-peddling toward the PRC's human rights conduct must not 
be overlooked. 
Despite Deng Xiaoping's boasts that the Wei Jingsheng case did 
not hurt the PRC's international image, it is up to Washington not to 
forget that, as with the Soviet Union, the United States does have a 
strong leverage and should use it to promote both national interests 
and the larger cause of humanity and human rights. Many Chinese, 
particularly the educated youth, look to the United States as the 
champion of human rights. The United States owes it to itself and 
what it stands for not to shy away from this universal moral 
responsibility. 
APPENDIX 1 
Excerpts from 
"RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON THE GUIDING PRIN-
CIPLES FOR BUILDING A SOCIALIST SOCIETY WITHIN 
AN ADVANCED CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY"* 
(Adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 12th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 28, 
1986. Beijing Review, October 6, 1986, Centerfold.) 
The overall scheme of China's socialist modernization is as fol-
lows: Taking economic development as the key link, we are to con-
tinue to reform our economic and political structures and at the same 
time speed up the country's cultural and ideological progress, making 
sure that these aspects of our work are coordinated and promote each 
other. From this perspective all our Party comrades should under-
stand the strategic importance of promoting socialist culture and 
ideology. 
Socialist culture and ideology guided by Marxism are important 
characteristics of a socialist society. During the socialist period, mate-
rial progress lays the groundwork and furnishes practical experience 
for cultural and ideological progress, which, in turn, gives intellectural 
impetus and support to the former and provides a powerful guarantee 
for its correct orientation. Our success in building socialism depends 
on our effort to build a society with a socialist culture and ideology. 
Thanks to our success in restoring order in all fields, launching 
all-round reform and achieving material progress since the Third Ple-
nary Session of the Party's 11th Central Committee in December 
1978, we have accomplished much in building such a society. Encour-
aging the emancipation of people's minds, adhering to the ideological 
line of seeking truth from facts and bringing into full play the scientific 
spirit and creative vigour of Marxism, our Party has abandoned a se-
ries of ossified concepts and raised its understanding of socialism to a 
new height. Political stability and unity have prevailed throughout the 
country, democracy and the legal system are being gradually perfected 
and the initiative of the cadres and masses has increased. Mass activi-
ties for promoting cultural and ideological progress are becoming 
more and more widespread and are yielding much fresh experience. A 
* Reprinted by permission of Beijing Review. 
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social climate of respect for knowledge and talents is being fostered, 
and our educational, scientific and cultural endeavors are thriving. 
The Party's fine tradition is developed and the work style of its mem-
bers and general standard of social conduct is improving. These are 
the main trends. We must recognize, however, that in many ways our 
work to promote socialist culture and ideology has not been adapted 
to the needs of socialist modernization, reform and the opening of the 
country to the outside world. We must acknowledge that we lack ade-
quate understanding of the importance of our work in this area, that 
we still have some problems to solve regarding the principles guiding it 
and that both in the Party and in society at large there remain some 
grievously negative phenomena that will take redoubled effort on our 
part to eliminate. Unless we have an overall view of how things stand 
in our work to promote socialist culture and ideology, and unless we 
fully understand that it is urgent and will be of long duration, we shall 
not be able to keep up our efforts, and the general interest will suffer. 
Reform means the development and perfection of the socialist sys-
tem. The progress of the reform in all areas reflects the tremendous 
changes that have taken place in China in the past few years. Our 
policies of launching all-round reform and opening to the rest of the 
world have infused our socialist cause with great vitality and have sig-
nificantly promoted socialist culture and ideology. Development of 
the socialist commodity economy and improvement of socialist de-
mocracy have led to profound changes in people's ideology and out-
look. At the same time they have placed higher demands on us in our 
effort to foster socialist culture and ideology. This is a great historic 
test for us: Will we be able to meet these demands by shaping public 
opinion, values and the cultural and social environment so as to facili-
tate socialist modernization and reform? Will we be able to resist the 
decadent bourgeois and feudal ideologies and avoid the danger of devi-
ating from the right direction? Will we be able to arouse the boundless 
enthusiasm and initiative of the people of all our nationalities, so that 
through the efforts of several generations we can build a modern, pow-
erful socialist country? We should be confident that with the Party's 
correct leadership, with the guidance of Marxism, with our basic so-
cialist economic system and policies, with the people's democratic 
state power and socialist legality and, in particular, with the people's 
firm support for socialist construction and reform, we shall achieve 
socialist modernization, so long as we do our best to promote the cul-
tural and ideological progress of our socialist society along with its 
material progress. 
In short because our work in promoting socialist culture and ide-
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ology is of strategic importance, we must ensure that it is capable of 
promoting the all-round reform and the opening to the outside world 
and embodying the four cardinal principles.* That is a basic guiding 
principle for our work in this area. 
A high degree of democracy is one of the great goals of socialism 
and also an essential manifestation of socialist culture and ideology in 
the life of the state and of society as a whole. Historically, the con-
cepts of democracy, liberty, equality and brotherhood took shape in 
the struggle of the rising bourgeoisie and the working people against 
feudal autocracy, marking a great mental emancipation of mankind. 
Although Marxism incorporated what was best in these bourgeois 
concepts, it is different from them in principle. In essence, bourgeois 
democracy serves to protect the capitalist system. By eliminating class 
oppression and exploitation, socialism has paved the way for the peo-
ple to become masters of their own destiny and for democracy to ad-
vance to a new level in history. The major historical lessons to be 
drawn from China's socialist development are, first, that we should 
have mustered all our resources to develop the economy and, second, 
that we should have substantially extended democracy. Since the 
Third Plenary Session of its 11th Central Committee, the Party has 
stressed that there can be no socialist modernization without democ-
racy, that democracy must be institutionalized and codified in law and 
that the Party must conduct its activities within the limits permitted 
by the Constitution and the laws of the state. The Party has taken 
effective measures to further democratize its political life, the political 
life of the state, economic management and the life of the entire soci-
ety. In urging reform of the political structure, as it has done of late, 
the Central committee aims-always while upholding the leadership 
of the Party and the people's democratic dictatorship-to reform and 
perfect the Party and state leadership systems and to take a step fur-
ther in extending socialist democracy and improving the socialist legal 
system, all for the purpose of facilitating socialist modernizatioti. This 
will be a very complex task. After exhaustive investigation and study, 
the Central Committee will work out plans for accomplishing it, so 
that political reform may proceed step by step and with proper 
guidance. 
Democracy cannot be separated from legality and discipline. So-
cialist legality, embodying the will of the people, safeguards their legit-
* Keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, up· 
holding the leadership of the Communist Party, and upholding Marxism-Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought. 
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imate rights and interests, regulates their relations and sets norms to 
keep their activities within proper bounds, at the same time punishing 
all unlawful activities that endanger society. Legality dissociated from 
socialist democracy can in no sense be socialist legality, nor can de-
mocracy dissociated from socialist legality be socialist democracy. 
Unless we strengthen our socialist legal system based on the Constitu-
tion and strengthen work discipline while combating all practices that 
repress and undermine democracy, we shall not be able to ensure 
smooth economic development and the unimpeded progress of all-
round reform: furthermore, we shall not be able to maintain long-
term political stability in our country. Bourgeois liberalization, which 
means negating the socialist system in favour of capitalism, is in total 
contradiction to the people's interests and to the historical trend, and it 
is therefore firmly opposed by the masses. 
APPENDIX 2 
DEMOCRACY, REFORM & MODERNIZATION* 
Excerpts from speech by Fang Lizhi on November 18, 1986 
at Shanghai Tongji University 
China Spring Digest, March/April, 1987, p. 12. 
Socialism is at a low ebb. There is no getting around the fact that 
no socialist state in the post-World War II era has been successful, and 
neither has our own thirty-odd year long socialist experiment. There 
are those who claim that China is too large, too poor, and too 
overpopulated for socialism to succeed here. Some say that we have 
accomplished quite a bit in getting as far as we have. These excuses 
can be refuted on theoretical and practical grounds. China's popula-
tion density is not overwhelming. According to my research on the 
subject, each square kilometer of arable land in China support 750 
people, but the same amount of land in Japan supports twice that 
number, up to 1500 people per square kilometer. Why can't China 
achieve Japan's level of production!? Both countries once were in a 
similar economic state. Just after the war, Japan's economy was as 
backward as ours, so China's present situation cannot be explained as 
a result of population pressure. Claims that China is too poor may be 
disproved on the same grounds. 
From Marx to Mao, Communism has Failed 
I will illustrate my point with examples drawn from socialist 
countries. I find the case of East and West Berlin particularly striking. 
Though they are separated by a tall wall, West Berliners who want to 
go to East Berlin do so freely. They need only buy a vacation pass. 
West Berlin is materially rich, but in East Berlin there are few con-
sumer goods in the markets and the people look like they lead severe 
lives, despite the impressive architecture that abounds in that part of 
the city. (laughter, applause) The difference between East Berlin and 
West Berlin is clearest at the border. There is a brief customs check 
on the West Berlin side, but going back the vehicle itself is thoroughly 
examined, for fear the East Berliners might escape to West Berlin. If 
their society is so fine, why do they worry about people escaping? 
(long, enthusiastic applause) My point is not to criticize East Germany 
* Reprinted by permission of China Spring Digest. 
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but simply to say that mistakes must be admitted. Socialism has 
failed. (enthusiastic applause) I am here to tell you that the socialist 
movement, from Marx and Lenin to Stalin and Mao Zedong, has been 
a failure. (enthusiastic applause) 
Of course, socialism has some positive aspects. What deserves 
our attention, however, is the fact that the practice of socialism has 
not produced them. We should face this problem squarely and not 
allow ourselves to be blinkered by narrow orthodoxy. Clearing our 
minds of all Marxist dogma is the first step. Last year I advocated the 
same idea at Beijing University; my statements were passed on and 
some people upstairs took issue with it. Now I learn that the same 
ideas are to be found in the documents of the Party Central Commit-
tee, acknowledging, in effect, the narrowness of Marxism-Leninism. 
Let me clarify what I mean. Marxism contains some insights into the 
nature of civilization, but in practice it leads us to accept only the 
truths of Marxism and dispense with all the other lessons of history. 
It rejects all positive elements to be found in other peoples, cultures, 
and history up to Liberation. But no aspect of humanity may be re-
jected, for all contribute to civilization. 
Sweden's Successful Socialism 
Thus we must commit ourselves to complete and thorough liber-
alization. We must remold our society by absorbing influences from 
all cultures. What we must not do is isolate ourselves and allow our 
conceit to convince us that we alone are correct. World civilization is 
the composite product of every culture. Socialism is one facet of this 
vital world civilization. Although it stands at low ebb today, there are 
several different types of socialist societies, each trying to achieve the 
goals of socialism in its own way. Not all have failed utterly. During 
a conference I attended in Sweden last July, a Swedish acquaintance 
informed me that Swedish socialism was true socialism. Over half of 
their industries, he said, are nationally owned and there are no great 
disparities of wealth. Their standard of living is very high; their per 
capita gross national product equals $19,000, far beyond ours. He 
asked about our social welfare system, so I was forced to admit that 
the one we have is nothing compared to Sweden's, which genuinely 
provides social welfare. Their government promotes Marxism, too. I 
saw a mural in an exhibition hall depicting their Socialist Democrat 
Party inciting rebellion among workers. (laughter) Another showed 
how the people came to enjoy a better life after the Party secured 
power during struggle in the state legislative body. Furthermore, the 
Swedes consider television to be an instrument of education, so com-
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mercials are banned. (applause) Considered as a whole, from ideol-
ogy to a level of social development far beyond our own, Sweden is 
more socialist than China. The Swedes call their socialist experiment 
a success. 
Absorb the Proletariat Into Bourgeoisie 
Lenin labeled the Social Democrat Party traitorous-an accusa-
tion he also flung at the Second International. But whether or not 
they betrayed the Revolution, they did solve some real problems, and 
if practice is the standard for evaluating theory, we must consider 
Swedish socialism to be more progressive and rational than Chinese 
socialism. China emphasizes class struggle and dictatorship of the 
proletariat, destroying the capitalist class in the process. The Swedes, 
on the other hand, promote social harmony as the means to resolve 
class and other social contradictions. During the 1950's, Sweden, like 
China, took radical steps to adjust social relations, even obliterating a 
social class in the process. However, the victim was the proletariat 
rather than the capitalist class. (enthusiastic applause) They obliter-
ated the proletariat by transforming the bulk of the Swedish popula-
tion into bourgeoisie. I feel their experience merits serious 
consideration. 
We are hobbled by many old ideas which we have grown to ac-
cept as natural. Going abroad leads one to realize that those old hab-
its of thought are flawed. There are many reasons for China's failure 
to keep up with the rest ofthe world. We still have too many feudal 
tendencies. 
Loosening the Bonds Does Not Constitute Democratization 
My topics are democracy, reform and modernization. I have al-
ready touched upon reform and modernization. Now I will discuss 
the necessity of democracy. 
Not long ago we asked for democracy which is not quite different 
from relaxation of restrictions. However, it is important to note that 
democracy is quite different from relaxation of restrictions. The criti-
cal component to the democratic agenda is human rights, a touchy issue 
in our country. Human rights are fundamental privileges that people 
have from birth, such as the right to think and be educated, the right 
to marry, and so on. But we Chinese consider these rights dangerous. 
Human rights are universal and concrete, but at present we lump free-
dom, equality and brotherhood together with capitalism and criticize 
them all in the same terms. If we are the democratic country we say 
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we are, these rights should be stronger here than elsewhere, but at 
present they are nothing more than an abstract idea. (enthusiastic 
applause) 
I feel that the first step toward democratization should be recog-
nition of human rights. Everybody has different views and methods, 
but if they are integrated according to democratic principles people 
can become united societies and nations. However, the whole issue 
changes the moment we come to consider democracy as something 
that is maintained by collective effort, for already democratization has 
come to mean something performed by superiors upon inferiors-a 
serious misunderstanding of democracy. (enthusiastic applause) Our 
government does not give us democracy by loosening our bonds a lit-
tle. It gives us only enough freedom to writhe. (enthusiastic applause) 
Freedom by decree is not fit to be called democracy, for, unlike West-
ern democracy, it fails to prove the most basic human rights. Our 
newspapers often report the inspection tours of the people's represent-
atives. Representatives of the people make inspections? Think about 
it. Does such a thing take place in a democracy? Representatives are 
selected by the people. They should represent their constituency, not 
inspect it. (applause) An institution that inspects the people is not 
democratic. 
Democracy Starts with the Individual 
Representatives should spend some time listening to their constit-
uencies before sessions of the National Assembly, then use the Assem-
bly as a forum for presenting the views of the people. But far be it 
from our representatives to represent our opinions. Actually, I once 
considered it perfectly natural to put up with inspection tours. (laugh-
ter) Then, early this year, I spent several months at a research institu-
tion in New Jersey. One day I received in the mail some information 
from a state congressman describing what he had recently accom-
plished in the state legislature, his voting record, what issues were be-
ing discussed-in short, giving an account of his politics. It was his 
report to the people, demonstrating the congressman's respect and of-
fered to represent at the next session of the state legislature those who 
did not agree with his stand on issues. He cared even for the views of 
a Chinese man who had been accustomed to calling American society 
a false democracy. In our genuine democracy, on the other hand, I 
have never received a report of my representative's activities or his 
voting record. (applause) My representative will be only too happy to 
cast my vote without having the vaguest idea of what I think. That is 
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why our 'genuine democracy' will never be a match for the false de-
mocracy. (laughter) 
In democratic nations, democracy flows from the individual and 
government has responsibilities toward him. Objectively speaking, 
government depends for its continued operation upon the taxes he 
pays. Taxes return to the individual as services coordinated by the 
government, such as schools, hospitals, public welfare and municipal 
government. Subjectively, the citizens of a democratic society expect 
their taxes to return as government services and protection of individ-
ual rights. The situation in China is quite different; we praise our gov-
ernment whenever it finally gets around to doing something for us, 
when in fact the government has done nothing more than fulfill its 
obligation. Our schools always remind students to study hard to make 
the best of the opportunity that the government and Party have given 
them. (laughter) There certainly is nothing wrong with telling stu-
dents to study hard, but it is incorrect to suggest that educational op-
portunity is the government's to give, for each individual has a 
fundamental right to receive it. The constitution guarantees it. (ap-
plause) We pay taxes (you students may not, but the head of each 
family pays taxes), so the government must provide you with educa-
tional institutions in return. We must make the government recognize 
that it is economically dependent upon its citizens. Such is the basis of 
democracy. But feudal traditions are still strong in China. Social rela-
tions are initiated by superiors and accepted by inferiors, contrary to 
what they should be in a democratic society. What Chinese intellec-
tual life lacks utterly is democratic social conscience. Our political 
institutions need many reforms, but development of democratic social 
conscience is absolutely vital. 

APPENDIX 3 
INTELLECfUALS' ROLE IN CHINESE SOCIETY* 
Excerpts of Fang Lizhi's Speech at Jiaotong University 
on November 15, 1986, 
China Spring Digest, March/ April 1987, p. 26 
I have always been opposed to the view that Marxist philosophy 
should become the sole theoretical guidance of everything. Now let us 
use this method of research to study the document on spiritual civili-
zation. In the paragraph of "Marxism as Guidance," the document 
says that Marxism should guide morality, the rule of law, etc., but it 
does not spell out that Marxism guides scientific research. 
Society cannot remain static but will continuously develop. Of 
course the pace of development could be quick at one time and slow at 
another. Since we have said intellectuals are the leading force in soci-
ety, the responsibility of developing China should be ours, not others. 
It is said that reforms in China depend on the resolve of the top leader-
ship. If the leadership has the resolve they would push the society 
forward, since they are in the dominant position. 
But does this mean that if the top leadership lacks resolve, Chi-
nese society would stop moving forward? Of course, the nature of the 
Chinese system and the traditional morals and value determine that 
the top leadership plays an extremely important role. No wonder 
someone made a joke that China not only should import new technol-
ogy, but what is more important, China should import a prime 
minister. 
This joke represents a view that no imports will be of any use 
unless China imports persons occupying key positions. It must be rec-
ognized that this represents the reality based on the present Chinese 
system. But the problem is that by relying only on the resolve of the 
top leadership, China cannot hope to become a developed country. 
Relying on the top leadership itself is not progressive thinking. What 
I mean is that if the democracy we are striving for remains one that is 
granted only from the top, then the democracy that is practiced in our 
society is not the true democracy. To go further, democracy itself em-
bodies the recognition of individual rights. 
The society is then composed of these individuals. This means 
* Reprinted by permission of China Spring Digest. 
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this right is not granted from above. Rather, men are born with 
rights. Human rights as a term is a taboo in China. In fact this is a 
very popular term. It simply means that men are born with rights to 
live, to marry, to think, to receive an education, etc. For an individ-
ual, this right comes with his birth. And these rights are human 
rights. Therefore, we should not read human rights as a horrible term. 
Instead, we should think of human rights, liberty, equality and love as 
a positive historical legacy and then strive for democracy. Until then 
there is no true democracy. We should not place our hope on grants 
from the top leadership. Democracy granted from above is not de-
mocracy in a real sense. It is relaxation of control. 
Of course, relatively radical forms are also included in the strug-
gle for democracy. Only by striving can we get what we really need. 
Because of the extremely long history of feudal society in China, plus 
the wide spread of feudal ideas as a result of the Cultural Revolution, 
there have emerged many erroneous ideas and opinions. For instance, 
there have been distorted interpretations of the exact meaning of de-
mocracy and liberty. Take for instance the relationship between us 
and government. It is not so much what the government has given us, 
as it is we that have maintained the government. Government can be 
looked upon only as a representative of practicing democracy. There-
fore, the first issue that needs to be clarified is who provides whom? I 
have spent a relatively longer time at the university. There has been a 
typical and popular method used in the teaching of students. Students 
are told that they should study hard and value the opportunity that 
the Party has granted them. 
Of course as a citizen one should study hard even out of consider-
ation of personal development. But to conclude that the opportunity 
is granted by the Party and state is completely erroneous. Why is this 
wrong? Because it is incorrect conceptually. Since the opportunity is 
granted by the state, we must ask where the state comes from? How 
are opportunities granted to you? 
It is known that to be able to receive an education is a right for 
everyone of us as citizens. Individuals have the right to education. 
The opportunity is not granted by anyone. Therefore, to say that the 
right to education is granted by the leadership reflects a feudalistic 
viewpoint. In appearance everything seems to have been granted by 
the government; in reality, it is not the case. From an economic point 
of view, every citizen pays taxes. And these taxes include the expenses 
for education. Therefore, the opportunity for education is not 
granted. 
In the developed countries, the concept is that citizens are taxpay-
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ers to maintain the government. In return, the government uses the 
taxes to manage things in the interest of citizens. Out of this relation-
ship, the psychological feelings of the taxpayers are that it is the citi-
zens who maintain the government. The government can survive only 
by levying taxes. As a result the government must serve the citizens. 
From this logic, it is not so much whether citizens are permitted to be 
educated as it is the government that has the responsibility to run 
schools for citizens. 
So, too, the case in China. Everyone of us has paid our taxes. 
Although you students have not yet paid your taxes, your parents have 
paid on your behalf. 
One must have a clear understanding of this issue. But this issue 
should not make the relationships among people so tense. One must 
have a clear sense of what belongs to you, and what belongs to me. It 
is a relationship within the concept of the contradictions among the 
people, not one based on antagonism. 
One must have a correct concept that we are born with the rights 
of democracy. 
Relying only on the determination of the government is partially 
correct. The decisive factor in determining the stability of peoples' 
lives and the development of the society lies in whether the intellectu-
als as a group have the awareness of democracy and of themselves to 
conscientiously strive for their rights. It would be tragic if we don't 
have this awareness and simply wait for the leadership for their 
determination. 
When I was abroad, I often explained to foreign friends the tragic 
experience of Chinese intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution: 
The doors of universities were closed and intellectuals were deprived 
of rights. These friends, on the one hand expressed their sympathy, 
while on the other hand, they were a little contemptuous of Chinese 
intellectuals, asking me why you failed to express your will? Where 
was your will? Why didn't you demonstrate that you were against, 
not for the Cultural Revolution? During the 1950s, idealism prevailed 
among Chinese intellectuals. This was valuable. But this genreation 
was strongly influenced by the doctrine of obedience. No matter how 
they were treated, they would continuously work hard without pro-
test. These people seem to have a lot of self restraint and have nothing 
to compete with the world. 
In fact, this attitude is not conducive to our society. One should 
strive for what is one's due. It is time that we changed the characteris-
tics of the intellectuals of the 1950s. I believe that the modern-day 
intellectuals have surpassed the intellectuals of the 50s in this respect, 
122 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
although the undergraduates have been criticized or pointed at one 
way or another. 
I also hope that we can have our independent thinking, independ-
ent personality, independent feelings and consciousness. Only by hav-
ing possessed these qualifications can we achieve something. 
Otherwise, the old outlook could not be transformed by simply relying 
on grants from the government, such as the conditions of learning and 
democratic rights. 
Should China have another Cultural Revolution, I hope that we 
would not become the object of sympathy and be told why you have 
put yourself in this dilemma again. It would be tragic if China is to 
repeat this cycle. The intellectuals should demonstrate the strength 
they possess. Such strengths on the one hand, have not become fully 
understood and, on the other, have not been demonstrated. As long as 
one has the awareness and speaks out in criticism, the effects will be 
greatly felt. People have been deeply impressed by this awareness 
since the latter half of 1985. Wasn't it true that a small action would 
lead to strong reaction nationwide? This proves that we have strength. 
But the question remains whether you dare to use it. As long as every-
one of us realizes that the government should give us democracy, not 
grant us democracy, China will be able to transform the feudalistic 
ideas and gradually approach modern standards in thinking. 
According to the translation of the Washington Post, January 25, 
1987. 
APPENDIX 4 
To His Excellency Ambassador Han Xu* 
Embassy of the People's Republic of China 
2300 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20008 
STATEMENT 
February 20, 1987 
We the undersigned scholars and researchers of Chinese studies in 
American universities are deeply concerned by the punitive measures 
adopted against some of China's leading intellectuals in the sciences, 
the social sciences and humanities. We believe they are patriotic intel-
lectuals of integrity and international standing who are dedicated to 
the national task of reform and modernization. As American scholars 
of China we are extremely concerned that the severe criticism against 
them will adversely affect China's intellectual vitality. Not only will it 
jeopardize the expression of views and opinions but it may dampen 
scholarly exchange between China and the outside world. Ultimately, 
it may even undermine China's efforts toward modernization. We are 
also concerned on humanitarian grounds about the personal safety and 
wellbeing of the people involved with whom we have had a variety of 
fruitful contacts in recent years. 
This statement is signed by the following scholars whose institutional 
affiliations are mentioned only for purposes of identification and 
should not be construed as expressing the views of the institutions. 
Complete list of Names as of February 20, 1987 (by alphabetical order: 
original signatures on file) (148 signers from 40 institutions) 
* Reprinted with permission from co-organizers of the appeal, Professor Leo Ou-fan 
Lee of the University of Chicago and Professor Merle Goldman of Boston University. 
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APPENDIX 5 
160 U.S. SCHOLARS IN APPEAL TO CHINA* 
Letter to Envoy Asks Beijing to End Punitive Measures 
Against Intellectuals 
By Fox Butterfield 
The New York Times, February 24, 1987, p. A7. 
BOSTON, Feb. 23- In an unusual move, a group of 160 senior 
American scholars have appealed to the Chinese Government to stop 
its crackdown on liberal intellectuals. 
The scholars, in a letter sent today to the Chinese Ambassador in 
Washington, Han Xu, said they were "deeply concerned by the puni-
tive measures adopted against some of China's leading intellectuals in 
the sciences, social sciences and humanities." 
The authors of the letter, experts on China from 40 American 
colleges and universities, said they feared the campaign "will adversely 
effect China's intellectual vitality" and might ultimately "undermine 
China's effort toward modernization." 
The letter marks the first time American scholars have spoken 
out as a group about domestic politics in China. By contrast with 
American experts on the Soviet Union, who have often been critical of 
Moscow for human-rights abuses, China specialists have remained si-
lent and sought to maintain good relations with Beijing. 
'We Tried to Be Neutral' 
"In the past we tried to be neutral, objective scholars not passing 
judgment, even during the Cultural Revolution," said Merle 
Goldman, a professor of Chinese history at Boston Univ~rsity who 
was one of the two organizers of the petition. 
"But that was like the Holocaust," she said. "We can't remain 
silent again." In the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to roughly 1976, 
millions of Chinese, especially writers, artists and scholars, were at-
tacked, beaten, shipped off to exile in the countryside or killed. 
Mrs. Goldman said the signers of the letter might risk angering 
the Chinese government and lose their chance to do research in China, 
* Copyright © 1986/1987 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by 
permission. 
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a highly coveted privilege after years in which China was closed to the 
outside world. 
Among the prominent American scholars signing the letter was 
John K. Fairbank, professor emeritus of history at Harvard Univer-
sity, who is widely regarded as the father of modern Chinese studies in 
the United States. Others included Frederic Wakeman, professor of 
history at the University of California at Berkeley; Lucian Pye, profes-
sor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
and Wm. Theodore DeBary, professor of East Asian civilization at 
Columbia University. 
The letter was also signed by Chinese-American scholars, includ-
ing Tu Wei-ming, a professor of history at Harvard; Victor Nee, a 
sociologist at Cornell University, and Leo Lee, a professor of Chinese 
language and East Asian civilization at the University of Chicago. 
Professor Lee was the other organizer of the petition. 
In a separate effort, 21 China specialists at the University of 
Michigan, which was one of the largest China studies centers in the 
country, signed a statement that was read in Congressional testimony 
earlier this month expressing "concern" about the campaign in China. 
Another open letter to Mr. Deng, expressing shock at "the severe 
criticism and punishment" of intellectuals, has been signed by mostly 
ethnic Chinese authors and scholars in the United States and Hong 
Kong, including Chen Ruoxi, who is perhaps the most important Chi-
nese writer outside China. 
The statement from Michigan, read by Kenneth Lieberthal, a 
professor of political science, said events since the ouster in January of 
Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, were 
"sadly reminiscent" of the beginning of the anti-rightist campaign of 
1957 and the Cultural Revolution in 1966. 
Mr. Lieberthal testified before the House Foreign Affairs Sub-
committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 
In a telephone interview, Mr. Lieberthal said, "People here felt it 
was not productive for American scholars to write directly to China 
telling them what policies to have." 
But at the same time, he said, the scholars at Michigan, who have 
been heavily involved in intellectual exchanges with China, felt "it was 
not too early to voice our anxieties." 
Opinions Vary on Crackdown 
Among those who signed the Michigan statement was Michel 
Oksenberg, a professor of political science who was the China special-
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ist on the National Security Council under President Carter and 
helped work out the normalization of relations between Washington 
and Beijing in 1978. 

APPENDIX 6 
CHINESE STUDENTS RESPOND* 
The Wall Street Journal, Friday, January 23, 1987 
[The following letter has been signed by 1,000 Chinese citizens who 
are studying in the U.S. More than 480 have allowed their names to 
be published in the U.S. Chinese-language press; the rest have re-
quested anonymity. A copy of the document has been delivered to the 
Chinese government.] 
We, the Chinese studying abroad (including government-spon-
sored and self-supporting students) are extremely concerned about the 
recent changse of the political situation in China. We fail to under-
stand why, after the calming down of the student demonstrations, the 
Party Central Committee took a series of severe measures to remove 
Hu Yaobang, the Party's secretary general, from his post and to adopt 
penalizing decisions against intellectuals such as Fang Lizhi, Liu 
Binyan, and Wang Ruowang. All these sudden changes cannot but 
cause our deep anxiety. 
1. Hu Yaobang has made remarkable contributions in many ar-
eas since the downfall of the Gang of Four. He has supported the 
movement to liberalize people's ideas and thinking, helped redress the 
falsely and unjustly convicted cases left over during the past 30 years, 
played an important role in initiating the economic and political re-
forms, and contributed remarkably to the creation of the relaxed at-
mosphere in the fields of culture and ideology. We are shocked and 
deeply upset by his departure, which will greatly harm people's confi-
dence in reforms and the four modernizations. 
2. The punishment and criticism of Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and 
Wang Ruowang gives people, both at home and abroad, an impression 
that the historic tragedy is repeated in which intellectuals are attacked 
and liberal ideas are suppressed. It will destroy the confidence of the 
people, injure the reputation of the party and government in the minds 
of the pepole and interrupt the stability and consistency of China's 
policies. It will seriously tarnish the image of China in the world. In 
sum, it is neither conducive to unity and stability nor to the building of 
the system of democracy and the rule of law, even less so to the devel-
* Reprinted by permission of the organizer of the appeal. 
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opment of international economic cooperation and to the cause of the 
unification of China. 
3. We see once again in the Party's newspaper the old practice 
of criticizing people in an unreasonable manner by quoting people's 
opinions and views out of context. We feel the "ultra-leftist" practice 
of labeling people arbitrarily and finding faults with others has 
redominated the areas of communication, culture and ideology. We 
are deeply concerned about the prospect of the economic and political 
reforms of China. 
We fear the recurrence of the political situation of the Cultural 
Revolution in which ruthless struggle and merciless criticism were 
rampant. The recent development is diametrically opposed to the ba-
sic principles adopted by the Third Plenary of the Eleventh Party Con-
gress and seriously violates the spirit of the constitutional rights such 
as the freedom of speech. If this continues, the economic and political 
reforms of China will be ruined. 
On the nation's rise and fall, everyone shoulders a responsibility. 
We sincerely hope that the party and the government will persist in 
reforms, oppose retrogression, preserve the principle of the rule of law 
and avoid punishing people for voicing their opinions. A deep sense of 
mission for the future of our motherland has prompted us to write this 
letter to openly express our views to the party's Central Committee 
and State Council. 
APPENDIX 7 
OPEN APPEAL TO CHINESE LEADERS* 
(Signed by 36 leading Chinese-American scholars and writers. Eng-
lish translation based on Chinese text published in Chung Pao (Centre 
Daily News), Feb. 3, 1987, p. 2; The Nineties, March, 1987, p. 96.) 
We the undersigned scholars and writers of Chinese descent liv-
ing abroad, are very concerned about the situation and devlopments 
on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. We have all been to the Chinese 
mainland. We have witnessed progress made by the Chinese Commu-
nists in economic and political reforms and we understand the inevita-
ble difficulties and hindrances along the path of reform. We have 
endeavored, and will continue to endeavor, to promote exchanges be-
tween China and the outside world, especially between China and the 
United States. 
However, after putting down the student demonstrations with 
reason and forebearance, the Chinese Communist leadership has taken 
severe measures against Liu Binyan and several others. These actions 
cannot but cause a great shock and deep anxiety among us. We have 
had wide contacts with intellectuals of mainland China, and we are 
deeply impressed with Liu Binyan's social conscience and sense of jus-
tice born of his strong love for his country and nation. We feel that 
the punishment of Liu Binyan and others will have the following seri-
ous consequences: 
1) Dampen many overseas intellectuals' concern for and confi-
dence in mainland China's future. 
2) Damage the enlightened image of Chinese Communists on 
the international scene as a result of economic and political reforms in 
recent years. 
3) Produce a strong negative effect on the future of Hong Kong 
after its return to China in 1997. 
4) The Chinese Communist press has, in a sudden reversal of its 
liberal trends in recent years, once again begun to resort to provoca-
tive, ultra-leftist views reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution years, 
creating a frightening atmosphere for the intellectuals and threatening 
China's "stability and unity." Such an atmosphere can potentially 
provide the leftists at various levels with a pretext to punish the stu-
dents who demonstrated in support of reform on trumped-up charges 
• Reprinted by permission of The Nineties. 
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without the knowledge of the highest authorities, thus replaying the 
tragedy of the suppression of intellectuals. 
We feel compelled to appeal to the Chinese Communist leader-
ship: the punishment of Liu Binyan by the Chinese Communist au-
thorities is harmful to China and unfair to Liu himself. In the eyes of 
the Chinese both at home and abroad, in the international literary cir-
cles, in the academic world as well as in journalism, Liu Binyan has 
become a symbol of China's enlightened policy and the voice for the 
people. We sincerely hope that in the interest of the future of the Chi-
nese nation, the Chinese Communist authorities never do any harm to 
such a patriotic intellectual as Liu Binyan, risking further alienation of 
the people. We recognize that the expulsion of Liu Binyan and others 
from the Chinese Communist Party is an internal decision, a decision 
with which we as outsiders have no desire to interfere. But we do 
hope that the Chinese Communist Party authorities see fit to give Liu 
Binyan and others the opportunity to appeal the decision. We also 
hope that following their expulsion from the Party, they continue to 
enjoy full protection of their constitutionally-guaranteed rights as citi-
zens of the People's Republic of China, such as the rights to personal 
freedom, work, and a decent livelihood. 
APPENDIX 8 
OPEN LEITER TO DENG XIAOPING* 
(Singed by 32 writers and scholars in the United States and Hong 
Kong. English translation based on Chinese text published in Chung 
Pao (Centre Daily News), February 4, 1987, p. 2; The Nineties, March, 
1987, p. 97.) 
Dear Mr. Deng Xiaoping: 
The undersigned writers and scholars are greatly shocked by and 
deeply concerned about the unfolding campaign in China to criticize 
such intellectuals as Liu Binyan, Fang Lizhi and Wang Ruowang. 
In the time-honored intellectual tradition of love for one's nation 
and selfless devotion to the cause of humanity, Liu Binyan and others 
have through their powerful voice on behalf of the people earned wide 
respect and support both at home and abroad. Liu's work in particu-
lar has helped to enhance the hope for social progress in China and 
confidence in the current Chinese reforms in the international 
community. 
The spirit in which Liu Binyan and others spoke out on issues is 
in complete accord with the "Double Hundred" policy reiterated by 
the Chinese Communist leadership and with the fundamental policy of 
"freedom to pursue creative writing" guaranteed at the Fourth Con-
gress of Writers. 
In view of the repeated Chinese Communist assurances to the 
world that "China will never again launch political campaigns," the 
recent "Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization" Campaign has caused deep 
concern in the intellectual circles around the world. 
Based on our sympathy for fellow intellectuals, we strongly urge 
the Chinese Communist leadership to clearly guarantee Liu Binyan 
and others their fundamental human rights, personal freedoms and all 
the rights of a citizen under the law, particularly their right to write, 
to publish, to lecture outside the country, and to defend themselves 
before any forum. 
The present political backslide of the Chinese Communists can-
not but result in a loss of confidence of the people. We hope the Chi-
nese Communist leadership will carefully weigh its action against its 
responsibility to history and to the Chinese nation. We ask it to con-
duct a self-scrutiny by heeding well-meaning advice, to immediately 
* Reprinted by permission of The Nineties. 
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abandon the practice of scapegoating the intellectuals in political 
struggles, and to continue the policy of opening and reform. 
We look forward to your positive reply to our letter. 
APPENDIX 9 
CHINA EXPELS TIMES REPORTER FOR ENTERING 
RESTRICfED AREA* 
The New York Times, July 23, 1986, pp. Al, A3. 
The Peking bureau chief of The New York Times was expelled 
from China yesterday after being detained for nearly six days on suspi-
cion of espionage. 
The correspondent, John F. Burns, was placed aboard a plane of 
the Chinese state airline and flown to Hong Kong. 
The official New China News Agency said he had been ousted 
from the country for "activities incompatible with his status as a jour-
nalist." It said he had been involved in "deliberately breaking into 
Chinese areas closed to aliens, thereby violating the law governing 
aliens' entry into and exit from the People's Republic of China." 
In a statement issued in New York, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, pub-
lisher of The Times, said, "We are grateful for the prompt resolution 
of the problem facing John Burns, though we regret his expulsion 
from China after so many years of distinguished reporting for The 
New York Times." 
Accused of 'Act of Spying' 
The Chinese authorities told A.M. Rosenthal, executive editor of 
The Times, that they considered Mr. Burns guilty of an "act of spying 
and intelligence gathering which will not be tolerated by any sovereign 
state." 
Mr. Rosenthal, who arrived in Peking on Saturday with the news-
paper's foreign editor, Warren Hoge, said of Mr. Burns: "I believe in 
his innocence of any espionage and intelligence gathering." 
The Times editors were told by the Chinese authorities yesterday 
that Mr. Burns and an American traveling companion had broken into 
"a military restricted zone of our country" and had taken "numerous 
photographs of classified objects." 
Mr. Burns's wife, Jane Scott-Long, and their two children, Jamie, 
5, and Emily, 2, were allowed to remain behind in Peking to complete 
the family's preparations to leave China. 
* Copyright © 1986/1987 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by 
permission. 
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Mr. Burns said the trip out of which the charges grew had been 
"a legitimate journalistic venture." 
"This is not the kind of thing spies do," he told reporters after his 
arrival in Hong Kong. "I'm not a spy. I'm a journalist. If I had been 
a spy, I certainly would not have chosen to do anything as clumsy as 
this way to go about gathering information." 
Until yesterday, Mr. Burns, who spent most of his incarceration 
incommunicado in a small cell, had not been accused of any offense. 
On Monday he was allowed to see his family, British and American 
Embassy officials and his editors. 
Mr. Rosenthal voiced regret over Mr. Burns's expulsion, adding, 
"We'll soon be asking the Foreign Ministry to accredit another New 
York Times correspondent to China." He said he had been assured by 
the authorities that the newspaper would be allowed to replace Mr. 
Burns. 
The case against Mr. Burns arose from a motorcycle tour of cen-
tral China that began hite last month. He was accompanied by Ed-
ward McNally, a lawyer on leave from the United States Justice 
Department to teach constitutional law at Peking University, and 
Zhang Daxing, who had recently returned to China after studying in 
the United States. 
During their trip, the three were stopped by the police near the 
border of Shaanxi and Sichuan provinces and told they were in a re-
stricted area. They were held for two days but were allowed to return 
to Peking after writing long "self-criticisms." 
Mr. Burns, who said he had thought the matter had been re-
solved, was taken into custody for a second time on Thursday at the 
Peking airport as he and his family prepared to leave China on vaca-
tion. He was questioned at the airport for 15 hours, his home was 
searched and he was taken to a detention center early Friday morning. 
Film from the trip was confiscated and Chinese officials told the 
Times editors yesterday that the materials would not be returned. 
Mr. McNally had left China to attend to business in Hong Kong 
before Mr. Burns was detained. Mr. Zhang was reported to have been 
questioned for a day and ordered to write a second self-criticism. His 
whereabouts were not known. 
Mr. Burns, who is 41 years old, was born in Britain and travels on 
a British passport. He became The Times's Peking bureau chief in 
1984. He reported from China for The Globe and Mail of Toronto 
from 1971 to 1975, when he joined The Times. He has also served as 
The Times's bureau chief in Johannesburg and Moscow. 
REFORM IN REVERSE 
TEXT OF CHINA'S STATEMENT 
The New York Times, July 24, 1986, p. A3. 
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Following is the text of a Chinese statement on the case of John F. 
Burns, the Peking bureau chief of The New York Times, who was ex-
pelled yesterday. The statement was read in Peking by Xu Hui, an offi-
cial of the State Security Bureau, to A.M Rosenthal, executive editor of 
The Times, and Warren Hoge, the newspapers foreign editor. 
The Burns-McNally case is a grave one. They disregarded the 
laws of China, deliberately violating the law governing aliens entering 
into and exiting from the People's Republic of China. They broke into 
a military restricted zone of our country and took numerous photo-
graphs of classified objects. 
Such demeanor obviously constitutes an act of spying and intelli-
gence gathering which will not be tolerated by any sovereign state and 
needless to say is also a regrettable incident. 
We attach great importance to friendly relations between China 
and the United States and are loath to see such a relationship 
impaired. 
Since the beginning of the Burns and McNally case, while up-
holding the sovereignty of the law of China, we have acted with the 
utmost restraint and have sought earnestly to deal with the matter 
satisfactorily within the limits permitted by law and restricted to the 
least possible publicity. 
It is out of such considerations that we did not investigate and 
affix criminal responsibility of the two persons through judicial proce-
dures, which we could have done according to the nature of their 
offense. 
Thus the penalization has been greatly mitigated. We hope this is 
taken notice of by the U.S. side. 
We have made a decision to expel Burns from the territory of the 
People's Republic of China today. 
We will only release a brief news item, without making public the 
details of the case. 
We will adhere to this attitude unless we are faced with a difficult 
situation, in which case we will have to act against our will. 
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